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The House Un-American Activities Committee, popularly known as the HUAC, 
conducted two investigations of the movie industry, in 1947 and again in 1951-1952.  
The goal was to determine the extent of communist infiltration in Hollywood and 
whether communist propaganda had made it into American movies.  The spotlight 
that the HUAC shone on Tinsel Town led to the blacklisting of approximately 300 
Hollywood professionals.  This, along with the HUAC’s insistence that witnesses 
testifying under oath identify others that they knew to be communists, contributed to 
the Committee’s notoriety.  Until now, historians have concentrated on offering 
accounts of the HUAC’s practice of naming names, its scrutiny of movies for 
propaganda, and its intervention in Hollywood union disputes.  
 The HUAC’s sealed files were first opened to scholars in 2001.  This study is 
the first to draw extensively on these newly available documents in an effort to 
reevaluate the HUAC’s Hollywood probes.  This study assesses four areas in which 
the new evidence indicates significant, fresh findings.  First, a detailed analysis of the 
  
Committee’s investigatory methods reveals that most of the HUAC’s information 
came from a careful, on-going analysis of the communist press, rather than tec niques 
such as surveillance, wiretaps and other cloak and dagger activities.  Second, the 
evidence shows the crucial role played by two brothers, both German communists 
living as refugees in America during World War II, in motivating the Committee to 
launch its first Hollywood probe.  Third, an examination of the HUAC’s practice of 
requiring witnesses to name names shows this to be an on-going exercise of data 
triangulation.  Finally, the documents in the HUAC archives reveal an overriding 
concern with exposing the activities and practices of communist front organizatio s, 
which the Committee viewed as powerfully effective venues for communist 
propaganda.  In summary, the newly available archival evidence, upon which this 
dissertation uniquely draws, indicates the HUAC operated in a less sinister manner 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Question 
It is fascinating and ironic that there is a link between the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 and the necessity for a major reappraisal of a significant aspect 
of American media history.  The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the 
USSR were boons for historians.  The failed August 1991 coup against Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev led Russian President Boris Yeltsin to dissolve the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and take control of its assets, including 
its historical archives.  By the end of December of that year, the Soviet Union was o 
more and the Russian Federation, the largest of the constituent republics of the former 
Soviet Union, permanently inherited most of the assets of both the former Soviet 
government and the organization that dominated it for its entire history, the CPSU.   
For several years thereafter, the dissolution of the USSR was a notion 
contested by many former hard-line communists who aspired to restore the Soviet 
Union in some form.  Thus, in an effort to discredit his communist predecessors, 
Yeltsin in the mid-1990s opened the archives of the CPSU.  They included the 
historical records of the Comintern, the international organization headquartered in 
Moscow through which the Soviet government exercised control of various national 
communist parties around the world.1  Yeltsin’s idea was that a democratic society 
                                                
1 The Comintern is a shortened form of the Communist International, also 
known as the Third International.  Too much has been written debating whether the 
member parties of the Comintern were under the control of the USSR to recount here.  
Suffice it to say that I side with the historians who fall into the anticommunist 
tradition and Post-revisionists, who affirm that member parties were under the 
effective control of the USSR and CPSU.  The revisionist historians stand in 
opposition to this thesis.  I will briefly discuss these three groups later in Chapter Two 




should be open and transparent, while at the same time historians could document just 
how bad the deposed Bolsheviks really were.  
The Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) was a loyal member of 
the Comintern until its dissolution during World War II.2  After the war, the 
American communists continued to take guidance more directly from the Central 
Committee of the CPSU.  Before and during the Cold War, the fear of intrusive 
investigations by the American government led the CPUSA to secretly ship its 
records – sometimes on microfilm, sometimes as regular hard copy documents – to 
the Soviet Union for safe keeping.  Until the sudden fall of the Soviet Union, which 
allowed President Yeltsin to open those archives, most Western historians believed 
these records to be permanently out of reach.   
From the early 1930s to the early-1950s, American media in general and the 
motion picture industry in particular were an important locus of activity for the 
CPUSA.  When investigations by a congressional committee of the United States
House of Representatives called the Committee on Un-American Activities 
(popularly known as the HUAC) brought Hollywood under its scrutiny, the pressure 
of public opinion led the major studios to fire known communists and deny 
employment to those who refused to cooperate with the HUAC.  Some of the 
blacklisted writers then moved to New York to work under pseudonyms in the new 
                                                
2 The dissolution of the Comintern was actually a political act in name only.  
According to Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Kyrill M. Anderson in The Soviet 
World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) 12, Stalin 
simply transferred the functions and duties of this organization to a unit of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU called the International Department, which continued 
uninterrupted operation until the dissolution of the CPSU.  See Carr, E. H. Twilight of 
the Comintern, 1930-1935 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) for what is probably 




television industry, whilst others migrated to Mexico or Europe.  For a decade or so, 
these Americans, mostly writers, were unable to work under their own names.  On 
this historians agree.  
What is in dispute is the proper characterization of the conduct of the HUAC 
investigations and the extent to which that communist activity warranted them.  So e 
consider it a dark era for American democracy when the establishment repress d 
radical ideas and reactionaries bent on rolling back the New Deal violated the civil 
rights of those on the progressive cutting edge.3  Others saw the blacklisted writers as 
victims of their own insistence on shrouding their activities in secrecy, which led to 
suspicions that members of the CPUSA, thought to be under the control of a foreign 
power, engaged in subversive activities.4  Under this view, one could argue that the 
actions of the HUAC investigators were not only proper but even prudent to bring 
scrutiny upon the CPUSA.   
One reason for the dispute as to the proper interpretation of this aspect of 
history was that, with the exception of transcripts of public testimony offered in open 
sessions, most of the rest of the HUAC records were sealed.  This included all the 
transcripts of its executive sessions, during which the Committee heard a great deal of 
testimony.  As I will discuss further at length below, this circumstance changed 
relatively recently.  However, one fundamental reason for the unsealing of the HUAC
                                                
3 For example, see Larry Ceplair and Steven Englund, The Inquisition in 
Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community 1930-1960 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983) 216.   
4 For an extended discussion of this, see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, 
Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1999) 9-22 and Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The 





files was the fact that, because of Yeltsin’s action described above, in the mid-1990s 
historians had greater access to documents dealing with the CPUSA in the Moscow 
than in Washington.  This led to new efforts by historians to petition Congress for 
access to the HUAC archives and in 2001 Congress relented.  A very large trove of 
archival documents is now newly available to researchers.  Hence the irony: the 
collapse of the Soviet Union has predicated a need for a re-evaluation of the history 
of Congressional investigation into communist activity in the American media, 
specifically the motion picture industry.  
The Cold War deeply affected all of American society, particularly in its early 
years.  Individuals and organizations had to come to terms with the idea that the 
United States was now one of only two superpowers and the only nation capable of 
defending the free world from communist aggression.  The advent of nuclear warfare 
meant a radical change in the sense of personal security for the average American.  
No longer was the possibility of massive civilian casualties a threat only to citizens of 
far away countries.  With the exception of Pearl Harbor, not since the War of 1812 
was there a seriously substantial threat of destruction on American soil by a foreign 
power.  The idea that a foreign power could strike against the United States with such 
immediate and devastating force was a new and terrifying reality.   
Furthermore, the Cold War era witnessed the maturation of an allegation of a 
unique security threat that had originated shortly after World War I, i.e. the possible 
existence of a “Fifth Column” – a well-organized group with strong organizational 
ties and loyalties to a hostile foreign power.  The CPUSA had financial and media




numbers.  For years, there had been indirect evidence and abundant testimony from 
ex-communists that the CPUSA was in fact subordinate to the Soviet communist 
party.  With each change in the political line from Moscow came an immediate and 
seeming automatic change in line by the CPUSA.  There were persistent stories of 
communist spies finding employment in key government and military positions.  
Moreover, with the exception of the years of the Popular Front (1936-39) and the war 
years after the German invasion of the Soviet Union (1941-45), the CPUSA had 
consistently and publicly advocated the overthrow of both the American political and 
economic system.  Yet, despite sporadic persecution in the late 1910s and early 
1920s, American society largely tolerated its domestic communists as a fringe of 
misguided, ineffective, marginal and, therefore, non-dangerous radicals.   
The onset of the Cold War changed this.  Now these radicals were closely 
associated with the principal enemy of the United States.  The U.S. House of 
Representatives created what became the HUAC in 1938 as a special committee 
under the chairmanship of Rep. Martin Dies, a Democrat from Texas, to investigat  
“alien” ideologies such as fascism and communism.  In 1945, it became a standing 
committee of the House as the result of a brilliant parliamentary maneuver by John 
Rankin of Mississippi, well known as a racist and anti-Semite.  During the early y rs 
of the Cold War, the Committee focused the majority of its attention on the perceived 
communist threat and links between the CPUSA and Moscow.  It launched 
investigations into possible communist infiltration into government, the atomic 




Later in the early to mid 1950s, several Senate committees launched 
investigations of their own.  For example, Nevada Democrat Patrick McCarran 
chaired the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, which investigated Owen 
Lattimore, and authored the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950.5  One 
committee chairman, Republican Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, became notorious 
for his unscrupulous investigatory practices and unsubstantiated, reckless allegations.  
At different times, opponents castigated various committee members of both parties
and in both houses of Congress as demagogues, witch-hunters, and red-baiters.  In 
fact McCarthy’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in the Senate was often 
confused with the HUAC.  As Senator McCarthy fell in the public’s esteem, it 
became a common tactic to characterize all anticommunists as McCarthyists.   
The Truman Administration adopted a measured response, which Attorney 
General Tom C. Clark crafted and implemented.  Truman and Clark were generally 
dubious of the threat of domestic communism and fearful that a widespread 
anticommunist backlash would needlessly harm innocent citizens.  However, intense 
popular pressure, partly due to the fall of China to Mao’s communists, dictated they 
had to do something to assure the public that a fifth column had not infiltrated the 
American government.  Thus, the result was the institution of loyalty oaths for 
government employees and members of the armed forces.  Congress enacted 
legislation requiring organizations working on behalf of foreign powers to register 
                                                
5The Internal Security Subcommittee was a subcommittee of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee of which McCarran served as chairman from the Seventy-eigh h 
through the Eighty-second Congresses.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court later found 
portions of the McCarran Internal Security Act unconstitutional, some portions are 




with the government, disclosing the nature of that relationship, its leadership and 
financial details.  The Justice Department prosecuted most of the senior leadership of 
the CPUSA under the Smith Act of 1940 for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of 
the government of the United States.  In June of 1951, the Supreme Court upheld 
those convictions as well as the constitutionality of the Smith Act in its decision in 
Dennis vs. the United States. 
The years 1947 and 1952 saw major congressional investigations of 
communist subversion into motion picture industry by the HUAC.  Later, these 
investigations expanded into the other mass media of radio and television.  In 1947 a 
number of Hollywood luminaries, who were willing to cooperate with the HUAC, 
gave testimony to communist activity in the movie business.  Shortly thereafter, the 
HUAC subpoenaed nineteen industry professionals, who currently or recently were in 
fact members of the CPUSA.  The Committee actually called ten of them to testify in 
the presence of a bevy of reporters and newsreel cameras.  Rather than plead the Fifth 
Amendment, they all refused to answer the questions about their membership in the 
CPUSA based on a unique First Amendment defense.6  They also tried to read into 
the record various statements, including an indictment of the investigation itself.  
Congress voted contempt citations against the “Hollywood Ten” or the “Unfriendly 
                                                
6 This defense consisted of arguing that the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech implied a right not to speak, especially in matters of politics and conscience.  
On December 5, 1947, a grand jury indicted the Ten on contempt of Congress 
charges.  They were all found guilty the follow year.  In 1949, the Court of Appeals 
of the District of Columbia unanimously sustained their conviction and held “that 
compelled questions into political affiliation did not violate the First Amendment.”  
The Supreme Court denied their appeal certiorari in 1950.  Carl Beck, Contempt of 
Congress: A Study of the Prosecutions Initiated by the Committee on Un-American 




Ten” and after a protracted appeals process, they were all sentenced to prison time for 
refusing to testify.   
Originally, the management of most of the studios for whom the Hollywood 
Ten7 worked pledged to stand behind them, deeming their personal politics as 
irrelevant to their artistic contributions to the motion picture industry.  Shortly after 
their disastrous appearance before the HUAC and before their contempt appeals could 
wind their way through the courts, the studios for which they worked fired the 
Hollywood Ten.  Moreover, the major studios issued a declaration known as the 
Waldorf Statement, in which they vowed not to employ anyone who did not 
cooperate with the government in its investigation of communism.  Thus, began the 
Blacklist era in the motion picture, radio and television industries, during which an 
estimated three hundred industry professionals lost their jobs.  It was a decade when 
the demands of media economics clashed with individual artistic careers as well
personal and political loyalties.  These issues resonate today with relevance to post-
September 11th America, i.e. when concerns for national security collide with civil 
rights.  The result then was amongst other things shattered friendships, destroye 
careers, and the on-going dialectic of recrimination.   
It has now been more than a generation since the initiation of HUAC’s 
investigations of Hollywood.  However, the reverberation of these events still haunts 
the entertainment industry.  Although most of the participants have long since passed 
away, the children of those blacklisted as a result of the investigations, many of 
                                                
7 The Hollywood Ten were Adrian Scott, a producer; Edward Dmytryk, a 
director; Herbert Biberman, Lester Cole, Dalton Trumbo, Ring Lardner, Jr., Albert 




whom also work in the media or its unions and guilds, still feel the pain of the trauma 
that the blacklist inflicted on their youth.8  
The year 1997 was the fiftieth anniversary of the first significant foray by the 
HUAC into Hollywood and the resulting blacklist.  It saw a number of articles in the 
news media and the trade press discussing the “travesty” of blacklisting and the 
suppression of political rights.  Since then there has appeared a revisiting and 
reappraisal of those events.  The Writers Guild of America has worked steadily o 
restore the credits of blacklisted screenwriters, which totaled eighty-two separate 
screen credits as of March 1999.9  As well, the Directors Guild of America led efforts 
to restore screen credits to those who worked on the black market for so many years 
and had recognition for their artistic achievements denied.  This fueled even more 
commentary in the trade press.  In 1998 the Writers Guild of America West, which 
had in the 1950s cooperated with the effort to drive communists out of the motion 
picture business, gave the Robert Meltzer Award posthumously to Paul Jarrico, 
former communist and blacklistee.  This honor is given to recipients “in recognition 
of a singular act of courage in the defense of freedom of expression and the rights of 
writers.”10   
                                                
8 I experienced this personally when approached by the daughter of a 
blacklistee after delivering a paper on this issue at an academic conference.  The 
paper was “Edward Dmytryk and the Hollywood Ten: A Revisionist Approach,” 
delivered at the 50th Annual Conference of the University Film and Video 
Association.   
9 David Robb and Dana Harris, “WGAW white-out clears 7 more from 
blacklist,” Hollywood Reporter, March 11, 1999, 1 & 56. 
10 David Robb, “Late blacklisted writer gets a credit for courage,” Hollywood 





Sheila Kuehl, chair of the California Assembly’s Judiciary Committee, 
presented to the surviving sons of the late Ben Margolis, one of the lawyers for the 
Hollywood Ten, a resolution passed by the Assembly honoring their father.  Kuehl 
“praised Margolis for having inspired several generations of civil rights attorneys.”11  
This same person, lauded in 1999, was roundly criticized in the 1950s for refusing to 
cooperate with the HUAC and attempting to disrupt the proceedings of the Californi  
Senate Committee on Un-American Activities.  Interestingly enough, his Hollywood 
Reporter obituary and the California Assembly resolution omit the fact that he was in 
fact a longtime member of the CPUSA and subject to party discipline.   
The 1999 Academy Awards reflected the continuing bitterness generated by 
events occurring some fifty years before.  The animosity for many had not subsided.  
The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences decided to give film and stage 
director Elia Kazan its lifetime achievement award.  A group calling itself the 
“Committee Against Silence” organized a protest of the event, because, they asserted, 
that it was wrong to honor a man who named names before the HUAC.12  They urged 
audience members to refrain from applauding when Kazan received the Oscar and 
accused the Academy of an “insensitive and unconscionable act.”13   
                                                
11 David Robb, “Lawyer Margolis saluted as a ‘legend of our times,’” 
Hollywood Reporter, March 9-15, 1999, 65. 
12 David Robb, “Oscars protest targets Kazan’s role in blacklist,” Hollywood 
Reporter, February 11, 1999, 8 & 32. 
13 David Robb, “Kazan protesters urging silent treatment at Oscars,” 




Blacklisted director Jules Dassin took out a full-page ad in the Hollywood 
Reporter, branding Kazan “a traitor” who had shamed his country.14  The co-chair of 
this protest group, blacklisted screenwriter Bernard Gordon, asserted: 
The bad old days of the HUAC and McCarthyism … were the 
time when fear ruled the land – fear of dissent.  Without dissent, 
without the freedom to express unpopular ideas or to make 
unpopular associations, there is no democracy and no chance to 
move government to the popular will.  Elia Kazan cooperated 
with the HUAC, validating their reign of terror, blacklisting 
thousands of men and women, not just in Hollywood, but 
throughout the country, destroying all progressive organizations 
and crippling the trade union movement.  As a result, our 
country has suffered a fearful regression.  Internally, we have 
become a nation ridden with crime, poverty and homelessness 
and an atrocious increasing gap between wealth and poverty; 
externally, we have moved from ‘The Land of the Free’ to 
become an international bully, envied perhaps, but feared and 
hated.  Let’s not reward HUAC, McCarthy and Elia Kazan for 
helping to bring about this dreadful transformation.15 
 
An assumption underlying this rhetorical protest implies the validity of one side of 
the historical dispute mentioned above: namely communists in the media were merely 
innocent dissenters who were mercilessly hounded from their jobs and persecuted 
merely for holding unpopular beliefs and making unpopular associations.   
 In answer to the above, an organization called “The Ad Hoc Committee for 
Naming Facts,” affiliated with the Ayn Rand Institute, also took a full-page ad in the 
Hollywood Reporter, entitled “In Praise of Elia Kazan.”  The ad listed what it called 
“Three Big Lies” about the blacklist era.  It asserted first that the Hollyw od 
communists by being Party members were de facto supporters of and apologists for 
Stalin and, therefore, bore partial responsibility for his reign of terror.  Second, the 
                                                
14 Hollywood Reporter, March 15, 1999, 11. 
15 David Robb, “Oscars Protest Targets Kazan’s Role in Blacklist,” 




HUAC was justified in investigating whether an individual was a member of the 
CPUSA, because the latter was a subversive organization directed and financed by a 
hostile foreign power, both of which were dedicated to the violent overthrow of the 
American government.  Third, there was nothing wrong with the blacklist, because 
studios had the right to deny employment to individuals who refused to acknowledge 
membership in such a subversive organization, the goals and ideology of which those 
studios found abhorrent.16  Thus, more than fifty years after the Hollywood Ten first 
sat before the HUAC, the rancorous debate is as intense as ever.   
 Since it is indisputable that there were in fact active communists working in 
the Hollywood establishment, these two ideologically grounded perspectives define 
the continuing debate.  The radical Left and increasingly the modern Hollywood 
establishment aver the Hollywood communists were benign radicals bent on positive, 
constructive social change.  They were the victims of a political pogrom led by the
HUAC and the other forces of American reaction, which damaged the fabric of 
American democracy.  The contrary conservative view: Hollywood communists were 
political subversives employed in a key media industry, which had a powerful effect 
on the shaping of public opinion.  They were, either wittingly or not, under the 
control of a foreign enemy bent on the destruction of the United States.  The 
Hollywood communists, therefore, represented a clear national security threat that the 
government could not ignore.  Thus, the HUAC investigations were justified.   
On the one hand, the revisionist perspective embraced by the Hollywood 
establishment with its recent rehabilitations and the awarding of honors ironically 
                                                




ignored or summarily dismissed the recent scholarship on the American communist 
movement that has produced a strongly negative picture of the CPUSA as a whole.  
This scholarship showed the American party deeply involved in espionage for the 
Soviet Union.17  On the other hand, advocates of the anticommunist perspective have 
not produced any solid documentary evidence firmly linking Hollywood communists 
to the treasonous misdeeds of their colleagues, i.e. national CPUSA officials and 
communists working in other sectors of American society.  Thus, in both the popular 
and scholarly press, the debate over moral, legal and political appropriateness of the 
blacklisting of media professionals during the 1940s and 1950s is deadlocked.  
Given recent scholarship on the activities of the CPUSA, as well as the new 
availability of previously sealed HUAC archival materials, there is a compelling case 
for the necessity of a reappraisal of the HUAC’s conduct of its Hollywood 
investigations.  Thus, this dissertation will seek to answer the following central 
research question:  In light of more complete archival information, how should we 
reinterpret the conduct of the investigations in the 1940s and 1950s by the HUAC into 
the communist infiltration of the motion picture industry?  This dissertation will seek 
to dispassionately answer this question in an ideologically neutral manner, 
interpreting the evidence in the context of the national security situation of the era in 
question balanced against the need to tolerate unpopular dissent in a democratic civil 
society.   
 There is a strong argument for the significance of the central question of his
dissertation.  The debate around the history of the HUAC investigations of the media 
                                                
17 See Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret World;  Klehr, Haynes, and 




lies at the intersection of difficult issues of civil rights, including the fre dom of 
speech and free political association, and national security.  Restriction on media 
independence in times of perceived grave national security crisis is an issue that did 
not originate nor die with the Cold War.  More specifically, the events in question, if 
understood factually, may provide us with lessons in these areas, especially in the 
post-9/11 era in which these issues are particularly germane.   Finally, the dilemma of 
the limits of congressional investigatory power versus constitutional protections for 
witnesses remains unresolved some sixty years later.    
Much strident debate has transpired about the history of the HUAC’s 
investigations of communists in Hollywood, the fate of the Hollywood Ten, and the 
resulting Blacklist.  It is routine to describe HUAC activities as just ano her sad 
aspect of the McCarthy era.  Importantly, as indicated above, this dispute has been 
inconclusive.  Furthermore, it appears to be on the increase both in terms of intensity 
and acrimony.  Judging from the war of words over Elia Kazan’s honorary Oscar, this 
rancorous public discussion does not appear well informed on the continuing 
scholarship in the field.  Rather it relies on several dated texts, which unfortunately 
many consider seminal and definitive.  Because historians have published a great deal 
of new research on the activities of the CPUSA through the middle 1950’s, the 
perspective offered in that dated historiography is very much in doubt.  With the 
opening of access to previously sealed HUAC archives, the time has come for a 
scholarly reappraisal of the Committee’s aims, conduct and effectiveness in these 




With all the popular and media attention in the film industry to the subject, 
one might conclude that there has also been a similar wave of academic interest, th  
result being that there is little room for original and significant scholarship in this 
area.  However, although there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the 
subject of the activities of the CPUSA as a whole, relatively little recent research 
addresses either communist activity in Hollywood or the resulting HUAC 
investigations.   The review of literature in the next chapter will demonstrate a 
significant gap in the historical record that the current scholarly literature does not 
adequately address.   
Although this dissertation uses the HUAC’s two probes of Hollywood as a 
point of reference for a study of the Committee’s investigatory methods, the research 
findings presented herein are highly relevant to the history of journalism.  A key 
aspect of the HUAC’s mandate was to investigate subversive propaganda and the 
Committee interpreted that to apply to the communist press, as well as a variety of 
publications by communist front organizations.  Thus, as Chapter Five will explore in 
detail, communist newspapers and magazines, such as the Daily Worker and New 
Masses, provided primary sources of information for the HUAC and such 
publications were objects of careful scrutiny for Committee investigators.  Chapter 
Seven will describe how the HUAC discovered that the communist press was often 
less than truthful in reporting the activities of celebrities on behalf of the CPUSA and 
its favored causes.  Finally, this study as a whole addresses the issue of the HUAC’s 






Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Scholars can usefully categorize historical studies on the HUAC, American 
communism and their intersection in Hollywood into four groups according to their 
basic premises and assumptions.  These groups include the anticommunist scholars 
and the civil society historians, both of which produced major studies in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  More recently, the revisionists of the 1970s and on and the post-
revisionists of the 1990s and later have dominated the field.   
The Anticommunists.  Historians writing in this school of thought were 
unsympathetic to both the American communist movement and international 
communism as a whole.  The seminal historians in this tradition include the team of 
Irving Howe and Lewis Coser,18 Theodore Draper,19 E. H. Carr20 and the early works 
of Harvey Klehr.21  These historians wrote primarily about the CPUSA and the 
Comintern; they did not focus on communism in Hollywood.  More importantly to 
                                                
18 See Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party: A 
Critical History, 1919-1957 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).   
19 See Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New York: 
Viking Press, 1957) and Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia: 
The Formative Period (New York: Viking Press, 1963).  Both are meticulously 
researched studies of the Byzantine historical twists and turns of the early y rs of the 
CPUSA as it transformed itself from a splintered movement of non-English speaking 
immigrants to a thoroughly Stalinist organization adhering to the Comintern lin .   
20 See Carr, Twilight of the Comintern for the definitive history of the 
Comintern before the opening of that organization’s archives in Moscow during the 
mid-1990s.   
21 See Harvey Klehr, Communist Cadre: The Social Background of the 
American Communist Party Elite (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978) and 
Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New 
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this study, with the exception of William F. Buckley’s The Committee and Its Critics, 
which is strictly speaking not a work of history but rather an extended investigative 
journalistic treatise, the anticommunists did not pr duce any major studies on the 
operation of the HUAC itself.22   
One might think the anticommunists were all conservatives, but this was not 
so.  In fact, the most significant figure of this tradition, Theodore Draper, was a 
former secret Party member and later an avowed liberal.23  In fact, much of the early 
impetus to the anticommunist movement came from American socialists, who warned 
of the profoundly anti-democratic nature of international communism.  Rather than a 
normative political perspective, Anti-Communism was a shared beliefs about the 
nature of communism that bonded adherents from diverse backgrounds from the 
radical left to the conservative right together.  The basic premise of this trad tion is 
the assertion that by its very nature international communism was a significant 
national security threat to democratic governments around the world.  It emphasized 
the effective control that the Comintern exercised on national communist parties and 
argued that the Third International was essentially a branch of the CPSU.  Thus, a
common and consistent theme of this earlier historiography is the general 
subservience of the CPUSA to the Comintern and in turn to the CPSU.24   
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24 For a broad, well-researched account of the anticommunist movement, see 
Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism 




The typical anticommunist logic was as follows: The communist movement 
based on Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism seeks to destroy democratic and free-market 
societies on ideological grounds.  The Soviet Union is the leading power of the 
communist world.  The CPUSA is under the strict control of the USSR through the 
former’s subservience to the CPSU.  This circumstance makes the CPUSA a nation l 
security threat to the United States.  Ergo, the American government (and by 
implication, the HUAC) is justified in its attempts to unmask and destroy the power 
of the CPUSA.   
The Civil Society Historians.  These scholars emphasized the importance of 
the preservation the civil rights of those espousing unpopular political positions, 
particularly the right of free speech and the right of free association.  Some held the 
communists in contempt for their support of Stalinism, whilst others considered them 
simply misguided radicals.  In either eventuality, these historians argued that the 
HUAC investigations both in method and scope were unwarranted and detrimental to 
American civil society.  Even when acknowledging that some domestic communists 
were involved in espionage, these historians asserted that the incidences typially 
were minor and not indicative of the conduct of the average American communist.  
They argued in essence that the HUAC’s net was too large and indiscriminate, 
leaving no room for distinction between advocacy of radical ideas and associations 
with others of a like mind from lack of patriotism or even treasonous conspiracy.  
Moreover, they asserted that crudely researched and politically motivated 
investigations too easily ruined the lives and careers of individuals who had only a 




solely on political views and associations in which dissent from the status quo 
received the brand of “un-American.”   
Robert K. Carr’s 1952 work entitled The House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, 1945-50 represents another entry in civil society literature on the HUAC.25  
In fact, the book was part of Cornell University’s “Studies in Civil Liberties S ries.”  
Carr, who served as the head of Truman’s Commission on Civil Rights and later 
became president of Oberlin College, was the primary author of the historic report To 
Secure These Rights.  According to Truman’s Attorney General, Tom C. Clark, this 
document was “a blueprint of most everything that’s been done in the area of civil 
rights since that time.”26  Carr advanced the first scholarly argument of note for the 
abolition of the HUAC based on a civil society argument.  He asserted that the 
pernicious conduct of investigations by committee members and the resulting 
negative effects on civil society overshadowed any beneficial effects of exp sing the 
nefarious activities of domestic communists. 
John Cogley, the executive editor of The Commonweal, offered the two-
volume Report on Blacklisting27 as another entry that one can include under the rubric 
of a civil society perspective.  The Fund for the Republic, which had as its mission 
the promoting education in civil rights in the United States, commissioned the report.  
The Fund, which began operation in 1952 with a $15 million grant from the Ford 
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Foundation, has the goal of supporting “the elimination of restrictions on freedom of 
thought, inquiry and expression.”28  Cogley asserted that the design of the text was 
educational, non-partisan and non-judgmental.  Its goal was to allow an educated 
citizenry to pass judgment once it had the pertinent facts.  However, the fact that the 
founding director of the Fund, Robert M. Hutchins was a firm opponent of 
congressional anticommunist investigations in the 1940s and 1950s was indicative of 
the fact that, though the report was fair and non-polemical, it was not neutral in 
perspective.29   
The impact on civil rights by the practice of blacklisting is the central issue 
with which Cogley’s report is concerned.  He covered the issue thoroughly, 
discussing not only those blacklisted for links to communism, but also 
anticommunists who found themselves un- or underemployed before or after the 
HUAC inquiries.  In the case of the former, there was some evidence to suggest that 
during their heyday of influence, communists in Hollywood sought to blackball their 
political nemeses.  Likewise, some anticommunists who testified readily before the 
HUAC found their careers in a tailspin allegedly due to beliefs about their 
“disloyalty” to the movie business by bringing negative scrutiny to bear upon the 
industry. 30  Cogley also cites examples of ex-communists, who testified and named 
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names, also finding themselves “rebuffed” by “liberal Hollywood” and 
underemployed.31 
Report on Blacklisting includes an extensive essay by Harold W. Horowitz, 
who was a law professor at the University of Southern California, on the legalities of 
blacklisting as a practice.  However, Horowitz’s focus is limited to a discussion of the 
legal relations between and rights of employers, employees, and third parties who 
advocate boycotts based on the activities of certain employees in an industry.  He 
does not address the legalities surrounding the HUAC investigations themselves.32   
The sources upon which Cogley drew were the published findings of the 
HUAC, newspaper accounts of events surrounding HUAC hearings and the Blacklist, 
and over five hundred interviews with individuals on all sides of the issue.  
Obviously, what he could not access were the archival records of which this 
dissertation takes advantage.  Thus, although Cogley’s Report on Blacklisting 
represents an important addition to the literature of the civil society perspective, it 
does not answer the central research question posed by this dissertation.   
Walter Goodman’s well received work. The Committee, represents the most 
thorough and comprehensive history of the HUAC to date.33  It also is most likely the 
best known.  Goodman dealt with the precursor committees that evolved into what 
became the HUAC, i.e. the Fish, McCormack-Dickstein and Dies Committees.  He 
then proceeds to offer an account of HUAC investigations and hearings during each 
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congress from the 79th Congress in 1945, when the HUAC became a permanent 
committee of the House, through the 89th Congress that served through January 1967.    
Goodman strived for an evenhanded approach – critiquing the conduct of both 
the HUAC and the “doctrinaire” communists it investigated.  He argued, however, 
that the Committee undermined the legitimate task of investigating the CPUSA by 
efforts to assail the New Deal and probe the affairs of fellow travelers.  “Soon the 
Congressmen were taking logically impermissible shortcuts; it was no longer a man’s 
loyalty to the U.S.S.R. that made him likely subversive, but his adherence to causes 
favored by those who were loyal to the U.S.S.R.”34  The result was that, according to 
Goodman, the HUAC became for the McCarthyists “the engine of their vengeance, 
and for thirty years it has run on flesh and blood.”35  He concludes his civil society 
argument for the abolition of the HUAC by asserting: “Between the Committee and 
the liberal spirit no reconciliation is possible, for the Committee embodies the drive to 
ban, censor, forbid, jail that has cursed the land for two hundred years.”36  
Working long before the House Judiciary Committee opened the HUAC 
archives to researchers, Goodman drew meticulously from congressional public 
reports.  Thus, the author did not have at his disposal the very materials that justify 
the necessity for this dissertation.  The result is that, although Goodman has a chapter 
on the HUAC’s investigations of Hollywood, all the information presented is from 
the then extant public record.   
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Actor Robert Vaughn was not only Napoleon Solo in The Man from 
U.N.C.L.E., but also a doctoral student at the University of Southern California in the 
late 1960’s.  Writing in the civil society tradition, his dissertation, entitled Only 
Victims: A Study of Show Business Blacklisting, s an inquiry into the history and 
effects of blacklisting in the various sectors of the entertainment business.  Later 
published in book form, this was the first scholarly study of the HUAC investigations 
into the media.  Vaughn’s stated goal was to examine the actual, probable and 
possible effects of the HUAC investigations on the American theatre between the 
years 1938-58.37  He, nevertheless, spent a great deal of time looking at the HUAC 
hearings into communist activity in Hollywood and devoted almost half of the book 
to recounting the investigations that impacted the motion picture business.   
  Not only is his research question very different from the one posed in this 
dissertation, but the primary sources from which his research derives are very 
different.  The main primary evidence upon which Vaughn drew in his chapters 
focusing on the HUAC investigations of Hollywood were transcripts of the public 
hearings and published reports by the HUAC, not the executive sessions.  Most of the 
rest of his citations were from secondary sources, some of which he relied on heavily, 
such as Walter Goodman’s The Committee, which was discussed above.  The new 
primary data that Vaughn produced was the result of a survey sent to one hundred key 
show business figures of the Blacklist era.  Moreover, Vaughn solicited that new 
primary data to answer a very different research question.  
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Ted Morgan offered the most recent study in the civil society tradition with a 
study of the politics of anti-communism in the United States from the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 through the end of the McCarthy era.  In Reds: McCarthyism in 
Twentieth-Century America, Morgan argues that the HUAC was one of the platforms 
for “a long line of men who exploited the Communist issue for political advantage, 
recklessly smearing their opponents with false accusations.”38  The book seems 
thematically schizophrenic.  It seeks to indict anticommunist demagogues, such as 
Martin Dies and Joseph McCarthy, yet Morgan cannot help but acknowledge the 
nefarious acts by CPUSA party members: conspiracy, fraud, espionage, and even 
treason.  Ironically, this is reflected in the contrast between its title and subtitle; is it 
about “Reds” or “McCarthyism?”  Ultimately, he is highly critical of the negative 
impact on civil society by those anticommunists who struck blindly at an unseen 
danger the specifics of which they were ignorant.  Morgan asserts that by the time of 
McCarthy, the CPUSA was a spent force and that the Wisconsin senator was beating
a dead horse.  However, the author is surprisingly silent as to what killed the horse.   
Morgan does draw upon the archival records of the HUAC newly available at 
the National Archives, but only insofar as they addressed his research on Martin Dies.  
A careful review of his citations indicates that he did not conduct a systematic review
of the HUAC archives on any other subject.  Furthermore, he only deals with the 
Hollywood investigations of the late 1940s and early 1950s in a passing, summary 
fashion and brings no new insights on them based on new archival information.   
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The Revisionists.  The revisionist historians gained a strong influence starting 
in the late 1960s and persisted through the end of the 1980s.39  This group of 
historians came of age during the tumultuous era of Vietnam and Watergate.  Their 
perspective is decidedly left of center and in fact represents one aspect of the New 
Left movement.  Often neo-Marxist themselves, they are dubious of anticommunist’s 
claims that the international communist movement sought world hegemony.  The 
revisionist historians are generally suspicious of the capitalist system, which they 
believe corrupts democracy through the undue and unfair influence of corporate 
money.  Some of these scholars are openly sympathetic to certain aspects of the 
American communist movement, looking to it as “a tradition that could serve both as 
a source of political reference and inspiration” for post-1960s leftwing activists.40   
 Scholars probably most often cite The Inquisition in Hollywood by Ceplair 
and Englund as the seminal work in this area.  Writing long before the unsealing of 
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the HUAC archives, the authors write squarely in the tradition of the economic and 
political analysis typical of the New Left scholars of the 1970s and 1980s.  Their goal 
is essentially to tell the story of the Hollywood Ten and the Blacklist as an outgrowth 
of the labor battles surrounding the founding and early years of the Screen Writers 
Guild, as well as the “lost opportunities” of the era’s radicalism.  They attempt to 
trace the rise of radicalism in Hollywood with an emphasis on the activities of the 
local communists: their labor organizing struggles, through their participation in the 
Popular Front and its disintegration just before World War II, to the anti-New Deal 
and anti-labor backlash that accelerated with Roosevelt’s death.  They recount the rise
of anticommunist organizations, such as the Motion Picture Alliance, and the 
practices of the Hollywood communists that caused their estrangement from 
Hollywood liberals.  They end with the famous encounter between the Hollywood 
Ten and HUAC, and its aftermath.41   
In the “Afterword” to the paperback edition, Ceplair and Englund contend that 
their research is part of “…a wave of historical research about Hollywood – all are 
carefully researched.”42  This section seems to be a defense from the charge that they 
are “partisans” for the CPUSA and its methods.43  Whilst Inquisition in Hollywood 
does provide a good deal of otherwise missing information on the subject, their focus 
is in fact to tell the story of the Blacklist from the perspective of the Hollyw od 
radicals.  For example, although their bibliography is comprehensive and lists works 
that advocate positions on all sides of the issues, once one removes purely journalistic 
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citations, quoted texts and in-text citations overwhelmingly emphasize those w are 
sympathetic to the communist side and antipathetic to those who opposed them.  Most 
all of the interviews conducted for the book were with one-time communists or 
“fellow travelers,” who had never repudiated their involvement with the CPUSA.  Ex-
communists, who had not only repudiated the CPUSA, but also sought to oppose its 
activities by revealing its intentions, methods and membership were not only not 
quoted or even interviewed, but typically labeled “turncoats and informers.”44  Thus, 
not only did the authors not have access to the HUAC archives, the aim and results of 
their study is very different from the purpose of this research endeavor.   
 Victor Navasky’s Naming Names is essentially a moral study of the ethics of 
“finking” and the politics of being a “stool-pigeon.”  Certainly the book deals with 
historical subject matter, namely those who chose to inform to the HUAC and those 
who chose not to and suffered the consequences.  However, Naming Names is not 
fundamentally an historical study as much as an inquiry into ethics that uses a series 
of historical events as an object lesson.  Thus, Navasky’s is a metaphysical exercise, 
rather than a historical investigation of verifiable documentary evidence.  He does not 
set out to discover the facts about what happened several decades earlier, but to 
compare and contrast the justifications offered by the key players in those events for 
their conduct.  The book is more of a discussion than a narrative, which is the most 
common and certainly traditional approach to doing history.  Rather, by juxtaposing 
opposing views on the issue of naming names, he creates a kind of dialectic that even 
                                                




has the feel of a Platonic dialogue.  Into this dialogue, he brings outside 
commentators and ethicists to give input on the morality of “finking.” 
 Not surprisingly, Navasky, the former editor of the The Nation, draws 
conclusions that are much the same has those of Ceplair and Englund.  His argument 
is that although the Hollywood Reds may have had their moral failings, they paled 
beside the immorality of naming names and the institution of the Blacklist.  Not only 
were the informers culpable, so were the liberals who failed to defend the civil rights 
of the blacklisted and cooperated with the government’s repression, either activ ly 
through their Anticommunism or passively through their silence.  Thus, Navasky, 
writing in an essentially journalistic style based on interviews, tells the tory of the 
Blacklist from the radicals’ perspective as well, but this time with a moral rather than 
historical presentation.45  That is not to say that historians do not reach moral or 
metaphysical conclusions after interpreting the meaning of the evidence pres nted.  
However, that evidence derives from historical research, primarily from archiv l 
documents, and is usually presented in narrative form.  Thus, like Ceplair and 
Englund, Navasky’s study does not address the research question posed by this 
dissertation and, writing in the early 1980s, he was unable to access the newly opened 
HUAC archives. 
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 The Hollywood Writers’ Wars by Nancy Lynn Schwartz focuses primarily on 
the trade union wars that characterized the founding of the first writers’ union in 
Hollywood, the Screen Writers Guild (SWG), which was the predecessor to today’s 
Writers Guild of America.  In this, she follows a course chartered by Ceplair and 
Englund and like them she writes from a decidedly New Left perspective.46  
However, she places her account in the context of the upsurge in leftwing sympathy 
and activities that took place during the Depression.  The effects of this worldwide 
economic disaster deeply affected Hollywood, where the studio administrations 
attempted to exact wage cuts from a workforce that was largely non-union.    
Schwartz, like Ceplair and Englund, emphasizes the struggle of screenwriters 
to gain more artistic control over the ultimate disposition of their work in the face o  
the power of studio executives to make arbitrary changes to screenplays.  The result 
was labor battles between an upstart writers union and the studio executives not only 
over wages issues, but over artistic control, which ultimately meant the structure of 
the industry.  Because the SWG contained a large number of communists in positions 
of leadership, the government became interested in these events.  Partisan politics – 
specifically support for and opposition to Roosevelt’s New Deal – came into play.  
Ultimately, she asserts, this fed the frenzy of the hysteria surrounding McCarthyism, 
which ultimately led to the sad fate of the blacklistees.   
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Like Navasky, Schwartz wrote in the early 1980s at a time in which the 
HUAC archives were still sealed and, thus, she did not address or answer the central 
research question of this dissertation.   
 Tender Comrades, edited by Patrick McGilligan and Paul Buhle, is the fourth 
book to take a revisionist perspective on the events of the Blacklist period.47  The 
historiographic essay that serves as the introduction repeats the same assertions put 
forward by those cited above.  There is the insistence that “[w]hether or not to inform
was, for those who refused, above all not a question of politics, but a matter of ethics 
and morality.”48  Later in the text, Walter Bernstein asserts that this was true not only 
of those who refused to inform, but also of those who did.49  There is no recognition 
of the possibility that the opposing side might have had honorable motives.  Rather, 
the blacklistees were victims of “left-wing turncoats and Anticommunist zealots.”50  
Tender Comrades consists mainly of interviews with thirty-five survivors of 
the blacklist or in some cases their widows.51  Five other academics or journalists, 
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including Larry Ceplair, join the editors as interviewers.  This is the reason for the 
book’s ideological perspective: all of those interviewed are former “blacklistees,” 
who refused to cooperate with the HUAC, and all the interviewers are tremendously 
sympathetic to those they interviewed.  In several cases, they openly state their 
admiration for their interlocutors and make professions of love for their films.  Thus,
the book is also not a history – there is no central narrative, no use of archival or other 
documentary evidence, and no verification or crosschecking of sources – but a kind of 
oral history.  Also, though Tender Comrades appeared in 1997, in it there is no 
coming to terms with the more recent historiography on the conspiratorial activities of 
the CPUSA.   
 There was one recent dissertation on the HUAC probes of the media and the 
resulting blacklist.  John Gladchuk in Reticent Reds: HUAC, Hollywood and the 
Evolution of the Red Menace, 1935-1950 argues that the HUAC represented an arm 
of repression that operated within the confines of an ultraconservative societal 
atmosphere reminiscent of Nazi tactics.  This dissertation did not draw upon the 
resources of the newly opened HUAC archives, even though it was completed in 
2006, five years after these documents were opened to the scrutiny of researchers.  
The substance of his argument does not cut much new ground; it basically 
reformulates arguments of previous New Left scholars’ research on the subject.  
Therefore, his study does not answer the central question posed by this dissertation.52 
The Post-Revisionists.  Recent scholarship on the relationship between the 
CPUSA and the USSR has tipped the balance between the anticommunists and the 
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revisionists.  This is the direct result of new archival resources becoming available in 
the former-Soviet Union.  As mentioned above, these newly accessible primary 
sources include a huge collection of the records of the CPUSA that were secretly 
shipped to the USSR for safe keeping during the height of the Cold War.  At the 
forefront of this research are Harvey Klehr, the Andrew A. Mellon Professor of 
Politics and History at Emory University, and John Earl Haynes, who holds the title 
of Twentieth Century Political Historian at the Library of Congress.53  Other 
historians have corroborated their findings to produce a rather damning picture of the 
CPUSA.54   
The conclusions drawn by this new research have validated the assertions 
made by many of the ex-communists who defected and became government 
witnesses: CPUSA members had penetrated the U.S. government, its military and 
atomic research program on behalf of the Soviet intelligence organizations.  This is 
important because many scholars, including most of the revisionists discussed above, 
had dismissed much of this type of testimony due to the fact that some had used the 
issue of national security to advance partisan or personal agendas: “A number of 
liberals and radicals pointed to the excesses of McCarthy’s charges as justification for 
rejecting the allegations altogether.”55 
                                                
53 See Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret World; Klehr, Haynes, and 
Anderson, Soviet World; Haynes and Klehr, Venona. 
54 These include Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and 
the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB(New York: 
Basic Books, 1999); John Barron, Operation Solo: The FBI’s Man in the Kremlin 
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1996); and Allen Weinstein and Alexander 
Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – The Stalin Era (New 
York: Random House, 1999). 




Evidence from these new sources appears to confirm precisely what Ceplair, 
Englund, Navasky, Schwartz, McGilligan, and Buhle had dismissed.  For example, it 
seems clear that Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy56 and that Ethel and Julius Rosenberg – 
whom many media communists and their radical successors defended, mourned and 
held up as a model of courageous behavior57 – were guilty of espionage on behalf of 
Moscow.58  Also, certainly guilty was Lauchlin Currie, a key White House aide to 
President Roosevelt, who passed secrets to the Soviets in a manner that undermined 
the policies of the president for whom he was working.59  In addition, Harry Dexter 
White, FDR’s Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, betrayed his country and his boss, 
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau.60  Communist agents also penetrated the atomic 
research program and the OSS, which was the predecessor to the CIA.  These are just 
a few famous cases of many documented demonstrating that the CPUSA was a 
hotbed of espionage for the Soviet Union.   
Klehr and Haynes assert, “The investigations and prosecutions of American 
Communists undertaken in the late 1940s and early 1950s were premised on an 
assumption that the CPUSA has assisted Soviet espionage….  It was an explicit 
assumption behind congressional investigations of domestic communism in the late 
1940s and 1950s, and it permeated public attitudes toward domestic communism.”61  
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One such investigation is obviously the HUAC inquiry into Hollywood communism.  
Haynes and Klehr summarize their findings by asserting: 
[I]t became clear that espionage was a regular activity of the 
American Communist party.  To say that the CPUSA was 
nothing but a Soviet fifth column in the Cold War would be an 
exaggeration; it still remains true that the CPUSA’s chief task 
was the promotion of communism and the interests of the Soviet 
Union through political means.  But it is equally true that the 
CPUSA was indeed a fifth column working inside and against 
the United States in the Cold War.62   
 
Thus, the most salient features of the Party are becoming indisputably clear as 
more and more archival information becomes known.  The intellectual position for 
old apologists – such as Victor Navasky – for American communists and the Soviet 
Union is becoming increasingly difficult to defend rationally.  Given this new 
scholarship rich in documentary evidence, serious historians will have to rethink what 
has become almost a ritual of branding all assertions of communist conspiracy as ed-
baiting and McCarthyist hysteria.  This in turn requires a reappraisal of the positions 
espoused by the revisionist literature that has dominated the study of communist 
infiltration in the media for decades.    
 Within this post-revisionist context, Hollywood Party by Kenneth Lloyd 
Billingsley represents a more recent serious addition to the literature on Hollywo d 
communism. 63  It benefits from and recognizes the more recent historiography on 
American communism in general.   
Billingsley seems taken aback by the fact the current popular awareness in 
Hollywood – and by implication in the country as a whole – about the Blacklist is 
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one-sided.  He notes that events such as “Hollywood Remembers the Blacklist” and 
its accompanying rhetoric tell of how government and industry leaders struck out at 
“radicals” during the Blacklist period, but ignore the activities of the CPUSA that 
provoked those actions.64  His book covers much of the same ground as Inquisition in 
Hollywood, dealing with problems of studio unionization, disputes over the 
undemocratic nature of Party discipline, friendly and unfriendly witnesses before the 
HUAC, and the rehabilitation of the informers.  However, Billingsley’s work is 
concerned with trade union history as much as anything else.  He spends half of the 
book recounting the battles between the Conference of Studio Unions (CSU) on the 
one hand versus the major motion picture studios and the International Alliance of 
Theatrical Stage Employees (IA or IATSE) on the other.  Billingsley devotes much 
less attention to the “writers’ wars” than the previous studies. 
 Because he has a narrower scope, i.e. this labor battle, wherein the CSU and 
the IA waged a war over who would represent the rank and file studio craft worker, 
Billingsley is able to go into more detail.  His sympathies are obviously not with the 
CSU and the communists who dominated it.  The author does a thorough job 
establishing that Herbert Sorrell, head of the CSU, as well as its other important union 
leaders, were either de jure members of the CPUSA or de facto communists by 
adhering to and supporting every shift in the party line.   
Billingsley offered citations from the various reports of the HUAC that were 
far more extensive than those in the previously cited texts.  His citations indicated 
that he drew from a more diverse set of sources: radical, liberal and conservative.  
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However, except for HUAC reports and interviews, he relied heavily on secondary 
sources.  There is little or no archival work evident.  On the one hand, his 
breakthrough source was an extensive interview with AFL leader Roy Brewer, head 
of the I.A. during the trade union wars and probably the most influential 
anticommunist in Hollywood during the decade of 1945-1955.  (The aging Brewer 
had been silent for years and ignored by earlier historians with exception of Cogley.)  
On the other hand, Billingsley produced no concrete evidence linking Hollywood 
communists to any specific conspiratorial activity that would threaten national 
security.  He accepted the anticommunist perspective based on compelling but still 
circumstantial evidence.  Finally, Hollywood Party appeared before the opening of 
the HUAC archives.   
The other recent work within the post-revisionist context is Ronald and Allis 
Radosh’s Red Star over Hollywood: The Film Colony’s Long Romance with the 
Left.65  Published in 2005, it benefits from the general post-revisionist scholarship that 
explodes the myth that somehow the CPUSA was not only subordinate to Moscow 
but also that it was an espionage tool of the latter.  The Radoshes conducted 
interviews with some of the aging participants of the Blacklist era, as well as 
researched archival documents, such as materials in the Warner Brothers arc ives.  
They are not only familiar with the vast literature on the subject – both scholarly and 
popular – and work done in the Soviet archives, as well as the Venona decryptions 
recently declassified by the American government.  Finally, they had access to and 
made use of the selected portions of the recently opened files of the HUAC.  Thus, 
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they, along with Ted Morgan, are the only scholars in this review to have 
incorporated this previously unavailable data.   
The focus of the Radoshes’ work was to demonstrate that many of the 
Hollywood Reds were not merely “misguided radicals,” but hardcore Stalinists.  
Some of them had made the conversion to communism during visits to the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s at the height of the show trials, wherein Stalin rid himself of any 
threat to his power from the senior Bolsheviks through execution on trumped up 
charges.  Furthermore, the Radoshes argued that many of these communist 
screenwriters were successful in putting pro-Soviet propaganda in a number of 
Hollywood movies – an idea dismissed by civil society scholars and ridiculed by the 
revisionist historians discussed above.  Finally, they made a persuasive case that th  
Stalinist practices of the Hollywood party leadership were the main contributing 
factor to not only destroying the alliance with the liberal left of Hollywood and 
sympathy for the communist case, but also for the eventual destruction of the Party 
itself.  In other words, the Party had only itself to blame.  However, the Radoshes did 
not make a clear and sustained argument drawing upon any new archival material that 
would answer the central questioned posed by this study.  Furthermore, their use of 
the newly unsealed HUAC archives was narrowly selective to cover specific topics 
their text addressed.  They did not conduct a systematic study of those files pertaining 
to the Committee’s investigations of Hollywood.     
Other Sources.  Surprisingly, there are very few scholarly biographies of the 
key players of the era.  Bruce Cook published a biography of Hollywood Ten member 




However, he reveals next to nothing about Trumbo’s activities as a communist 
insider.66  Gary Carr produced a doctoral dissertation on another Hollywood Ten 
alumnus John Howard Lawson, but his chief concern was studying Lawson’s 
screenwriting career, rather than his political importance in the McCarthy era.67  
Hollywood’s Other Blacklist: Union Struggles in the Studio System is an account of 
the aforementioned conflict between the IA and the CSU over which union would 
represent Hollywood below-the-line trades, such as set painters, set decorators, 
cartoonists and publicists.68  One of the authors was a participant in these events; the 
other is a communication scholar.  Methodologically, the study is hybrid; it is part 
oral history and part narrative history.  There is little doubt that both writers come 
from a perspective heavily sympathetic to the ideological position of the CSU.  This 
is the sum total of what can be reasonably categorized as scholarly or even semi-
scholarly.  None of the above deal in depth with the HUAC itself, and neither do they 
draw up the archival material made available by the post-revisionist historian .    
Autobiographies of the participants, however, are far more numerous, of 
vastly uneven quality and none of them remotely scholarly.  Edward Dmytryk’s wrote
two autobiographies: It’s a Hell of a Life, But Not a Bad Living69 and Odd Man Out: 
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A Memoir of the Hollywood Ten.70  The latter is concerned specifically with 
experiences in the CPUSA, his break with the Party, his HUAC testimony, his prison 
time and his rehabilitation.  Another informer, Elia Kazan, wrote A Life in which he 
vigorously defended his decision to testify before the HUAC.71   
Autobiographies by blacklistees include Lillian Hellman’s Scoundrel Time, 
which as the title indicates, gives no quarter to her ideological enemies.72  The 
accuracy of Miss Hellman’s recollections has been seriously called into question by 
numerous historians.73  Donald Ogden Stewart’s By a Stroke of Luck! appeared 
several years before Hellman’s book.74  The unrepentant Lester Cole, who remained a 
faithful, doctrinaire Stalinist and a loyal supporter of the Soviet Union to his death, 
published Hollywood Red in 1981.75  Other than expressing leftwing sentiment, it has 
precious little to say about being a “red” and concentrated on his Hollywood career.  
The autobiography of another of the Hollywood Ten, Ring Lardner, Jr., I’d Hate 
Myself in the Morning appeared shortly before his death.76  Titled after a quip he 
made whilst testifying before the HUAC, like Cole’s, the book is silent on Lardner’s 
actual activities within the CPUSA.  Arthur Miller wrote of his life and offered an 
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extensive discussion of his thoughts on the blacklisting phenomenon, the HUAC and 
the allegorical meaning of his play, The Crucible.77  Other recent additions to this 
genre are Walter Bernstein’s Inside Out: A Memoir of the Blacklist78 and Norma 
Barzman’s The Red and the Blacklist.79  Both decry blacklisting and the damage done 
to their lives and careers.  Both offer copious amounts of gossip about media friends, 
but neither are very informative about CPUSA activities or their contributions to 
them.    
 The above memoirists display the numerous inherent problems with 
autobiographies.  Citations of documentary evidence are rare and editorship is of 
uneven quality.  The authors wrote years after the events and mostly relied on their 
memory, rather than contemporaneous evidence.  Subject to the temptation to 
represent oneself in the best light, often autobiographers spend more time in self-
justification formulated years after the events in question.  Logic is not necessarily the 
forte of screen artists and, thus, one can read some arguments that defy the most 
elementary rules of reasoning.  When two people writing in two different books 
dispute the facts of an event, without corroborating evidence, it is one person’s word 
against another.  Therefore, although these works are very useful as source material, 
they are fraught with potential traps for the historian and certainly do not answer the 
central question of this dissertation. 
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 Finally, there are a few overtly polemical works on the Blacklist era, which 
are perhaps of the least value to the historian, primarily because they are essentially 
propagandistic in nature, designed to sway public opinion in one direction or another.  
I would include in this list screenwriter Gordon Kahn’s Hollywood on Trial;80 Dalton 
Trumbo’s Time of the Toad,81 (allusion of the book’s title is to associate the HUAC 
investigation as a radical miscarriage of justice similar to the Dreyfus Affair in 19th 
century France); and John Howard Lawson’s Film in the Battle of Ideas, the work of 
another member of the Hollywood Ten.82   
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identify them as Communists were allegedly forgeries (29).  Finally, Trumbo argues 
that citizens have a right to secrecy, i.e. the right not to disclose political opinion or 
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activity known as conspiracy begins.  Trumbo does reveal an interesting belief that 
perhaps indicates why the CPUSA was so interested in the motion picture industry: 
“Even though it is customary in intellectual circles to deplore motion pictures as art, it 
would be a fatal mistake to underestimate them as an influence.  They constitute 
perhaps the most important medium for the communication of ideas in the world 
today” (49).  This ironically seems to justify the HUAC’s very decision to investigate 
Communist activity in the movie business! 
82 John Howard Lawson, Film in the Battle of Ideas (New York: Masses & 
Mainstream, 1953).  A strident and doctrinaire Stalinist, Lawson’s fondness for 
Marxist jargon – “superstructure,” “war-mongering,” “Wall Street monopolists,” 
“United States imperialism” – makes for tedious reading.  He dutifully cites Marx and 
offers a quote from Stalin in order to unlock the subtleties of the theory of base and 
superstructure (7-8).  He offers this appraisal of the Communist world: “The Sovi t 
Union emerged from the war steeled and strengthened in the anti-fascist struggle, 




On the other side of the ideological spectrum, The Trojan Horse in America83 
is worthy of mention here.  The author, Martin Dies, Jr., was the original chairman of 
the HUAC from 1938-1944 when it was a still a special committee.  He attempts a 
justification of the need for and utility of such a body on a permanent basis based 
upon the activities of subversive organizations then operating in the United States.  
His central thesis is that the CPUSA represents an obvious allusion: the CPUSA is the 
equivalent of a Trojan Horse operating in stealth fashion.  If its conspiratorial conduct 
is left unexposed, it will lead to the downfall of the American system in the same wy 
in which ancient Troy fell.  The fact that his account contains few citations, no 
bibliography and no index undermines Dies’ argument.  In other words, he presents 
an argument with no substantiated and verifiable evidence, which given his position 
in Congress ought to have been available to him. 
Finally, Robert E. Stripling’s The Red Plot Against America is a polemical 
argument for a strong anticommunist stand against the CPUSA with a bit of 
biography thrown in.84  Stripling served as the chief investigator for the HUAC from 
                                                                                                                                          
its people.  In China and the Eastern Democracies of Europe, people’s governments 
undertook the task of building free societies, free from private exploitation, devoted 
to rational progress and human rights” (9-10).  This is his starting point to argue that 
because Hollywood is a propaganda machine for the existing order and its ruling 
class, motion pictures must be removed from the control of “Wall Street big money,” 
so that socially responsible, i.e. radical, independent filmmaking can flourish.  No 
wonder the HUAC wanted to investigate! 
83 Martin Dies, The Trojan Horse in America (New York: Dodd, Meade & 
Co., 1940). 
84 The biographical portion consists of his account of how he was drafted into 
the army in 1944 despite being over thirty, married, a pre-Pearl Harbor father wi a 
legislative deferment.  Stripling believes White House pressure led to his induction 
after he led the HUAC investigation of the connection of the Eislers to Eleanor 




1938-1948, brought onto the Committee’s staff by Martin Dies and retained through 
the chairmanship of J. Parnell Thomas.  His book recounts in chronological order the 
various HUAC investigations in which he was instrumental, including the saga of 
Elizabeth Bentley and the Alger Hiss-Whittaker Chambers case.  The 1947 foray int  
Hollywood was one such inquiry.  Essentially, Stripling’s work summarizes in a form 
accessible to the average citizen the information publicly available in the HUAC 
various reports to the House of Representatives.  There are no revelations here from 
closed archives and unfortunately he does not reference the material presented to 
primary sources.   
Thus, the gap in the scholarly literature on the subject is clear.  All but two 
texts were published before the historiographic contributions of the post-revisionist 
historians of the 1990s and the unsealing of the HUAC archives.  Only Ted Morgan 
and Ronald and Allis Radosh accessed the testimony offered in executive sessions 
and they did so very selectively without a broad and systematic review of the files.  
At least in part because of this, the literature does not adequately tell the story of the 
HUAC’s conduct as its members investigated the motion picture industry.  The 
literature on this subject does not, therefore, provide an answer to the central research 
question posed by this study. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Plan of Organization 
Research Methodology & Conceptual Framework.  I will employ a historical 
methodology for this dissertation.  Such a statement should be relatively 
straightforward.  Alas, however, the current academic environment is one in which 
postmodernism has invaded both the social sciences and the humanities.  The 
discipline of history in particular seems to have suffered quite a bit from an ass ult on 
its intellectual foundations.  Peter Novak has written convincingly about the crisis in 
the discipline of history concerning the concept of “objectivity.”  He has attempted to 
show that “the evolution of historian’s attitudes on the objectivity question has always 
been closely tied to changing social, political, cultural, and professional contexts.”85  
However, Novak’s is a descriptive work, not a normative one.  Just because many 
historians, such as Hayden White, Dominick LaCapra, and especially Michel 
Foucault have called into question or abandoned the notion of objectivity, does not 
infer that this ought to be the case.  I will not follow their example in this dissertation.  
Rather, I will conduct my research according to the dictates of traditional historical 
methodology as so eloquently defended recently by Keith Windshuttle.86   
 I think that sound methodology is crucial for the historian and it is what 
separates the serious scholar from the dilettante and knowledge from speculation.  
This dissertation will adhere to traditional characteristics of well-articulated historical 
research, which are as follows: 
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• The evaluation of evidence in an objective fashion, which means submitting one’s 
assertions to the various rules of logic that have been identified over the years.87   
• The evaluation of evidence on its own terms and avoiding the use of political 
ideology to shape how it is interpreted.88 
• An interpretation that offers the most reasonable position given the available 
information.   
• In order to guard against proof-texting, recognition that the historian must 
inevitably sift the evidence, using some and discarding some.89 
• An explicit delineation between fact and speculation, which can result from gaps 
in the historical record or the necessity to infer the motivations, emotions or other 
mental states of actors upon the stage of history.   
The idea of offering a conceptual framework for research undertaken is to 
articulate the paradigm the scholar will employ to organize and make sense of the 
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data.  The advantage of a conceptual framework is that one works from an organizing 
principle and, thus, the ability to offer an interpretation of the meaning of the data is 
straightforward.  In other words, a conceptual framework helps insure that the 
researcher can make sense of the evidence.  The disadvantage of conceptual 
frameworks – and I believe this is particularly true with ideologically driven 
paradigms – is that they tend to trap the scholar into one perspective and in some 
sense predetermine the results of the inquiry.   
 I think there is a strong case for allowing the evidence itself to disclose the 
meaning of the facts.  Insofar as a conceptual paradigm indicates the intellectual and 
personal “baggage” of the researcher, it can also represent a hindrance to his or her 
objectivity.  It seems to me that objectivity is possible, if this is defined as taking the 
most reasonable position on an issue, given the current evidence, irrespective of one’s
personal feelings.  As has been argued above, adhering to the criteria of sound 
argumentation goes a long way towards insuring this.   
 One can find the intellectual justification for this approach in the writings of 
Immanuel Kant, whose work, if more contemporary scholars would take the time to 
read it, is an antidote to both the radical relativism and epistemological skepticism of 
postmodernism.  In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lays out the cognitive 
structures of human understanding, showing how humans – all humans – organize 
and process experience.  His goal is to find a sound middle ground between the naïve 




of Hume.90  In some respects, these find parallels in historiography in the “scientific” 
method of Leopold von Ranke, the thought of R. G. Collingwood and the post-
modernistic relativism of Hayden White respectively.   
Each of these approaches was and is problematic.  Realism cannot adequately 
explain how the thinking subject, in this case the historian, interacts with the facts and 
possibly unwittingly shapes them.  The naïve realist assumes he/she is apprehending 
things as they really are and relies entirely on method to preserve objectivity.91  For 
the idealist, sure knowledge rests in the thinking self, who tries to reconstruct the 
reality of the outside world, including the past, through the logical processes of the 
mind.92  However, this position cannot adequately explain events caused by forces 
other than thinking historical agents.  The empiricist denies any metaphysical 
meaning to reality, as well as the ability of the perceiver to organize sense-
perceptions into an approximation of the truth without violating it.  The result is a 
radical relativism in which the truth is no more than what seems true to each 
individual.  Thus, for historians like White: “Historical stories, like all others, [are] 
made rather than found.”93   
Kant arrived at a commonsense position in a manner that was anything but 
commonsense.  First, he revised the idealist tradition by showing how the human 
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mind interacts with sense data and organizes his or her perception of nature.  Rather 
than the usual idealist metaphysical offering, Kant limits the discussion of the 
knowing subject to what in modern psychology would be called the cognitive 
structures of the mind.  Kant showed that humans do not arbitrarily organize 
perception, but, assuming one does not suffer from some sort of mental impairment, 
do so in strict and predictable patterns. If the brain is our computer hardware, Kant 
described its software.  He closed off the relativism of a multiplicity of perspectives 
by describing the human perspective: the cognitive structures of time, spac
causality, etc.  By doing so, Kant introduced the foundation of regularity necessary 
for empiricism to be able to make knowledge claims beyond simply an elaboration of 
method.   
Therefore, the conceptual framework I shall adopt for this study is 
architectonic in essence.  Along Kantian lines, I assume knowledge is possible and 
facts ascertainable.  There is a difference between fact and fiction in historical 
studies.  It is possible for the scholar to rise above race, class, gender, ethnic or 
national origin, religious affiliation, etc., in order to discern and describe the facts of 
events long past, as well as to offer an objective interpretation as to their meaning.  
This can be achieved by strict adherence to sound methodology and the rules of sound 
argumentation.  The researcher is also well advised to recognize his or her own 
fallibility and susceptibility to “discovering” what one wants to find.  Recognitio  of 
the problem allows one to be on guard against it by recognizing that one’s research i  




dialectical process is yet another check against unwarranted assumptions and 
speculation.   
No one scholar need attempt to ascertain all the truth about a problem in order 
to achieve some knowledge about the subject.  Obviously, complete knowledge 
would be the most desirable, but it is a fallacy to hold that somehow partial 
knowledge is not valid.  While waiting for new evidence to come to light, there is 
nothing wrong with the historian reaching a tentative position as long as it is 
recognized as such.  In fact, much history is tentative in nature.  That does not mean 
that it does not represent historical knowledge.  It is just incomplete knowledge.  Is 
this so terrible?  Our knowledge of physics is still incomplete, yet several times a year 
scholars trust it enough to embark on airplane trips to conferences and symposia 
without resorting to the position that knowledge of aerodynamics, if it exists at all, is 
relative to perspectives of race, class and gender.    
New Data.  I have noted previously that the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which led to partial and temporary opening of some of its archives, has changed our 
understanding of the history of international communism.  In particular, we now have 
a clearer picture of the nature of the Soviet foreign policy goals, the Soviet esp onage 
threat to the West, and how deeply the CPUSA was involved in the undertaking of 
both.  These records include not only the archives of the Soviet government and its 
agencies, such as the KGB, but also those of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union [CPSU] and the Communist International [Comintern].   
Most of these collections have remained closed to Westerners, but one archive 




Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, known to historians by its Russian 
acronym RGASPI.94  According to Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, this archive holds 
the bulk of the records of the Comintern and the central agencies of the CPSU from 
the early 1920’s up to the death of Stalin in 1953.  It also contains an extensive 
collection of records of the CPUSA.95  These scholars report that over the last several 
years the Russian government has restored some of the power of its security agencies 
to block access to individual records and that in fact they have closed some files to 
researchers.96 
Apart from the fact that the Russian government has to a great extent again 
clamped down on access to this archive, I will not draw upon it as a primary source 
for this dissertation for two reasons.  First, a number of scholars have mined the 
riches of the RGASPI and their prodigious research is readily available.  The value of 
that research, and the reason I mention it here, is that it helps to more accurately 
establish the context in which the HUAC operated, i.e. the ongoing activities of the 
CPUSA, including espionage, and its relationship to the Soviet Union.  The 
scholarship of the post-revisionist historians has greatly undermined the conclusis 
of the earlier revisionists, who worked without access to the evidence in the Soviet 
archives.  Given the amount of work already drawn from documents in the RGASPI, 
it is not likely to yield much in terms of new, significant material.97  
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Second, this dissertation centers on the HUAC, not the CPUSA.   The Soviet 
archives hold only the records of the latter, not the former.  Although these two 
institutions were locked with each other in a struggle to the political death and, 
therefore, linked together historically, their organizational records were obviously 
very separate entities.  While the mandate of the HUAC in part was to investigat  and 
collect information of the CPUSA, the reverse was not true.  The post-revisionist 
historians working in the RGASPI have done an excellent job describing the nature of 
the HUAC’s political foe.  However, the most appropriate source of new information 
on the inner workings of the HUAC itself is the Committee’s collection at the Center 
for Legislative Archives, part of the National Archives and Records Administration in 
Washington, DC.   
The newly available HUAC material, upon which this dissertation will draw, 
includes transcripts of testimony of witnesses taken in executive session, minutes of 
meetings of the full committee and various subcommittees held in executive session, 
the records of the Committee’s files and reference section, and the documents related 
to investigations of individuals or organizations.  I will describe each of these in 
detail later in this section.  As noted in the review of the literature, the only authors to 
access these documents in a study addressing some aspect of the HUAC’s interactio  
with the media are Ronald and Allis Radosh, and Ted Morgan.  Because of the nature 
and aims of their research, all three made only selective use of the files.  Before I 
commenced work in the archive, Dr. Ronald Radosh personally told me that the 




items they needed.98  No scholar to my knowledge has undertaken any systematic 
study of the archive.  I am certain of this because archivists unsealed a number of 
boxes for me in the summer of 2007.   
Navasky, Vaugh, Goodman, and Ceplair and Englund, and the other scholars 
discussed earlier had to rely upon materials that the HUAC itself published for public 
consumption, which include transcripts of the testimony given in its public sessions.  
However, for years Congress never granted researchers access to its internal
documents and in 1976 the House Judiciary Committee sealed the records of the now 
defunct HUAC for fifty years.  Allen Weinstein, while researching for his study of the 
Hiss-Chambers controversy, waged an unsuccessful battle to gain access to tho e 
records.  This forced him to rely instead on the papers of several committee members 
deposited in archives around the country.99  It is important to note that the Nixon 
Library, which holds Richard Nixon’s congressional papers, opened in March 1994.  
However, Nixon chose to avoid most of the HUAC hearings on Hollywood and 
instead concentrated his efforts on the Hiss-Chambers controversy.  I have visited the 
library and found nothing of significance with respect to the Hollywood 
investigations.   
The question might then arise: why did scholars not request any pertinent 
HUAC documents under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA]?  
The answer is that Congress wrote the FOIA to apply only to the executive branch
and its agencies.  This legislation, first enacted in 1966 and substantially amended in 
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1974 and 1986, has been a valuable tool for scholars.  It replaced the “need to know” 
criteria with the “right to know” standard; the federal government has to justify the 
need to keep its documents secret.  The FOIA also provides judicial remedies for 
citizens who feel they have been unjustly denied access to government documents.  
However, when Congress enacted this legislation, it did not feel obliged to apply the 
provisions to itself.  The HUAC was a duly constituted committee of the United 
States House of Representatives and, therefore, it is not subject to the stipulations of 
the FIOA.   
The FIOA does apply to any documents produced by the Department of 
Justice and the FBI, which seem to be the two agencies most likely to possess records 
that have been untapped by researchers.  A number of such documents have recently 
come to light, including one file that indicated the FBI had investigated Groucho 
Marx’s communist sympathies.100  There is no index for these files, which a historian 
might use to search for a particular item.  The researcher does not know what exists 
when making a request.  Rather, one must fish around, making blind requests in order 
to discover what might exist.  Thus, it remains unclear how much unreleased 
information remains in FBI and Justice Department files.   
In the summer of 2001, there was a significant development in the status of 
the HUAC archives.  Since 1998, the National Coordinating Committee for the 
Promotion of History, a coalition of historical and archival organizations, had sought 
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the opening of the HUAC files.  The NCCPH, supported by the American Historical 
Association and the Organization of American Historians, filed a request with 
Representative. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee.  In July 2001 the Clerk of the House informed the NCCPH that most of 
the requested files would be unsealed and opened to public scrutiny.  These 
documents include the HUAC investigations of Hollywood and the other American 
media.101     
The specific records I have accessed for this dissertation are from the archive 
of the House Un-American Activities Committee, which operated from 1945 to 1975.  
A separate but related set of records are the archives of the House Special Committee 
on Un-American Activities, popularly known as the Dies Committee.  This 
immediate predecessor to the HUAC functioned on a temporary basis from 1938 to 
1945 and needed annual reauthorization.  I did not access the records of the Dies 
Committee because they lay outside the timeframe of the major Hollywood 
investigations.  Likewise, for the same reason, I did not delve into the records of 
another precursor to the HUAC, the McCormack-Dickstein Committee.  This body 
functioned in 1934-1935 and its formal name was the Special Committee to 
Investigate Nazi Propaganda and Other Propaganda. 
In 1969 the HUAC’s name changed to the House Committee on Internal 
Security and in 1975 the House of Representatives decided to abolish the Committee.  
At that point, the House of Representatives transferred the HUAC’s jurisdiction to the 
Judiciary Committee.  Hence, the HUAC records are now part of a National 
                                                





Archives’ record group assigned to archive the documents of the House Judiciary 
Committee.  In terms of a typical congressional committee, the HUAC files are 
indeed vast: 2,058 feet for the thirty years between 1945 and 1975.  By contrast, the 
records of the House Judiciary Committee, which usually produced the most copious 
amounts of archival records of the various House committees, represent 2,025 feet of 
material for the years 1947 to 1968.102   
The HUAC archive consists of six major record sections, which apparently 
correspond to six staff sections.  They are the Administrative Section, the Ediorial 
Section, the Files and Reference Section, the Finance Section, the Investigativ  
Section and the Research Section.  Several sections hold little interest for the 
purposes of this study.  These include Editorial Section, which oversaw the 
publication of HUAC reports and staff studies, and the Research Section, the bulk of 
whose work appears to reside as contributions to other sections.103  A  well, the 
Finance Section appears to offer very little archival material of significa ce for this 
dissertation.   
On the other hand, the Administrative Section, the Files and Reference 
Section, and the Investigative Section each contain a great of documentary material 
germane to the HUAC investigations of Hollywood.  The Administrative Section 
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contains the file “Minutes of Full Committee and Subcommittee Meetings: 1/22/1947 
– 8/21/1974.”104  These are meeting minutes of executive sessions that were closed to 
public scrutiny.  An inspection of these documents reveals that, although there was 
not a consistent format for the minutes, they were generally not word-for-word 
transcripts of those meetings, but rather were typically summary accounts that 
indicate motions for committee action, amendments to and discussion of those 
proposals, and resulting votes.  HUAC subcommittees included those for legislation, 
national security, and communism in the government, as well as various ad hoc 
subcommittees with mandates to work on investigatory issues of a limited duration.   
The Files and Reference Section functioned like a repository of information 
on subversive organizations and activities drawn mostly from public sources, such as 
newspapers.  The staff for this section collected a massive amount of raw data an  
cross-indexed it, but did no investigatory or analytical work.105  At one time, the Files 
and Reference Section maintained two major collections: one of periodicals of 
subversive organizations and another of subversive pamphlets.  These were sent to 
the Library of Congress after the dissolution of the HUAC.106     
The investigatory and analytical functions fell under the purview of the 
Investigative Section, which offers an abundance of documents that are of key 
importance to reassessing the HUAC’s conduct in the Hollywood investigations.  
This section includes ten subsections, four of which are critical to this study.  The 
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105 Ibid, 10. 




names of the subsections are Transcripts of Executive Session Testimony; 
Investigative Name Files; Investigative Organization Files; and Exhibits, Evidence 
and Other Records Related to Various Committee Investigations.107   
The HUAC or one of its subcommittees could take testimony in executive 
session if a majority of committee or subcommittee members believed that public 
testimony “…might 1) compromise classified information or endanger the national 
security; 2) defame, degrade, incriminate or unjustly injure the reputation of any
person; or 3) adversely affect the National interest.”108  Through careful inspection of 
the transcripts, I have identified a minimum of fifty-nine instances of testimony taken 
in executive session that have at least some bearing on the HUAC’s investigations of 
Hollywood.  Individuals giving such testimony include Hollywood celebrities, 
industry executives, labor leaders and current and former CPUSA leaders with ties to 
the media.  I believe that this newly available testimony will lead to a revised and 
more nuanced understanding of the HUAC’s Hollywood investigations.     
When the HUAC decided to initiate an investigation of an individual or an 
organization, the Investigative Section staff gathered information from a number of 
sources, including data on hand in the Files and Reference Section.109  The 
Investigative Name Files and the Investigative Organization Files repres nt the staff’s 
efforts in this respect.  The content of files varies according to the degree to which the 
HUAC pursued an investigation of a particular individual or organization.  Some 
investigations ended at the preliminary stage when the Committee or its staff 
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recognized a lack of evidence to proceed or that the information sparking the 
investigation was erroneous.  Some files indicate that an investigation became full-
fledged and committee staff used the information to prepare for a hearing.  On the 
other hand, some files indicate ample evidence of communist activity and that a 
hearing was planned or warranted, but it never materialized for reasons that are now 
obscure.  In those cases, the subject of the investigation escaped the scrutiny of the 
HUAC and the attendant public notoriety.  When, for whatever reason, the 
Committee closed an investigation, the file was retired to either of these two sections.  
The subsection with the cumbersome name “Exhibits, Evidence and Other 
Records Related to Various Committee Investigations” is a repository for documents 
supporting major investigations that resulted in public hearings.  Three sets of records 
found in this series are of particular importance to this dissertation.  They are the files 
named “Eisler, Hanns”; “Eisler, Gerhart”; and “Hollywood Black List” (sic).  These 
files typically hold items of evidence used by committee members or staff 
investigators during the questioning of witnesses.  For example, if the chief 
investigator asked a witness if he or she gave an interview for a communist 
periodical, he could produce a Photostatic copy of a clipping of the interview in 
question from the designated publication.  Thus, such material was often used to 
establish a particular line of questioning and/or corroborate or contradict a witness’s 
answers.  Because many of the witness called before the HUAC refused to answer
questions citing Fifth Amendment privilege, much of this information never came to 
light during public hearings, though some of it did find its way into the published 




other documents is critical to understanding the conduct of the HUAC in the 
Hollywood investigations.          
In summary, despite the existence of a number of texts addressing the history 
of the HUAC’s investigations of Hollywood in the 1940s and 1950s, the availability 
of new data offers a compelling reason for pursuing further scholarly study in this
area.  The recent opening of access to the formerly sealed HUAC files holds the 
possibility that new information may lead a new, more complete understanding of the 
HUAC probes into this key sector of the American media.   
Plan of Organization.  The first three chapters constitute the rationale for this 
dissertation.  Chapter One represents an introduction to the problem and offers a 
rationale for the central research question that this dissertation will address.  Chapter 
Two presents a comprehensive review of the scholarly literature on the subject.  
Chapter Three states the research methodology used in this study and offers a 
justification of the conceptual framework employed to guide the methodology.  
Additionally, in this chapter, I have specified in detail the new data that demonstrates 
the significance of the research question and outlined a plan of organization for this
dissertation.   
 Chapter Four will offer a two-part historiographic essay designed to establish 
an understanding of the domestic political and international environment in which the 
HUAC investigations of Hollywood took place.  While cause and effect relationships 
are maddeningly difficult for the historian to establish, I believe that good historical 




events of the past took place.  This allows the reader a much richer understanding of 
the past and helps one make better sense of the decisions of historical agents.   
In terms of establishing context, there can be little doubt that international 
developments had a significant impact on the political and philosophical environment 
in which the HUAC operated.  These include the collapse of the Soviet-American 
military alliance immediately after World War II and the radical realignment of the 
international, post-war balance of power.  Another contextual element for discussion 
is the fact that Communist gains in Europe and Asia made it appear that communism 
had replaced fascism as the political movement of the future.  Finally, this section 
will address how the advent of the nuclear age raised the stakes of international 
espionage to a degree never experienced in the past.   
 Chapter Four will include a second section offering an account of the 
significant changes on the American domestic scene in the decade and a half before 
the HUAC investigations of Hollywood.  Foremost amongst these would be the 
intense reaction by many to certain aspects of the New Deal that sought and achieved 
fundamental changes in property rights, the redistribution of wealth, and the proper 
role of the government in economic affairs.  The other important developments under 
discussion in this section are the rise and demise of the Popular Front coalition in 
support of the New Deal and the eventual post-war splintering of the liberal-left 
coalition with the onset of the Cold War.  An additional contextual factor is the 
resurgence of the Republican Party in the 1946 Congressional elections.  Finally, as  
result of experiences with Nazi Germany, it was an era in which American authorities 




to find an appropriate response to it compatible with democracy.  Thus, the goal of 
this chapter is to set the stage for what followed when the HUAC turned its attention 
to exposing communism in Hollywood.   
 The central focus of Chapter Five is a study of the investigatory methods 
employed by the HUAC and the evolution of the investigators’ logic.  I will draw 
primarily on documents from the newly opened HUAC archives for the evidentiary 
substance of this chapter.  A prominent feature of those investigatory methods was 
the early and extensive use of the Communist press as the HUAC’s primary pool of 
data to fuel its inquiries.   I will argue in fact that the Communist press made the 
Committee’s investigations possible.  Evidence presented in this chapter will show 
that the Committee’s methods were not those held in the popular imagination, i.e. the 
practice of spying into the lives of private citizens.  Rather, much of what Committee 
investigators did was to parse out the public record.  In summary, if the HUAC 
represented “Big Brother,” then “Big Brother” spent a great deal of its time scanning 
communist newspapers rather than peeking in peoples’ windows.   
 Chapter Six, entitled “The Brothers Eisler: From Manhattan to Malibu,” will 
tell the story of how the HUAC discovered a link between the Comintern’s one-time 
plenipotentiary to the CPUSA and Hollywood.  Gerhart Eisler served as Stalin’s loyal 
representative to the CPUSA for a time in the 1930’s and returned to the United 
States during World War II to help shape the American party line as a covert agent 
working in the American communist press.  Eisler entered the United States illegally 
and worked as a journalist under a number of pseudonyms.  Once exposed, Eisler 




court of public opinion by using the press.  Faced with imminent jail time, Eisler 
escaped to the Democratic Republic of (East) Germany, where he received a 
government appointment.   
It was the case of Gerhart Eisler that led the HUAC to investigate another 
Eisler – this one named Hanns, who was the younger brother of Gerhart.  Hanns was 
a composer of some international renown, who wrote the official anthem of the 
Comintern, not surprisingly entitled: “Comintern.”  His name came to the attention of 
the Committee through its investigation of his brother.  Like his brother, Hanns was 
also a member of the German Communist Party and later a Comintern official.  At 
one point in the mid-1930s, he was the director of the Comintern’s International 
Music Bureau and hailed by the Daily Worker (March 1, 1935) as the “foremost 
revolutionary composer.”  The lyrics to his operas called for the bloody overthrow of 
the capitalist ruling elite.  Also, like his brother, Hanns committed perjury to obtain 
entry into the United States.   
 The younger Eisler was in and out of the United States several times during 
the 1930s, including several trips to Moscow.  When he was in the country, he taught 
courses in musical composition at the New School for Social Research and wrote a 
text on scoring music for films under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.  Later
he moved to Hollywood to work as a film composer.  This chapter will recount what 
the Committee investigation revealed about Hanns Eisler and why it spurred the 
HUAC toward a full scale investigation of communist activity in the motion picture 




 In Chapter Seven, I will argue that, based on evidence from HUAC archives, 
the Committee acted as if exposing the various American social and political 
organizations that came to be known as communist-led fronts was an important end 
unto itself.  This view stands in contradistinction to that held by a number of civil 
society and revisionist historians.  They have argued that the HUAC’s interest in the 
fronts was to create guilt by association for front members, who apparently had no 
ties or at best very tenuous links with the communist movement.  In this view, the 
Committee sought to make charges of communism or communist sympathies stick by 
associating such innocents with front organizations, which often held a large non-
communist membership, who were unaware of the communist links of some of their 
leaders.  On the contrary, I will maintain that the evidence shows that the HUAC 
acted to combat the fronts as a response to what committee members saw as a 
powerful set of organizational and propaganda tools at the disposal of the CPUSA.  
The manipulation of those tools, HUAC members believed, served the direct policy 
interests of international communism and the Soviet Union, and subverted the normal 
functioning American body politic.   
 Hollywood offered the CPUSA a ready pool of “joiners,” who served as 
patrons and members of numerous communist fronts.  This is one reason why the 
CPUSA went to great lengths to infiltrate the motion picture business and court 
sympathetic Hollywood insiders.  The CPUSA’s additional goals in Hollywood 
appeared to be the cultivation of celebrities, who would bring prestige to party causes 
and influence others to join those efforts, and to acquire money.  The HUAC 




CPUSA’s ability to exploit the benefits of Hollywood celebrity than in exposing the 
motion picture money tree.   
 This stands in contradistinction to the general belief that the HUAC was most 
interested in forcing witnesses to name under oath the names of those individuals they 
thought were members of the CPUSA.  This practice by the HUAC of compelling 
witnesses to name names is arguably the most controversial aspect of the Blacklist 
era.  Many civil society and revisionist historians, along with the “unfriendly” 
witnesses, have reviled the HUAC for this practice.  Even many anticommunists have 
found it distasteful.  Often former communists were willing to testify about their own 
activities, but balked when forced to make statements under oath about others.  Many 
vigorously resisted the possibility of becoming a “fink” or a “stool-pigeon.”  Those 
who succumbed to the pressure of naming names often felt great anguish and guilt for
the rest of their lives.  Yet, despite the negative publicity and public condemnation 
this practice engendered, the HUAC persisted in asking nearly every Hollywood 
communist or ex-communist to name names upon pain of a contempt of congress 
citation.  I will argue in this chapter that this process was an exercise by th  HUAC in 
the triangulation of its data and, contrary to the views offered in the current 
historiography on the subject, it was of less import to the Committee than the task of
exposing communist fronts.   
 Chapter Eight, the final chapter, will offer a summary of the significant 
findings of this dissertation and draw appropriate conclusions as to how historians 
might reinterpret the conduct of the HUAC in light of the new data.  It will also 




which the American body politic struggled to find a balance between preserving the 
American ideals of freedom, including the freedom for political minorities to believe 
in and espouse decidedly unpopular ideas, and the necessity to protect the institutions 
that extend those freedoms from clear and present dangers.  Since more recent events 
have shown that this challenge has not been resolved, a more complete understanding 
of the historical record is a likely helpful contribution to the dialogue on this critical 





Chapter 4: Background and Context 
 1945 was a year of significant change.  World War II came to an end with the 
unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.  This victory resulted in a 
fundamental shift in the international geopolitical balance of power.  The United 
States and the Soviet Union became the world’s two superpowers, replacing the 
former European multi-polar balance of power.  Furthermore, the recognized 
international borders on the European map saw significant change, primarily to the 
benefit of the Soviet Union and the detriment of Germany.  This in turn led to several 
years of massive and disruptive population shifts with many refugees migrating west.  
The deleterious effect of the war on the economic and military strength of the
imperial European powers began the process of the disintegration of their colonial 
empires, which would largely disappear within the next fifteen or so years.  Often in a 
reaction to the consequences of imperialism, communism with its emphasis on 
liberation ideology came to influence heavily the politics of many of these n wly 
independent nations.  Also, the world entered the nuclear age with the explosion of 
the atom bomb over Nagasaki and Hiroshima.  In the future, this would permanently 
change the stakes when nations armed with nuclear weapons became involved in wars 
or the threat of wars.  The peril of mass human annihilation by atom and later 
hydrogen bombs transformed the balance of power into a balance of terror.   
Likewise, in many ways the United States domestically was a very different 
country in 1945 than it had been a decade earlier.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who dominated American politics for over twelve years, died in office and a new 




successful politically, ultimately failed to bring the United States out of the Great 
Depression. It took the armaments build up for the war to do this.  With the end of the 
Depression, significant support for experimentation with corporate statist or sociali t 
economic models came to an end.  The political consensus that brought about the 
New Deal frayed and then collapsed after FDR’s passing.  With the unemployment 
rate returned to normal by historical standards and economic expansion on the 
increase, in the late 1940s the mood of the country shifted to the center and then in 
the 1950s even more conservative.  The resurgence of the Republican Party in 
American politics from near political irrelevance in the mid-1930s reflect d this 
swing.  Accompanying this transformation was a pronounced change in the attitudes 
of a considerable portion of the American body politic’s opinions toward communism 
in general and the Soviet Union in particular.  Typically, Americans no longer saw 
Josef Stalin as “Uncle Joe,” which was his nickname in wartime propaganda.  The 
necessity of having the Soviet Union as a wartime ally no longer existed.  Hope for 
postwar cooperation revealed itself to be a chimera.  Additionally, many of the 
international developments outlined above contributed to the hardening of American 
public opinion into a view that saw international communism as pernicious and a 
menace.     
The events of this era had a profound impact in shaping the institutional 
behavior of both the CPUSA and the HUAC.  This in turn led directly to their 
collision over the Party’s activities in Hollywood.  The adoption of beliefs, policy 
decisions based on those beliefs, and the actions to implement those decisions most 




an account of the multifaceted domestic and international milieu facing HUAC 
congressmen as they pursued the Hollywood investigations, as this no doubt 
influenced their decision-making process.   
The New Deal.  Some have criticized the HUAC with assertion that the 
Committee used investigations of communism as a cover for an attack on the 
accomplishments of the New Deal.  They argued that reactionary committee embers 
opposed to FDR’s progressive reforms sought to sabotage them with smear tactics. 
Specifically, they alleged that these “reactionaries” attempted to create in the public 
mind an association between the New Deal and communism through unsubstantiated 
and spurious charges.110  Regardless of one’s position on the accuracy of these 
charges, it is useful to place such claims within the context of the political and social 
changes of the era in order to understand the conduct of the HUAC.   
The Great Depression was arguably the most serious peacetime crisis in the 
history of the United States.  Economic adversity was serious, prolonged and 
widespread.  A solution had defied the Hoover Administration and, when Franklin 
Roosevelt took over the presidency, the situation was as alarming as ever with bank 
failures reaching calamitous proportions in early 1933.  Because Roosevelt and his
advisors were convinced the Depression was the equivalent of a wartime emergency, 
they sought to solve the crisis through government bureaucratic control similar to th t
employed during World War I.111  Thus, the new administration took an approach to 
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combat the Great Depression that resulted in a fundamental change of the degree and 
scope of federal intervention in the American peacetime economy.      
Understanding the impact of the Great Depression and FDR’s unprecedented 
use of federal power in response is important in establishing the context of this study 
for three reasons.  First, to many Americans the severe economic dislocation appeared 
to portend the collapse of capitalism and its replacement by a different politico-
economic system, such as syndicalism, socialism, communism, or fascism.  Second, 
significant deprivation fueled interest in radical organizations, such as the CPUSA, 
that advocated for one of these new economic models.  Third, the vigorous response 
to the Depression by the Roosevelt Administration employing economic 
interventionist methods alarmed many conservatives, including most of the HUAC 
congressmen, who believed the federal government was overstepping its authority 
with programs that smacked of communism. 
The measures taken by FDR and his advisors during the New Deal included 
significant federal intervention into agricultural, industrial and labor markets.  
Roosevelt’s agricultural legislation attempted to alleviate persistent rural poverty by 
maintaining high agricultural prices via limiting supply, imposing crop quotas, paying 
farmers a subsidy to keep land out of production, and promoting compulsory 
marketing agreements.112  Later legislation formalized government price fixing on a 
number of agricultural products.  The National Labor Relations Act (i.e. the Wagner 
Act), which had the goal of a closed shop and the creation of a monopoly of labor, 
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strongly encouraged unionization.  This legislation and attendant executive branch 
regulation through the National Labor Relations Board attempted to cure the 
Depression with a high wage policy.113  The National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 led to the establishment of cartels governed by industrial codes.  The aim of 
these codes, which had the force of law through presidential executive order, was to 
promote industrial recovery through restricted production and higher industrial prices.  
Although the Supreme Court later found the NIRA unconstitutional, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 reinstituted the wage provisions of the now defunct NIRA.   
To pay for his New Deal programs, FDR promoted legislation requiring 
sharply higher taxes, especially on the wealthy and corporations, and repeatedly 
reduced deductions and restricted tax shelters.  The Administration introduced or 
raised taxes on: corporate dividends and excess profits (1933); personal income taxes 
(1934, 1935, 1941 and 1942); estate taxes (1934); undistributed profits (1936); and 
social security (1937).114    Moreover, the Revenue Act of 1937 further reduced, 
restricted or eliminated numerous deductions and loopholes in the federal tax code.  
FDR criticized those who sought to make use of legal deductions and tax reduction 
strategies and the owners of big business who opposed his economic policies.  In his 
acceptance speech for the 1936 Democratic presidential renomination, Roosevelt 
called his policy opponents “economic royalists [who had] carved new dynasties” and 
“privileged princes…thirsting for power” who had achieved an “industrial 
dictatorship.”  Not only did their “despotism” cause the Depression, but he implied 
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the leaders of American big business were “cold-blooded” and specifically called
them “the enemy within our gates,” questioning their patriotism.115 
Historian Jim Powell characterized the New Deal as a time of experimentation 
with radical ideas in the hopes of finding a cure for the Depression.  He asserted that 
“…practically everything was tried.  Some New Dealers were outright socialists, and 
they had their day.”  For example, FDR advisor Rexford Tugwell openly admired 
Soviet economic methods and advocated the adoption of central planning through the 
mechanism of the National Recovery Administration.116  Powell does not argue that 
the New Deal was a full scale imitation of Soviet planning.  However, he does assert 
that the Soviet experience provided inspiration for some New Deal experiments.117  
The idea that the New Deal was a shade of Soviet central planning and that Roosevelt 
demonstrated hostility to the business class was not the isolated belief of a few 
rightwing “crazies.”  By the end of the decade and after seven years of the New Deal 
that had not cured the Depression, business leaders felt even more government 
economic intervention and control was at hand.  These employers were convinced of 
Roosevelt’s hostility toward them.  Powell quotes a poll of employers by Fortune 
magazine in 1941, in which 93 percent asserted “they expected their property rights 
undermined and also anticipated the possibility of a dictatorship.”118   
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Whether or not FDR’s contemporary opponents or antipathetic historians, 
such as Powell, were correct in their criticism of the New Deal is irrelevant.  
Additionally, the actual effectiveness and/or the appropriateness of FDR’s policies 
are not the point either.  What is relevant is the perception of those policies to a 
significant segment of the political and business establishment during the era in 
question.  There is strong evidence to suggest that, rightly or wrongly, many felt that 
the New Deal smacked of communism.  Furthermore, they believed that the 
Roosevelt Administration, which had normalized relations with the Soviet Union in 
1933, was leading the country down a dangerous path.  Although FDR has gone down 
in history as a master politician and one of the great American presidents, it is useful 
to remember that many of his political contemporaries, some of whom were in his 
own party, harbored grave and genuine doubts about the effectiveness, wisdom and 
propriety of his policies.  In some cases, especially those of Southern Democrats, who 
wanted to uphold conservative business practices along with segregation, this 
partially explains why they became FDR’s political opponents.119  Thus, the 
Committee’s suspicion of the New Deal and its various agencies did not arise ex 
nihilo, but rather within a specific historical environment.   
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The Popular Front.  Another contextual aspect of the domestic scene in the 
United States that later affected the HUAC hearings was the rise and demise of the 
Popular Front in support of the New Deal.  This represents another case in which 
Roosevelt’s critics were able to associate the New Deal with communism.  To 
understand the Popular Front era, one must first understand the Third Period (1927-
1934) that preceded it.   
During the Third Period, through the mechanism of the Comintern, Stalin 
attempted to transform the national communist parties controlled by Moscow into the 
recognized and dominant party of the left in their respective countries.  In other 
words, his goal was to eliminate the competition of the syndicalists, socialists and 
Trotskyites for the loyalty of those on the left, particularly amongst workers, artists 
and intellectuals.  Communists refused all cooperation with other leftwing parties nd 
gave social democrats the designation “social fascists.”  The communists tried to 
draw members away from the established trade unions dominated by the socialist 
into competing unions, which were either overtly or more likely covertly communist-
controlled.120    
Although it benefited Stalin personally in his struggle for control of both the 
CPSU and the international communist movement, the Third Period policy was a 
disaster for those institutions.121  This was particularly the case in Germany, where 
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many credited it with unintentionally enabling the Nazis to come to power becaus  it 
forced the powerful socialist movement to concentrate on fighting the communists 
rather than on opposing Hitler.  Likewise the Soviet-controlled communists figh ing 
on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War engaged in a similar policy.  As they 
conducted bloody purges on the left, particularly aimed at the syndical-anarchists, 
they weakened Republican forces enough to insure victory by Franco’s Nationalists.  
In other words, the Third Period line was particularly suicidal.  Furthermore, the 
sharp turn to the left that the Third Period represented did not earn the communists 
any significant additional broad-based support, even amongst industrial workers.  In 
fact, it pushed most of the local communist parties further toward the revolutionary 
fringe.  Rather than developing into a credible movement on the left, the Third Period 
further marginalized international communism, which would have collapsed without 
the direct support of Soviet resources.   
With the ascent of fascist-style regimes in Germany, Spain, and Portugal, as 
well as in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Comintern made another
sharp turn, this time to the right.  In mid-1934, Moscow instigated a new international 
line, known as the Popular Front, which lasted until the Stalin-Hitler Pact of August 
1939.  The aim of the Popular Front was exactly the opposite of the Third Period, 
namely a broad-based and unified response on the left against the reactionary forces 
of Nazism and fascism on the ultra-right.  Stalin feared an economically revitalized 
and militarily reinvigorated Germany with an anticommunist ideology dominating 
Central Europe and threatening Soviet territory.  Faced with this possibility, Soviet 
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foreign policy sought accommodation with the Western democracies in cooperation 
against Hitler and to achieve, if possible, an anti-German alliance.  Thus, Soviet 
foreign interests again determined the party line of the national parties within the 
Comintern. 
The CPUSA dutifully followed the Comintern directive and soon began 
promoting the Popular Front ideal in the United States.  Well-known American 
communist hardliners, such as William Z. Foster, found themselves marginalized 
with assignments to powerless party posts, while others were expelled from the par y 
outright.  Almost overnight the CPUSA ceased its “struggle on the left” and began 
advocating cooperation with all “progressive” elements within American society.  
The CPUSA quickly became pro-Roosevelt, whom a year earlier it labeled a fascist, 
and worked diligently for his reelection in 1936 and 1944.122  It also became 
decidedly pro-New Deal.  Revolutionary rhetoric became suddenly absent from the 
speeches of party politicians and from the pages of party publications, such as the 
Daily Worker.  The new CPUSA leader, Earl Browder, sought to put an American 
and patriotic face on the party.  He adopted a new party slogan: “Communism is 
Twentieth Century Americanism.”  A bust of Lenin found itself alongside of those of 
Jefferson and Lincoln on party banners.  The party dropped the policy of competing 
trade unions and its labor organizers began working inside existing unions.  In fact, 
communist organizers became critical to the success of a number of unions, including 
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the United Auto Workers, as well as in John L. Lewis’ Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO).123  Finally, it was during the Popular Front period that the 
CPUSA concentrated significant resources on fighting for civil rights and briging 
relief to the unemployed.   
Party membership rose dramatically during the Popular Front and in fact it 
reached the highest point in the CPUSA’s history during this period.  However, the 
most significant result of the Popular Front is that its appearance of moderatin and 
concern for economic and social justice led many artists and intellectuals to join or 
become sympathetic to the CPUSA and the causes it espoused.  These included a 
number of novelists, playwrights, screenwriters and entertainers.  If the party did not 
quite make it into the mainstream of American politics, party members became 
accepted collaborators with many progressives and liberals in their struggle to attain a 
more just and equitable society.  One key historian of American communism labeled 
the Popular Front era the Party’s “heyday.”124  It was during this time when the 
Hollywood branch of the CPUSA recruited most of its members in the motion picture 
industry.  However, a core group of Stalinist “true believers,” such as screenwriter 
John Howard Lawson, joined during the Third Period and stuck with the party long 
after it again returned to the political wilderness after the Popular Front ended.   
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The Popular Front lasted approximately five years, collapsing suddenly in 
August 1939 with the conclusion of the Stalin-Hitler Pact.  In support of the new line 
from the USSR, communist parties worldwide abruptly ceased cooperation with other 
forces on the left in the fight against fascism.  In less than a week of the news from 
Moscow, the American party changed its line and began denouncing France and 
Britain as warmongering, imperialist nations.  It suddenly adopted a policy of 
advocating strict American neutrality in the impending European conflict.  Senior 
party propagandists and apologists began denouncing the horrors of war and 
celebrating the virtues of pacifism.125  The abandonment by the CPUSA of the 
struggle against the fascist menace, its failure to denounce Stalin’s cooperation with 
Hitler, and Soviet territorial acquisitions at the expense of its weak neighbors cost the 
American party dearly.  Membership dropped significantly.  Many liberals and 
progressives felt betrayed and never trusted the communist movement again.  The 
fallout from the Pact again marginalized the CPUSA to the fringe of American 
politics.  The change in line discredited the motives of the party as its loyalty to 
Moscow at all costs became obvious to those with an open mind.  Its reputation 
across the political spectrum lay in tatters.   
Although FDR never publically recognized communist contributions to his 
policy goals, they were valuable and the fallout from the Stalin-Hitler Pact meant he 
temporarily lost one component of his political coalition in support of the New Deal.  
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The political wilderness that the CPUSA found itself in because of its loyalty to 
Moscow lasted twenty-two months until June 1941 when Germany launched 
Operation Barbarossa, attacking the Soviet Union.  The Stalin-Hitler Pact became a 
dead letter and communists worldwide again had the luxury of being both pro-Soviet 
Union and anti-Nazi.  For the duration of World War II, American communists could 
both be patriotic and support the USSR.  Many party members fought heroically in 
both the European and Pacific theatres.  Party membership recovered to a significant 
degree, though it did not reach pre-Pact levels.  The party’s reputation was restored 
somewhat, but resentment and mistrust lingered amongst many of its former allies on 
the left.  However, this happy circumstance for American communists did not survive 
the war.  In April 1945, Stalin signaled a sharp turn to the left and the CPUSA 
immediately complied, making any hope of a full restoration of the Popular Front 
impossible and Earl Browder’s dream of peaceful co-existence between the 
communist and capitalist camps evaporated.  Hardliners under the direction of 
Moscow deposed Browder as head of the CPUSA and later expelled him from the 
party.  At Stalin’s behest, the Party abandoned wartime cooperation and returned to a 
far left position under the leadership of William Z. Foster, the hard-line Stalinis  who 
had earlier been pushed aside to make way for the Popular Front.  This hard turn to 
the left, when the party once again advocated the total overthrow of American 
economic and political system, was the position of the CPUSA in 1947-1952 when 
the HUAC conducted its investigation of Hollywood.   
Political Changes After FDR’s Death.  The departure of the communists from 




which had endured for almost a decade and a half, began to splinter with the onset of 
the Cold War and, even before FDR’s death, began to fray around the edges as many 
conservative Southern Democrats rebelled against Roosevelt’s progressive policies.  
This is significant because Southern Democrats consistently played an important r le 
in the HUAC.  The founding chairman of the Committee was Martin Dies of Texas.  
John Rankin of Mississippi was solely responsible for the parliamentary move that 
transformed the HUAC from a special ad hoc committee to a permanent standing 
committee of the House of Representatives.  John Wood of Georgia was the chairman 
of the Committee during the second Hollywood investigations in 1951-1952.   
After Truman took over the presidency, the fragmentation of the FDR 
coalition accelerated.  By the time he ran for reelection in 1948, a sizeable portion of 
the leftwing of the Democratic Party had peeled off to support former Vice-President 
Henry A. Wallace, an admirer of the Soviet experiment.  Wallace ran for the 
presidency on the Progressive Party ticket with the vigorous support of the American 
communists, amongst other groups.  Anticommunist liberals and centrists within the 
Democratic Party remained faithful to Truman, but many Southern Democrats also 
bolted the party to vote for Strom Thurman, who ran as a Dixiecrat, i.e. on the ticket 
of the States’ Rights Democratic Party.  Thurmond received thirty-nine votes in he 
Electoral College, carrying Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina, and 
winning more than 1.1 million popular votes.  Wallace won approximately the same 
number of popular votes, but did not score any votes in the Electoral College.  




victory and the Democrats controlled the White House for four more years.  
However, Franklin Roosevelt’s political coalition was permanently shattered.   
 The resurgence of the Republican Party in general and its performance in the 
1946 and 1952 congressional elections in particular is another important element in 
the political context that impacted the HUAC investigations of Hollywood.  The 
GOP’s political comeback was long delayed.  The Republican Party had won control 
of the House of Representatives in the 1916 election and dominated that chamber 
until the 1932 election that brought Democrats to power in the Congress and 
Roosevelt to the White House.  The 1936 elections for the 75th Congress saw the 
nadir of Republican electoral efforts with only 88 representatives elected ou  of a total 
of 435 in the House of Representatives and 16 senators out of a total of 96.  After a 
slow climb from political oblivion, the GOP won back control of the Congress a 
decade later in the 1946 election.  The Republicans believed FDR had been weak on 
national security and counter espionage and argued that Truman had been slow to 
correct his predecessor’s deficiencies.  Thus, in 1947 the GOP now controlled the 
congressional committees and Republican J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey became 
chairman of the HUAC.  By the end of the year, the Committee would be 
investigating security lapses under FDR, as well as communist infiltration in a 
number of social institution and industries, including the motion picture business.   
Propaganda.  During the decade before the HUAC’s Hollywood hearings, 
some government officials and scholars became aware of and concerned about the 
power of mass political propaganda.  This began an on-going struggle to find an 




Party’s propaganda chief as of 1930 and the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment 
and Propaganda from 1933-1945, embodied the reason for the concern for the power 
of propaganda.  Beginning in the late 1920’s, Goebbels mastered the art of mass 
propaganda through the medium of newspapers.  Later he developed effective if 
cynical uses for the media of radio and the cinema.  His philosophy of mass media 
propaganda was cynical because it was entirely instrumental: mass persuasion was to 
serve political ends through the manipulation of the facts with no regard to truth.  
Goebbels asserted, “Propaganda does not have anything to do with the truth.  We 
serve truth by serving a German victory.”126  Early on during the Nazi reign, 
Goebbels was able to convert one of Germany’s foremost documentary filmmakers, 
Leni Riefenstahl, into the service of regime.  She directed Triumph of the Will and 
Olympia amongst other films that effectively combined superb cinematic technique 
with a celebration of Nazi ideology and Weltanschauung.   
Whereas Hollywood benefited from the steady stream of German film artists 
who came to the United States as refugees from the Nazi regime, in general Am ican 
filmmakers held the Soviet cinema in high regard for its aesthetic and technique, even 
if they disagreed with its politics.  In particular, Sergei Eisenstein’s The Battleship 
Potemkin won international admiration for its ability to move an audience 
emotionally and sway it toward a particular point of view.  When Douglas Fairbanks 
and Mary Pickford saw it screened in Berlin, the film moved Pickford to tears, while 
Fairbanks told reporters: “The Battleship Potemkin is the most powerful and profound 
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experience of my life.”127  Moreover, the effectiveness of this film also represented a 
strong influence on Goebbels, who aspired for Nazi propaganda to achieve similar 
ends.  As one scholar said, “Like Lenin, he [Goebbels] realized the necessity of 
mixing entertainment with propaganda so that the propaganda content was 
disguised.”128  Additionally, many Hollywood professionals held Eisenstein’s 
theoretical writings, which offered a Marxist perspective on filmic technique, in high 
regard.  To this day, American film schools usually include a careful study of 
Eisenstein’s film theory in their curriculum.  Critics understood that the Soviet 
filmmakers’ use of montage to manipulate the emotions of the audience and distort 
their perceptions of reality was a key element of their aesthetic.129  Lenin’s oft quoted 
statement: “Cinema is the most important of all the arts for us…” reinforced the idea 
that subversive radicals might manipulate this entertainment medium toward 
revolutionary ends.130  
American awareness of the effective use of propaganda found expression 
during World War II when many Hollywood professionals and institutions actively 
sought ways to serve in support of the war effort.  The line between the genre of the 
motion picture documentary and the propaganda film is often a fine one to determine.  
Certainly the war documentaries produced by Hollywood professionals for the 
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American government offered effectual propaganda value.  Hollywood directors 
Frank Capra and Anatole Litvak, a German émigré, made the Oscar-winning “Why 
We Fight” series for the U.S. Army’s Special Service Division.  The Bureau of 
Motion Pictures of the Office of War Information (OWI) distributed the series.  Clark 
Gable, William Holden, Robert Preston, Walter Huston and Ronald Reagan were a 
few of the screen stars who narrated or appeared in propaganda films for the OWI.  
Also of note was John Ford’s direction for the U.S. Navy of The Battle of Midway, 
which also won an Oscar.  During the filming, Ford sustained a wound from enemy 
fire. 
Historian Allan Winkler tells the story of the OWI’s brief and controversial 
existence.131  Critics in Washington and in the media often asserted that the OWI 
sought to inject persuasive propaganda into its productions, rather than sticking to a 
purely informational role.  The OWI also attracted charges that it some of its 
materials were partisan, aiming at a Roosevelt reelection victory in 1944, and that it 
employed communists at the taxpayers’ expense.  Because of these allegations, 
several times Congress cut funding for the OWI and attempted to curtail its range of 
activities in order to restrict its mission to an informational role only.  As we hall see 
later in this study, the HUAC eventually subpoenaed several of those now ex-
communists in order to hear their testimony.    
Given all of the above, one could argue that the worry over the possibility of 
subversive propaganda finding its way into the American media, which was a stated 
concern of the HUAC, was not unreasonable.  Media critics, such as Walter 
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Lippmann, had warned for several decades of the negative impact of propaganda on 
democratic practices. 132  Thus, congressmen in the late 1940s might have been naïve 
about the actual danger of this sort of subversion, but at the time the actual threat as 
opposed to possible risks was not clear.  One can plausibly argue then that the belief 
by congressmen serving on the HUAC of the necessity to investigate charges of 
subversive content by and communist infiltration of Hollywood was not merely a 
product of anti-New Deal politics or the quest for media publicity, but was sincerely 
held.   
Revelations of Domestic Spying.  In the immediate aftermath of World War 
II, a number of spy scandals seriously called into question the Roosevelt 
Administration’s domestic security and counterintelligence policy or lack thereof.  
These revelations of Soviet espionage were no doubt on the minds of the 
congressmen serving on the HUAC as they undertook their on-going investigation of 
Hollywood.   
Historians Haynes and Klehr have convincingly argued that legal convictions 
for espionage in a court of law are not good indicators of the reality or the extentof 
Soviet spying.  Nor do convictions provide a reliable indication of the guilt or 
innocence of those suspected and/or charged with spying.  Not only does the very 
nature of the crime, for which the perpetrators aim to leave no trace, makes it very 
difficult to prove, government officials are often reluctant to admit into evidence in a 
court of law the nature and content of the documents purloined.  This is because often 
public exposure in open court might do even more damage to national security.  Also, 
                                                
132 See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1997).  




government counterespionage officials might opt not to arrest the spy in order to hide 
their knowledge of the spy ring.  The purpose of such a choice would represent an 
attempt to identify even more important spies or their handlers, try to turn the spy into 
a counteragent, or feed the foreign government disinformation.133  The historical 
record, as established through newly available archival evidence in the last dec de, 
reveals that the extent and gravity of Soviet espionage in the 1940s and 1950s was 
much more serious that the record of court convictions would indicate.  Haynes’ and 
Klehr’s argument offers a different perspective from those historians and critics who 
minimized the threat of domestic spying and concluded that in the absence of such a 
threat, the HUAC must have knowingly probed Hollywood for other, more sinister 
reasons.  In fact, the HUAC investigators, who investigated such persons as Alger 
Hiss and Gerhart Eisler, were well aware of the gap between the sparserecord of 
convictions of espionage in court and the reality of Soviet spying.  A broad inspection 
of the HUAC files reveals that Committee investigators carefully read the court 
transcripts of the various spy trials.   
The investigation by the FBI and the prosecution by the Justice Department of 
the Amerasia spy case was the first to reveal the possible significance and scope of 
Soviet espionage.  The details of the case are too complicated to recount in detail 
here.  However, the general outline of the event is worth noting because of the fallout 
from the investigation and resulting trial.  In early 1945, an intelligence analyst for 
the wartime spy agency Office of Strategic Services, which was the precursor of the 
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CIA, noticed that an article in the journal Amerasia contained major passages lifted 
word for word from a classified report he had written.  When OSS agents broke into 
the journal’s offices, they discovered a huge number of classified government 
documents, many of which came from the State Department.  The FBI took the case 
over and the subsequent investigation revealed a case of clear espionage with the 
source being State Department employees.  It also demonstrated strong pro-
communist sympathies by some of the policy analysts in the State Department with 
responsibilities for advising on East Asia in general and China in particular.  Using a 
wiretap, investigators overheard suspects name Harry Dexter White, an Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury, as a potential source of information.  White’s duties included 
supervision of the Treasury’s international monetary policy.134    
When the Justice Department prosecuted the various people involved for 
espionage, the result was a debacle.  White House aide Lauchlin Currie got involved 
and hired a former FDR aide, Tommy Corcoran, to bring high powered political 
pressure to bear on the prosecutors.  Also involved in the cover up was Assistant 
Attorney General James McGranery, who later became Attorney General a d who 
lied under oath during his confirmation hearings about his role in the case.135  
Furthermore, the less than aggressive prosecutor in the case later took a lucrative job 
at the law firm that represented one of the defendants.  The result was that most of
those charged had their cases dismissed before trial and the two persons who did go 
to trial obtained a plea bargain and only paid fines.  At the time, the cover up limited 
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the immediate damage of the Amerasia case to the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations.  However, subsequent congressional inquiries revealed enough of the 
details to give credence to suspicions by anticommunists, including those on the 
HUAC, that executive departments of the federal government harbored and protected 
communist spies.136   
In early September of 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet 
legation in Ottawa, Canada defected with his pregnant wife and a young child.  He 
encountered extreme difficulty in defecting due to a thoroughly initial inept res onse 
by the Canadian government, which at the time had no contingency plan for the 
defection of a Soviet spy.  Canadian officials repeatedly advised Gouzenko to return 
to the legation.  When the Canadian government finally understood the necessity of 
taking Gouzenko under its protection, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police began to 
analyze the documents that the young Russian brought with him from the secret 
cipher area of the Soviet legation.  Numbering more than a hundred, the documents 
indicated significant efforts by the Soviets to obtain industrial and military secrets, 
including information about American, Canadian and British efforts to develop 
atomic weapons at a time when they were official allies with the USSR against Nazi 
Germany.  In one startling aspect of the affair, Gouzenko claimed that a close advisor 
of American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr., was a Soviet agent.  Many 
historians have presumed that this was Alger Hiss. The case also revealed th  extent 
to which officials of the Canadian Communist Party willingly and knowingly abetted 
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Soviet espionage.  Finally, due to the differences in legal systems, the Canadians were 
much more successful securing espionage convictions than the Americans were in th  
Amerasia case.  Historian Amy Knight has argued that the Gouzenko spy case, by 
virtue of revealing the existence of an extensive Soviet spy ring operating in Canada 
and the United States, represented the beginning of the Cold War.137 
 In 1939, spurred into action by the announcement of the German-Soviet 
alliance, a former communist named Whittaker Chambers identified State Department 
employees Alger Hiss, his brother Donald Hiss, and Laurence Duggan, as well  
White House aide Lauchlin Curry, as secret communists who were part of a covert 
network in which espionage might be involved.  This occurred in a meeting with 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle arranged by Isaac Don Levine, a journalist 
and a committed anticommunist.  Levine had originally sought a meeting for 
Chambers with President Roosevelt, but was referred to Berle instead by the Whie 
House.  Both Levine and Berle made contemporaneous notes of the meeting.  In total, 
Chambers named thirty-five individuals that he claimed knowledge of as to their 
communist affiliation or espionage activities.  Berle’s notes did not cite Harry Dexter 
White’s name as one of these spies.  Levine’s notes did, however, indicate that 
Chambers indeed named the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.138  There was little 
to no follow-up by the government on the information revealed at the meeting.  
Levine’s autobiography states that when Berle reported Chambers’ story to FDR, the 
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President summarily dismissed it.  Levine’s said of Berle’s response: “To the best of 
my recollection, the President dismissed the matter rather brusquely with an expletive 
remark on this order: ‘Oh, forget it, Adolf.’”139  Later, when Chamber’s charges of 
espionage came to the attention of the HUAC and the public, along with the lack of 
attention previously given them by FDR, it provided more fodder for critics to charge 
that the Roosevelt Administration was at best careless with national security and at 
worst covering up disloyalty by governmental officials.  For the moment, however, 
Chambers’ allegations were forgotten and he continued to develop his career as a 
journalist, joining the staff of Time in 1939 and becoming an editor.   
In mid-1948, it came to public attention that Elizabeth Bentley, an ex-
communist, had in October 1945 confessed to the FBI her role as a handler of Soviet 
spies for the KGB.  Bentley revealed to the FBI that an American communist named 
Jacob Golos had used a travel agency, World Tourists, as a front from which he 
managed a spy network on behalf of the KGB.  Bentley was Golos’ assistant and, 
later, his lover.  After his death, she took over managing the network, but soon the 
KGB turned it over to a professional spy.  Feelings of professional rejection by the 
KGB and personal loneliness and grief brought on by Golos’ death led her to make a 
confession to the FBI.  At the time, many critics of anticommunism dismissed 
Bentley’s story as the delusions of a mentally unstable alcoholic, partly because her 
charges did not result in any convictions for espionage.  However, the Venona 
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decryptions and the opening of select ex-Soviet archives in the 1990s later vindicated 
the truthfulness of her testimony.140   
What significant information did Elizabeth Bentley reveal to the FBI?  
Through Bentley investigators discovered Golos conducted extensive espionage 
activities with the general awareness of and often collaboration by Earl Browder, the 
CPUSA party chief.  First Golos and later Bentley managed two large spy networks, 
which became known as the Silvermaster Group and the Perlo Group.  Nathan 
Gregory Silvermaster, an economist with the Board of Economic Welfare and later 
the War Production Board, coordinated the former apparatus, which included:  
- Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and later the 
American representative to the International Monetary Fund; 
- Lauchlin Currie, assistant to Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board and later a White House aide to President Roosevelt; 
- George Silverman, a civilian economic analyst working for an assistant 
chief of staff at the Pentagon; 
- V. Frank Coe, the director of the Treasury Department’s Division of 
Monetary Research, technical secretary of the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference, 
and later a secretary of the International Monetary Fund; 
- Solomon Adler, an official in the Treasury Department’s General 
Counsel’s office and later the representative of the U.S. Treasury in China; 
- William Ludwig Ullmann, who worked at the Treasury Department and 
later served as an Army Air Forces major. 
                                                




 Historians Haynes and Klehr characterized the participation of White and 
Currie in this spy ring as follows: “In addition to providing information about high-
level U.S. policy making, both men also promoted and protected the careers of 
midlevel officials who spied for Stalin.”141  Additionally, Coe and Adler used their 
positions to lend support to Mao’s communists and oppose American support of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Party.  Both men later emigrated to the People’s 
Republic of China and worked for the Communist Party of China.    
The Perlo Group derived its name from Victor Perlo, who served in the 
National Recovery Administration and later as a senior economist on the War 
Production Board, the federal agency in charge of the industrial production of 
armaments for the American military.  Other members of this spy ring included:  
- Harold Glasser, the Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board and a 
Treasury Department official, who later advised Secretary of State George Marshall 
on some European issues; 
- Charles Kramer, a congressional staffer on the Senate Subcommittee on 
War Mobilization; 
- Donald Wheeler, a research analyst for the Office of Strategic Services; 
- Lt. Col. Duncan Lee, an aide to General William Donovan, chief of the 
Office of Strategic Services; 
- Julius Joseph, deputy head of the Far Eastern section of the Office of 
Strategic Service; 
- Helen Tenney, an analyst in the Spanish section of the OSS; 
                                                




- Edward Fitzgerald, a staffer at the War Production Board and later an 
assistant to Senator Claude Pepper; 
- Maurice Halperin, who served as the head of the OSS’s research and 
analysis section in the Latin American division and later worked at the State 
Department; 
Other individuals that Bentley identified included William Remington, an 
economist with the War Production Board, who like Alger Hiss was convicted of 
perjury in sworn testimony regarding his communist affiliations, and Michael 
Greenberg, who worked at the Board of Economic Welfare.  The FBI had hoped to 
use Elizabeth Bentley as a double agent, but cooperation with the FBI’s 
counterespionage program by the British intelligence service allowed the double 
agent Kim Philby to learn of Bentley’s defection and inform the Soviets.142  However, 
in sum, the impact of Bentley’s defection cannot be underestimated.  Despite decad s 
of assertions that she fabricated charges, Haynes and Klehr have concluded the 
following in light of the release of the Venona decryptions and the partial opening of 
the Soviet archives:  
Elizabeth Bentley had told the truth and those she 
identified as Soviet sources were just what she said they 
were: spies who had assisted Soviet espionage against 
the United States.  It also became clearer that Bentley’s 
defection triggered events that brought about a 
catastrophic collapse of Soviet espionage in the United 
States just as the Cold War got under way and 
contributed to a permanent political isolation of the 
American Communist Party.143 
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During the HUAC hearings that took testimony from Bentley, the Committee 
called Whittaker Chambers to corroborate aspects of her claims.  This development 
was pivotal to the downfall of one of Washington’s brightest stars: Alger Hiss.  
Chambers’ testimony centered on the Ware Group, a covert Party group engaged in 
subversion and named after Harold Ware, a CPUSA member who worked in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration.  Chambers’ involvement with the group 
came at the behest of Josef Peters, the Comintern’s representative in the United States 
and the head of the CPUSA’s underground organization.144  Those Chambers named 
as spies for the Soviet Union included: 
- Nathan Witt, who after working at the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, served as a general counsel for and later first secretary of he 
National Labor Relations Board;145 
- John Abt, who worked at the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and 
the Works Progress Administration before becoming chief counsel for the Civil 
Liberties Subcommittee, popularly known as the La Follette Committee, of the 
Education and Labor Committee of the Senate; 
- Harry Dexter White, mentioned above; 
- Alger Hiss, the one-time clerk to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who 
later headed the State Department’s Office of Special Political Affairs, attended the 
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Yalta Conference as part of the American delegation and served as secretary general 
of the United Nations’ founding conference. 
Historians have devoted many volumes to the Chambers-Hiss controversy and 
Hiss’ later trial and conviction for perjury on January 21, 1950.  The recent work by 
serious historians with comprehensive access to the archival record has concluded 
that Hiss was indeed guilty and Chambers told the truth.146  The details of the story 
are far too complex and nuanced to recount here.  It is, however, important to note 
that the Hiss saga played itself out during the time period that represented, depending 
upon one’s perspective, the HUAC’s highpoint or low point.  This period, 1947-1949, 
included the investigation and exposure of the Eisler brothers, the first Hollywood 
inquiry, and the Hiss episode.  Lauded by some and despised by others, these 
hearings by the HUAC played the central role in exposing to the general public the 
communist activity not hitherto widely known.   
We shall see later in this dissertation that the Eisler case focused on the links 
of the CPUSA to the Comintern and the Roosevelt Administration’s naïveté regarding 
that circumstance.  While the Hiss case focused on communist infiltration into the 
federal government for the purpose of conducting espionage, the Hollywood hearings 
spotlighted communist efforts to use the motion picture industry for the purposes of 
propaganda, prestige and money.  The success of the Hiss investigation arguably 
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represented the Committee’s zenith in effectiveness terms of making a significant 
impact in the area of national security.  It is important to understand that the Bently 
testimony and especially the Hiss hearings were part of an on-going effort by 
anticommunists in the Congress to expose the extent to which dedicated communists 
had infiltrated key American institutions with nefarious intent and the extent to which 
the American government had failed to effectively defend the nation in this regard.   
 As a result of Gouzenko’s defection in Canada and at approximately the same 
time that Bentley began cooperating with the government, the FBI, the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police and British counterintelligence began to uncover extensive 
efforts by the Soviets to steal American, British and Canadian nuclear secrets.  As we 
shall see in the discussion below on the international environment in which the 
HUAC operated, the Soviet detonation of an atomic weapon sent a shock wave 
through the American political establishment and the public.  The availability of 
previously classified materials or documents from formerly closed archives leaves 
little doubt that Soviet atomic espionage shaved years off of Moscow’s atomic 
weapons research and development process.  These cases, which came to public light 
in the years 1948-1951, i.e. sandwiched between the first and second Hollywood 
investigations, included the following individuals: 
- Theodore Hall, a physicist at the Manhattan Project facility at Los 
Alamos, who was perhaps the Soviet’s most productive nuclear spy;147 
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- Klaus Fuchs, scientist in British nuclear weapons program, who confessed 
and was convicted of spying for the Soviets in 1950 and eventually emigrated to East 
Germany;148  
- Harry Gold, a Philadelphia chemist who served as a courier for the KGB 
and whose testimony was later instrumental in the conviction of Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg;149 
- Alfred Dean Slack, who passed to the Soviets information about military 
ordinance, but apparently ceased espionage activities when he went to work on the 
Manhattan Project facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee;150 
- Abraham Brothman, a chemist who supplied industrial secrets to the 
Soviets, including information about synthetic rubber;151 
- David Greenglass, the brother of Ethel Rosenberg and an army machinist 
who worked at both Oak Ridge and Los Alamos and provided the KGB with data on 
implosion detonators for atomic weapons;152 
- Morris and Lona Cohen, who conducted industrial espionage for the 
Soviets and served as couriers for information supplied by Theodore Hall, Klaus 
Fuchs and David Greenglass;153 
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- Morton Sobell, who was recruited by Julius Rosenberg, worked at the 
Navy Ordnance Bureau in Washington, and supplied the Soviets with information 
about “sonar, infrared radiation devices and missile guidance systems”;154 
- Joel Barr, an employee of defense contractor who defected to the Soviet 
Union after his espionage activities became known to the FBI and headed a 
microelectronics research institute in the USSR;155 
- Alfred Sarant, an electrical engineer for the Army Signal Corps who with 
Barr provided the Soviets with secrets of American avionics and radar and also fled to 
the USSR to eventually run a research institute;156 
- William Perl, an engineer who provided the Soviet information on the jet 
propulsion and supersonic aviation projects he worked on for the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics;157 
- Julius Rosenberg, a dedicated communist who oversaw “an extensive 
network of spies, most of them former CCNY classmates working in classified 
military technology research” and was convicted for spying on April 5, 1951;158 
- Ethel Rosenberg, the wife of Julius Rosenberg and sister of David 
Greenglass, who was a relatively minor participant in her husband’s spy ring, but 
nevertheless was executed with him on June 19, 1953.159 
To summarize, the lists articulated above – the Silvermaster Group, the Perlo 
Group, the Ware Group, the Rosenberg Group, along with other atomic spies – 
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demonstrate the extensive scope of Soviet success in securing numerous Americans 
to spy for Moscow.  These were not isolated cases and the stakes involved were not 
trivial.  In almost all of these instances, Americans betrayed their country for 
ideological reasons, i.e. their belief in the communist cause, and not for greed as more 
recent spies, such as John Walker, did.  Also, most of the individuals listed above had 
close links to the CPUSA if they were not in fact members.   
The first Hollywood investigation of 1947 was part of the same investigative 
environment as that which brought the espionage of Alger Hiss and other high 
government officials to light.  Within this larger context, the idea that communist 
activity in Hollywood with the implications for possible subversion through 
propaganda represented a potential threat was prima facie was not as farfetched as 
critics often portrayed it.  The congressional contempt citations related to the initial 
Hollywood inquiry of 1947 wound their way through the appeals process in the court 
system until 1950.  This apparently delayed the HUAC from further investigation of 
the motion picture industry until 1951-1952.  It was during this period between the 
two sets of investigations that new revelations of significant and serious industr al, 
military and nuclear espionage by Fuchs, the Rosenbergs and others further alarm d 
anticommunists as to the dangers of domestic communism.    
The International Scene.  The end of World War II represented a seismic shift 
in the contours of the international geopolitical scene.  Between the two world wars, 
the United States again withdrew into isolationism.  It shunned membership in the 
League of Nations, the brainchild of Woodrow Wilson, and with few exceptions did 




economic superpower during the interwar years, Europe still represented the fulcrum 
of political and military power with Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Italy, 
and, after 1934, Germany acting as the major players.  With the exception of the 
United States, the sole power outside of Europe with significant economic and 
military power, as well as an aggressive foreign policy, was Imperial Jap n.  
International conditions in the aftermath of World War II did not allow for history to 
repeat itself and the United States could not once again withdraw into isolationism.  
To a large extent, the USA became the post-World War II guarantor of international 
peace and the protector of Western democracies.   
The Exhaustion of Western Europe.  The end of World War II and its 
immediate aftermath saw much of the world’s political map redrawn compared to the 
beginning of the war.  Five and a half years of war left the European Allies mi tarily 
and economically exhausted.  Britain and France, now greatly weakened compared to 
their pre-war status, began to rapidly dismantle their colonial empires.  Within fif een 
years of the end of the war, most of the British, French, Dutch and Belgian imperial 
possessions gained their independence.  The European powers had little choice.  
World War II had left their economies in ruin and their military power depleted.  The 
imperial powers could not simultaneously battle domestic communism, defend 
against Soviet encroachments in Central and Eastern Europe, and resist often Marxist-
inspired national liberation movements in their colonies.   
In February 1947, the same month that the HUAC took testimony from 
Gerhart Eisler, an action that I will argue ultimately led to the Hollywood hearings, 




afford to support the conservative Greek government in its struggle against 
Communist guerillas.  Great Britain…was exhausted.  The British also said they 
could no longer afford to supply financial aid to Turkey.”160  The Greek Civil War 
had only started five months before in September 1946.  That the British, partners in 
the recent Allied victory over the Axis, could not sustain a defense against 
communism for longer than five months was a startling admission.  Clearly the 
United Kingdom, which was in actually in much better shape economically and 
militarily than the French, could not serve as the bulwark against communist 
expansion in Europe.  In fact several months earlier in December 1946, communist 
guerillas under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh began fighting French colonial troops 
in a war that in 1954 would end in a humiliating defeat for France.  
The Power Vacuum in Central Europe.  With the defeat of Nazism and the 
death of Hitler, Germany lay shattered and divided in 1945.  Austria was again 
detached from Germany.  Poland regained the province of West Prussia, which 
Germany had ceded at the end of World War I.  It was the desire to regain West 
Prussia that led Germany to attack Poland in 1939.  However, the territorial cost of 
losing World War II was much higher than after World War I.  Poland and the Soviet 
Union divided the German province of East Prussia between themselves.  The Allies 
awarded Poland additional German lands to compensate her for the loss of the 
western half of its pre-war territory taken by the Soviet Union as part of the Stalin-
Hitler Pact.  Thus, German lost the mineral-rich and industrial provinces of Upper
and Lower Silesia and the eastern portions of Pomerania and Brandenburg that lay 
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east of the Oder-Neisse river line.  Approximately ten million Germans migrated west 
of the Oder-Neisse, the product of both voluntary relocation to flee communism and 
forced expulsions to reorient national borders.  This represented one of the largest 
population resettlements in modern history.   
For several years after the surrender of Germany, a revised version of the 
Morgenthau Plan was the official policy of the Allied Occupational Authority.  The 
plan originally developed by Henry Morgenthau, FDR’s Secretary of the Treasury, 
aimed to break up a defeated Germany into a series of small, demilitarized states wi h 
de-industrialized, pastoral economies.  Although the onset of the Cold War resulted 
first in the revision and later the abandonment of the plan, its economic provisions 
greatly heightened the misery brought on by the war’s destruction of the German 
economy. The implementation of the Morgenthau Plan, even in its revised form, 
delayed German economic recovery for several years in the western zones.  Thus, 
while the Red Army occupied most of Eastern Europe, the plan aimed to keep the 
only nation in Central Europe that might provide a counterbalance in a permanent 
state of economic dislocation, military impotence and political fragmentatio .  Thus, 
this policy, which Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Hen y 
Stimson opposed along with Churchill and Anthony Eden, was heavy tilted to the 
national interest of the Soviet Union.  It does not then come as much of a surprise that 
a key contributor to the Morgenthau Plan was Harry Dexter White, to whom 




activities.”161  As noted earlier, the Venona decryptions later confirmed accusations 
by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, which White denied before the 
HUAC in 1948 just days before his premature death, that Morgenthau’s most trusted 
advisor was a Soviet agent.162  
Soviet Territorial Expansion and Domination of Eastern Europe.  By stark 
contrast with Germany, despite enormous human casualties, huge losses in materiel 
and destruction of infrastructure, the Soviet Union emerged from the war greatly 
strengthened both militarily and territorially.  As a member of the victorious allied 
coalition in World War II, the USSR was able to keep the territorial acquisitions  
made in 1940 by virtue of the Stalin-Hitler Pact.  Known also as the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact and signed in Moscow by the German and Soviet Foreign Ministers 
in Moscow on August 24, 1939, the agreement was a ten year non-aggression treaty 
between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.  It also contained a provision that if a 
third party were to attack one of the treaty parties, the other contracting party would 
remain neutral.  Most importantly, the pact contained a secret protocol that divided 
Eastern Europe into spheres of influence between them and provided for territorial 
annexations of various third countries. 
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Under the terms of the Pact, while Hitler was busy conquering Poland, France, 
the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway in 1939-1940, the Soviets were able to 
occupy the formerly independent states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  Thereupon 
followed coup d’états and sham requests for admission as union members into the 
USSR.163  Also, in June 1940, Stalin demanded and got the Rumanian territories of 
Bessarabia, Bukovina and Hertza.  Bessarabia became the basis of the Moldavian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, another constituent republic of the Soviet Union, while 
Bukovina and Hertza became provinces of the Ukrainian SSR.164  Most importantly, 
the Pact allowed for the partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union 
roughly along the Curzon Line.  Finally, the Hitler-Stalin Pact allowed Stalin to 
undertake the Winter War of 1939-1940 with Finland without fear of German 
intervention.  As the result of this action, Finland lost most of Karelia to the Soviet 
Union, part of Salla and some islands in the Gulf of Finland and the Arctic Ocean, as 
well as being forced to lease the Hanko Peninsula for a Soviet naval base.165   
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The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 temporarily erased these 
acquisitions, but the ultimate allied victory restored them in 1945.  In addition to 
these substantial territorial gains, the end of the war saw the transfer to the S viet 
Union of Carpathian Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia and, as mentioned above, the 
northern half of East Prussia from Germany.166  Thus, the Soviet Union emerged from 
World War II with more territorial acquisitions than any other nation.  However, 
Stalin was not satisfied with these d jure gains; he extended his de facto control to 
the rest of Eastern Europe.   
With the Red Army occupying much of Eastern Europe and communists loyal 
to Moscow installed as heads of the various national security services, opposition 
rights were gradually whittled away until a series of coup d’états resulted in giving 
communist dominated governments a monopoly on power throughout the region.  
Some of these communist regimes came to power in rigged elections, such as in 
Poland in 1947.  When in December 1948, the Polish Workers Party, i.e. the 
communists, and the Polish Socialist Party merged in a forced union, the 
transformation of Poland into a Stalinist satellite was complete.  Thus, the nation over 
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which Britain and France went to war with Germany in 1939 in order to preserve its 
independence found itself subjugated to the USSR at the end of that war. 
Brute Soviet force was also an instrument in the process of subjugation.  
When a non-communist party won the Hungarian elections in November 1945, the 
Soviet military commander, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, simply refused it the right 
to form a government and forced a coalition government instead in which 
communists held the military and security portfolios.167  Communist-dominated 
governments in Hungary dissolved most opposition political parties in late 1947 and 
the next year Stalin’s stooge in Hungary, Matyas Rakoski, forcibly merged his 
Hungarian Workers Party with the Social Democratic Party, which eliminated the last 
vestiges of Hungarian democracy until 1989.168   
The case of Czechoslovakia is perhaps most instructive in terms of 
understanding the concern over the dangers of domestic infiltration by communists.  
In the immediate postwar era, Czechoslovakian President Edvard Benes worked 
under the duress of a Soviet military occupation and had a profound mistrust of the 
West as a result of the Munich betrayals.  These factors came into play on a nation l 
basis when the Czechoslovak communists won a plurality of 38% in the 1946 
elections.  Thus, in May Benes found it necessary to name Klement Gottwald, the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) chief, to the office of prime minister.  
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Gottwald then headed a coalition cabinet of nine communists out of twenty-six 
portfolios.  At this point the communists began an aggressive campaign of 
administrative infiltration in part by bloating the civil service with appointments of 
party members.  Most observers believed the communists would fare poorly in new 
elections scheduled for May 1948 and the communist minister in charge of the 
national police began an illegal purge of the remaining non-communists from the 
police force.  On February 21, 1948, most of the non-communist cabinet ministers 
resigned in protest, but a communist coup prevent Benes from appointing a caretaker 
government ahead of elections.  The CPC mobilized thousands of protesters, 
primarily from the trade unions it controlled.  The threats of street violence and the 
intervention of the Red Army forced Benes to appoint a new cabinet dominated by 
CPC members with only a few token non-communists.  The most important one, 
Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, died under mysterious circumstances less than two 
weeks later.  By the summer of that year, the communists sought to impose a new 
constitution and Benes, now little more than a figurehead, resigned rather than 
acquiesce.  As the process of transforming Czechoslovakia into a Stalinist socialist 
republic neared completion, all political opposition soon met with severe 
persecution.169   
After six months of Soviet Red Army occupation and under duress, King 
Michael I of Romania named a new cabinet in March 1945 dominated by members of 
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the pro-Soviet Romanian Communist Party.170  On December 30, 1947, the 
communist Prime Minister, Petru Groza, forced the King of the Romanians to 
abdicate under threat of his personal assassination and the execution of over a 
thousand young political prisoners.171   
The final piece to fall into place in construction of the Soviet empire in 
Central Europe was the transformation of the Soviet controlled zone in the eastern 
third of Germany into the German Democratic Republic, which was proclaimed on 
October 7, 1949.  However, the building of a socialist paradise based in East Berlin 
did not proceed as planned.  Unhappy with their new Stalinist society, East German 
workers were the first in the Soviet bloc to instigate a series of revolts against their 
communist regime.  On June 17, 1953, just as the HUAC was winding up its second 
investigation of Hollywood, a strike erupted in East Berlin and soon workers 
throughout the German Democratic Republic joined in.  It took the intervention of 
Soviet troops to suppress the rioting and restore the authority of its satellite 
government.   
Communism was also on the move in Asia.  In November 1946, the Viet 
Minh under the leadership of a Leninist named Ho Chi Minh began a rebellion in 
colonial Vietnam that would result in the total defeat of French forces in 1954 and the 
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establishment of communist North Vietnam.  Likewise, the Chinese Civil War ended 
with a communist victory.  On January 22, 1949 the Chinese Red Army occupied 
Beijing and then on October 1 Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist 
Party, declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.  The fall of 
China to Mao’s Red Army represented a huge blow to American policymakers and a 
huge geopolitical shift in Asia.  The following February China concluded a treaty of 
alliance, friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.  Thus, the most 
populous nation in the world became a member of the communist commonwealth and 
until Stalin’s death, relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet 
Union remained very close.    
Almost exactly seventeen months after the fall of Beijing to the Chinese 
communists and a little over four months after the formalization of the Sino-Soviet 
alliance, troops from communist North Korea crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 
1950, invading their southern neighbor.  Within ten days and under a United Nations 
sanction, the first American forces were committed to the war, but early on the 
fighting was disastrous for U.S. and South Korean troops.  By early September, the 
anticommunist forces held only the city of Pusan and its perimeter and the North 
Korean army threatened to push the overwhelmed South Korean and American troops 
into the sea.  General Douglas MacArthur averted allied defeat when he scored a 
risky victory by landing the X Corps behind enemy lines at Incheon in mid-
September.  This tactic nearly cut off the North Korean Army, which began a retret 
that turned into a rout and a month later UN forces crossed the 38th parallel into North 




the UN forces again into full retreat.  Early in 1951 the newly appointed commander, 
General Matthew Ridgeway, stopped the communist assault and took the allies on the 
offensive.  However, when UN forces again reached the 38th parallel in May, the 
decision was made not to cross again into North Korean territory and the war 
stabilized into a form of trench warfare.  The result was essentially a stalemate and 
the war dragged on for two more years until a ceasefire took hold on July 27, 1953.  
President Truman’s controversial decisions, first to relieve General 
MacArthur of command in April 1951 and second not to move UN forces north of the 
38th parallel the following July, seemed to many anticommunists to indicate a recipe
for defeat or at least an example of fighting not to win.  This in turn led to suspicions 
that somehow communists still exerted influence in the upper echelons of the 
American government and appeared to give credence to the spurious charges made by
Senator Joseph McCarthy the year before that the State Department continued to 
employ communists.  McCarthy was wrong; Truman’s loyalty program and 
investigations by the FBI and the HUAC had already resulted in the removal of every 
significant communist or communist sympathizer in the State Department.  
Nevertheless, when the HUAC began its second investigation of Hollywood in 1951, 
not only was the United States at war with a powerful communist foe, the manner in 
which war was conducted reinforced the notion that to some degree in the United 
States there existed an enemy within or a “fifth column.”   
In summary, the end of World War II showed that Stalin’s Soviet Union was 
unwilling to be satiated with the huge territorial gains it had won since 1939.  The 




Europe, and expand the communist writ to large portions of Asia.  The advent of the 
independent-minded Eurocommunism movement and the Sino-Soviet split were still 
years off in the future.  With the minor exception of the Tito’s Yugoslav rebellion 
against Moscow, Soviet-dominated international communism appeared monolithic 
and on the rise.  As the HUAC went about its work in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the headlines of American newspapers regularly reported stories each year of n w 
countries falling into the communist orbit.  When the HUAC renewed its inquiry into 
Hollywood in 1951-52, the Korean War was raging and American casualties mounted 
daily.  The CPUSA followed Moscow’s line and blamed the United States and her 
allies for starting the war as an act of imperialist aggression designed to extend 
capitalist hegemony.  Many Hollywood communists embraced this perspective.   
The Advent of the Nuclear Age.  The defeat of Japan, which ended War 
World II, was the direct result of the advent of nuclear weapons.  A new nuclear age 
dawned and this radically altered the geopolitical equation.  Military superpower 
status was to a large degree predicated upon the possession of atomic armaments.  
Near the end of September 1949, President Truman shocked the American public 
when he announced that Moscow had exploded an atom bomb a month earlier.  There 
is little doubt that the Soviets would have developed the bomb on their own, but their 
ability to penetrate the Manhattan Project probably shaved years off of thate fort.  
After the detonation of the atom bomb, the Soviets immediately began work on a 
hydrogen bomb.  Industrial espionage no longer meant just a better tractor or turbine 
without paying the corporate patent holder’s license fee.  In the nuclear age, it meant 




the scope of the battlefield appeared radically altered.  World War II had seen urban 
devastation in Europe and massive civilian casualties as the result of carpet bombing.  
However, the specter of annihilation by nuclear weapons was ever so more dreadful.  
A Pearl Harbor style attack in the new age of nuclear weapons represented a 
frightening possibility and the previous war had demonstrated on occasion that there 
were individuals living in the United States – often citizens – willing to assist an 
external foe.  Prudence, therefore, seemed to dictate for many Americans careful 
scrutiny of any possible fifth column.      
Conclusion.  The HUAC congressmen may have been naïve or even wrong 
about certain of their assessments of the nature of the threat of international 
communism and its domestic manifestation in the United States at the time of the 
Hollywood investigations.  No doubt at times they allowed partisan politics to enter 
into their investigatory calculus.  Nevertheless, partisanship is not a satisfactory 
explanation of their behavior.  This survey clearly shows that there existed both 
internal and domestic circumstances that gave rise to logical and reasonable concerns 
about the threat of communism.   
HUAC members knew that internationally communism was expanding 
aggressively.  The USSR made large territorial acquisitions immediately before and 
after World War II.  Almost all of Eastern Europe came under Soviet domination in 
the period leading up to and during the first Hollywood investigations.  The fall of 
China occurred shortly before the HUAC returned for a second time to the motion 
picture industry, during which time the Korean War raged.  Revelations of domestic 




OSS, the Manhattan Project and a myriad of New Deal agencies gave credence to 
charges that aggressive Soviet expansionism and the fall of China were abetted by a 
fifth column.      
Furthermore, the HUAC’s concern about the possible use of the media in 
general and the motion picture industry in particular by communists for purposes of 
subversive propaganda was prudent considering the flowering of Soviet, Nazi and 
Italian propaganda in previous years.  The fact that the OWI engaged in its own brand 
of political persuasion while it employed known communists only heightened that 
concern.  Whereas during the Popular Front era and World War II a high degree of 
communist activity was tolerated, the CPUSA’s behavior during the Third Period, the 
era of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, and the time of the new left turn after the downfall of 
Browder, was enough to give one pause.  It raised serious questions as to whether the 
very existence of the CPUSA was compatible with a democratic society.  The 
collapse of Roosevelt’s liberal-left coalition only served to further marginlize 
American communists and empower those who were deeply suspicious of various 
aspects of New Deal experimentation that to them smacked of socialism, comunis  
and even fascism.    
While context is not everything as postmodernists would argue, it is important 
because it allows for an understanding of the matrix in which decisions come about.  
In the case of the HUAC, I would argue that the 1947-1952 investigations of 
Hollywood were not capricious or arbitrary.  Rather, they came about because of the 
need to address national security concerns first in the time of an incipient Cold War 




Chapter 5:  Examination of HUAC Methods of Investiga on 
In 1946 political cartoonist Bill Mauldin, who won the Pulitzer Prize twice, 
published a cartoon entitled “Freedom’s Brave Sentinels.”  In it, two shadowing 
figures labeled “Americanism Investigators” lurk outside of the home of an
unsuspecting family.  One investigator, wearing a trench coat and a fedorapulled low, 
peeks through the window, while the other sits before a Dictaphone machine that is 
tapping into the family’s telephone line.  Mauldin seems to capture perfectly the 
sinister images most Americans find so distasteful when thinking of the congressional 
investigations of communism in the 1940s and 1950s: an intrusive government 
violating the sanctity of citizens’ personal privacy in order to detect personal political 
convictions.   
Although the Committee always enjoyed support by a certain sector of the 
American public, the HUAC’s reputation was a checkered affair.  Liberals, whether 
they were willing to work with communists on certain issues or held a strongly 
anticommunist position, typically opposed the mission and existence of the HUAC.  
Many moderates and some conservatives were ambivalent about the manner in which 
the Committee conducted business.  Before 1945, when the HUAC operated as a 
“special committee,” Chairman Martin Dies had established a pattern of making 
careless charges of communist affiliations.  This practice did not change after Dies’ 
departure, when behind the scenes Rep. John Rankin, a Democrat from Mississippi, 




In 1948, Congressman F. Edward Hebert, a conservative Southern Democrat 
from Louisiana, maneuvered to get an appointment to the HUAC so that he could 
work to change what he saw as the Committee’s on-going record of abuse: 
I went on the Un-American Activities Committee 
because I did not like its flamboyancy.  I thought it 
ruined itself through its own fault.  It was a maligning 
committee.  I could see its flamboyancy, this wildness, 
this throwing names around and charging things.  I 
didn’t believe in it.  I thought they could make cases 
without all those monkeyshines.  They’d throw names 
around, say so and so’s a communist and then he 
couldn’t come before the committee to defend himself 
unless he was invited; and even if he were invited, there 
apparently would be something going on, some reason 
that they never got around to giving him a hearing.172 
Thus, even at the height of what came to be known as the “Red Scare,” the 
Committee had its detractors amongst all shades of the political spectrum.   
In addition to Martin Dies’ demagoguery before he stepped down from the 
chairmanship in 1945, the HUAC suffered from other unsavory associations.  The 
Committee’s enemies often noted that John Rankin was well-known as a racist and 
anti-Semite, unembarrassed to flaunt his noxious beliefs in speeches on the floor of 
the House and in speeches to his constituencies.  Furthermore, although John Wood 
of Georgia, who would chair the HUAC for part of the 79th Congress and again 
during the 81st and 82nd Congresses, was far more judicious in his public rhetoric and 
conducted hearings in a fair and subdued manner without the demagoguery of his 
predecessor, he came with baggage too.  Wood declined to investigate the Ku Klux 
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Klan for any un-American activity, citing it as “an old American custom.”173  If the 
HUAC conducted itself so carelessly in its open hearings, the American publiccould 
only imagine the shenanigans that might transpire during the behind-the-scenes 
investigations and images such as Mauldin’s cartoon, though exaggerated for effect, 
seemed plausible.   
The archival record, however, seems to indicate a significantly different 
picture of how the HUAC investigated communist infiltration into various institutions 
in American society.  It appears that the Committee’s methodology was much ore 
akin to routine research of public documents.  Generally speaking, HUAC staff 
collected documents available through normal means in public channels, conducted a 
type of content analysis of their substance, and digested the results in reports to 
Committee investigators and other governmental entities.  The HUAC investigators 
then attempted to verify the data with corroborating evidence, often in the form of 
field interviews, which in turn determined who might receive a subpoena to testify
before the HUAC.   The central argument of this chapter is that the documents 
primarily in the HUAC’s research activity were the products of the communist mass 
media and its allied front organizations.  In fact, the communist press was the sine 
qua non of the HUAC investigations.   
An extensive analysis of the archives reveals that a typical HUAC 
investigation proceeded in an established practice that had distinct features in a five-
step routine.  There were some variations to the procedure, which appears to have 
been informal, but as a general rule, the Committee’s staff workflow appeared to 
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follow a pattern.  The first step was the on-going research phase in which HUACstaff 
collected data, summarized information, and created files under the names of 
individuals and organizations.  Depending upon the investigatory agenda of the 
Committee, an individual case might move to the second step.  This was a 
corroboration phase, wherein investigators would look for additional evidence to 
substantiate the initial indications of the research phase.  If investigators determined 
the evidence was sufficient to proceed, the contents of the investigative file might 
lead the Committee to the third step, which was to hear testimony under subpoena or 
voluntarily in executive session.  If the data produced to that point might serve a 
public information function in the context of a broader investigation, i.e. a topical 
investigation of some aspect of American society such as atomic espionage, trade 
unions or the media, the HUAC usually moved to the fourth step, namely individual 
testimony taken in public session.  Again, the HUAC might secure this testimony 
either voluntarily from a cooperative witness or under subpoena from a disobliging 
one.  Often, the press reported the substance of this testimony to the wider public. 
The fifth and final step was the HUAC’s periodic task of producing printed accounts 
of its findings to Congress and the public.  These publications took the form of 
transcripts of public testimony, texts of speeches and statements by Committee 
members, and more formal analyses of committee findings in report form.   
This chapter will offer a detailed account of the first three of these phases, 
showing how the newly available archival material significantly deepens our 




longstanding public record to which this study could add little in terms of new 
insights.   
Several caveats are in order to clarify the pattern described above.  First, the 
archival records of the HUAC, as voluminous as they are, are not complete.  
Although the Committee’s recordkeeping improved over time, there are significant 
gaps in the early years, especially in the 1940s.  In particular, there is an ab ence of a 
significant amount of “intra-staff” written communication.  While there is some 
correspondence from investigators in field offices to headquarters in Washington, the 
archival documentary record is not rich in terms of preserved communication 
amongst the Committee staff and between staff and the congressmen serving on the 
HUAC regarding individual investigations.  Perhaps such written records never 
existed or staff might have destroyed or misfiled them.  It is possible that some uch 
communication was oral or, if written, became part of the congressmen’s personal 
papers.  Thus, one must characterize the investigatory pattern described above as 
likely, but not certain.   
Second, the HUAC proceeded with an investigatory agenda that was topical in 
nature, e.g. communists in government, communists in Hollywood, atomic spy cases, 
communists in trade unions, etc.  The Committee proceeded by topic in more or less 
linear fashion in order to inform and advise Congress on those issues.  The HUAC 
typically did not return to a topic after it held public hearings on the matter, although 
it might seek supplementary information on a subject at the staff level or in executive 




an exception to this linear pattern.174  Thus, the HUAC hearings were not a series of 
inquiries into the activities of unrelated individual cases.  Rather, they represented a 
sequence of topical investigations into national circumstances, all directly r lated to 
the possibility of communist infiltration into specific American institutions.  
Committee investigators pursued individual cases of specific communists if they 
appeared relevant and shed light on the broader inquiries.     
Third, the HUAC’s mandate was not prosecutorial, even if those called before 
the Committee felt that a HUAC subpoena was akin to a summons before the Star 
Chamber or the Grand Inquisitor.  In other words, the Committee’s mandate and 
general procedure were not to investigate communists as such and attempt to exac
punishment for political beliefs.  That is not to say that on occasion, especially in the 
early years of the HUAC, individual committee members did not violate this general 
procedure, recklessly cite names in public, and, thus, bring disrepute upon the 
Committee.  However, generally speaking, the key factor in determining whether one 
might receive a HUAC subpoena appeared to be the degree to which that individual’s 
case might speak to one of the more general, topical investigations.  The Committee 
simply did not thoroughly investigate individuals one at a time until all the names in 
the investigative files were exhausted.  Thus, an individual might have an 
investigative file created and even have a substantial number of entries made in it, 
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indicating significant possible communist activity, and yet never see a HUAC 
subpoena.  If a newly created individual file related to a topic that the Committee had 
already investigated in depth, it was highly unlikely that the HUAC would reopen the 
corresponding topical hearings.   
This makes sense if one keeps in mind that the HUAC had a three-part 
mandate from the full House of Representatives, which can be paraphrased as 
follows: (i) investigate the extent, character and objects of un-American a tivities in 
the United States; (ii) investigate the diffusion of subversive and un-American 
propaganda, whether of domestic or origin; and (iii) recommend to Congress remedial 
legislation to deal with either of the above.  Suspected CPUSA conspiratorial activity 
in trade unions or involvement in atomic espionage would constitute the un-American 
activity in the first part of the mandate.  The HUAC’s careful scrutiny of the 
communist press and alleged communist infiltration into the motion picture industry 
would constitute the effort to fulfill the second part of the mandate.  Thus, insofar as 
the Committee fulfilled this mandate, it had to focus on the big picture, e.g. extent 
and character of subversion, especially in its relation to propaganda.  At the height of 
the popularity, the CPUSA boasted of 100,000 members.175  However, contrary to 
popular belief in terms of the pervasiveness of HUAC investigations, the archival 
evidence suggests that only a fraction of the overall membership of the CPUSA ever 
became the subject of the Committee’s active scrutiny.  Those who did were most 
likely to have had some relation to the broader topical investigations designed to 
discharge the HUAC’s mandate.    
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Another factor to consider is that as a congressional committee, the HUAC’s 
investigative function centered entirely on that fact finding mandate.  As part of the 
national legislature, it did not have a law enforcement role, which properly belongs to 
the executive branch of government.  Thus, the HUAC was not a police force and in 
fundamental ways its investigators functioned differently from an organization like 
the FBI.  Certainly in sheer scope there were great differences.  The size of 
Committee staff varied over the years with the number of research staff and 
investigators fluctuating around two dozen.  By comparison, the FBI had over 3,700 
agents in 1946 and by 1952 this number exceeded 6,400.176   Unlike the FBI or other 
law enforcement agencies, the aim of HUAC investigations was not to bring charges 
against anyone.  The only potential punishment it could levy, other than a contempt of 
congress citation for refusal to testify, was the penalty of public exposure.177  
Therefore, its staff did not follow procedures crafted for preparation of cases for 
indictment.  While over the decades the Committee amassed extensive files on the 
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refusing to testify before one of its duly constituted committees, including an appeal 
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subject of subversive activities and propaganda, the scope of their actual 
investigations covered a relatively narrow range of topics.   
Given these stipulations, as articulated above, a careful study of the HUAC 
archives reveals that the initial research phase of the five step investigatory process 
was the most complicated and far-reaching in terms of impact on the most people.  It 
also demonstrates the high degree to which the communist press was an essential 
resource to the Committee as it carried out its mandate.  During the research phase, 
the HUAC staff derived a very large amount of raw data primarily from an extensive 
collection of radical periodicals and other publications.  Material issued by the 
CPUSA and its numerous front organizations represented the largest portion of this 
in-house library.   
Three of the most important publications in the HUAC’s periodical collection 
were the Daily Worker, the Peoples’ Daily World, the New Masses, Communist and 
Political Affairs.  The Daily Worker was the official newspaper of the CPUSA and 
articulated the authorized party line in the same manner in which Pravda voiced that 
of the CPSU.  Moreover, the line that the Daily Worker promoted invariably mirrored 
that of the Soviet party and reflected the policy goals of the Soviet Union.  For 
example, at the time of the second Hollywood hearings, as the Korean War was 
raging, the pages of the Daily Worker advocated a pro-Soviet position, arguing the 
United States was the military aggressor.  The paper was published in New York 




editor typically was a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.178  
According to an internal end-of-year report for 1948, the Committee’s collecti n of 
issues of the Daily Worker dated from 1924, the year of its inception.179  Its Sunday 
supplement was simply entitled the Worker.  The Peoples’ Daily World was the west 
coast version of the Daily Worker, with which it later merged after subscriptions 
plunged during the Cold War.   
The New Masses was a cultural and literary magazine, ostensibly the 
communist answer to the New Leader, which served a similar purpose for the 
Socialist Party of America.  In reality, the inspiration for the New Masses was a 
Soviet publication entitled the Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette), which was 
the official organ of the Union of Soviet Writers.  Like the latter, the pages of the 
New Masses contained short stories, poems, lyrics, critical reviews of books, plays 
and motion pictures, and other forms of cultural reporting.  It also authoritatively 
expressed the official party line on cultural policy and sought to express the need for 
the adherence to party discipline by “cultural workers.”  For example, it was in the 
pages of the New Masses that a famous incident occurred in which novelist and 
screenwriter Albert Maltz, later a member of the Hollywood Ten, was forced to 
publish a humiliating retraction of an earlier article and resubmit himself to party 
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discipline.180  The journal’s longtime editor was Michael Gold, a member of the 
CPUSA’s National Committee, who served as one of the party’s liaisons with 
communist and fellow-traveling writers and assisted in the supervision of party 
efforts amongst the Hollywood elite.181  He was particularly close to John Howard 
Lawson, the ideological leader of the Hollywood Ten.  The HUAC’s collection of 
issues of the New Masses was nearly complete, dating from 1927, the second year of 
its publication.182  
Two other important journals collected in the HUAC library were the 
CPUSA’s theoretical organs, Communist, and its successor publication, Political 
Affairs.  The former transformed itself into the latter in 1944 after the CPUSA briefly 
turned itself into the Communist Political Association as part of Earl Browder’s 
attempt to promote peaceful co-existence between the Soviet Union and the West and 
play up the spirit of cooperation after the Tehran Conference in 1943.  These two 
periodicals represented American versions of K mmunist, which was the main 
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theoretical journal published by the Central Committee of the CPSU.  Its editor
typically worked under the direct supervision of the party’s chief ideologist, who was 
usually the number two person in the Secretariat of the Central Committee.  For 
decades under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Mikhail Suslov, the éminence grise of 
the Soviet Politburo, filled this role.183  During the early Gorbachev era, Yegor 
Ligachev acted in this capacity before he was ousted in favor of liberals on the 
Politburo.  There is little reason not to believe that the American party mirrored the 
pattern of the ideology secretary ultimately having final say over media and 
propaganda matters.  Suslov’s counterpart in the CPUSA was Alexander Bittelman, 
an ardent Stalinist.  The editor of Communist and then Political Affairs was Victor 
Jeremy Jerome, a member of the National Committee, who typically went under the 
name V. J. Jerome and who is often cited as having acted as a sort of a cultural 
commissar for the CPUSA.184  Again, John Howard Lawson, “the most visible 
spokesman and leader of the Hollywood Party” had a special organizational and 
personal relationship with V. J. Jerome.185  Lawson bypassed local CPUSA officials 
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at the level of the county of Los Angeles and the state of California and reported 
directly to Jerome at party headquarters in New York City. 
Although the above periodicals figured prominently in the HUAC’s periodical 
library, it was in fact much larger, consisting in 1948 of “some 8,553 issues of 644 
periodicals.”186  In addition to newspapers and magazines, this collection included 
more modest newsletters and bulletins.  Most originated in the United States and 
perhaps the majority were radical leftist publications.  However, the collecti n also 
included periodicals from the far right and supporters of the Axis powers before and 
during World War II, i.e. Japanese, fascist and Nazi organizations, including the 
German American Bund and the Silver Legion of America.  Additionally, the HUAC 
obtained periodicals from labor unions, various religious groups and racially-based 
organizations.  Often radical organizations, the CPUSA in particular, used such 
entities as fronts to covertly further their policy ends. Finally, the Committee acquired 
publications from practically any source that might furnish information about the 
activities of potentially subversive organizations and individuals.  These included 
anti-fascist, anti-Nazi and anticommunist groups.187 
Committee staff also collected information from mainstream newspapers nd 
magazines, including trade publications, such as V riety and the Hollywood Reporter.  
If a publication reported on subversive activities or propaganda, the Committee 
wanted that report in its files.  A perusal of the HUAC archive shows that the 
Committee supplemented its own efforts by employing at least one press clipping 
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service, named Consolidated Press Clippings Bureaus, and possibly others.  It seems
the Committee used the clippings service to identify reports and editorials in 
mainstream publications, such as the Chicago Tribune, the New York Herald Tribune, 
the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun.  Clippings from columnists of varying 
political persuasions, including the conservative Westbrook Pegler and the liberal 
Drew Pearson, a critic of Senator Joseph McCarthy, found their way into HUAC files 
if they addressed some issue concerning radical politics or subversive activities.188  It 
is important to note that the existence of these articles from mainstream periodicals 
does not appear to indicate that the HUAC was somehow keeping political score in 
order to target members of the press or otherwise monitoring the press for purposes of 
investigating newspapers, magazines or reporters.  Rather in the absence of a large 
investigative staff, the Committee staff appeared to be essentially using reporters as 
surrogate researchers or investigators, supplying the HUAC with informati n for the 
price of a subscription or a clippings service.   
In addition to periodicals, research staff collected a huge number of other 
documents.  In 1948 a collection of pamphlets “written by leaders of subversive 
movements or issued by subversive organizations” reached a total of approximately 
five thousand.189  Research staff also accumulated other printed materials that radical 
and front organizations used to communicate to the public, including leaflets, 
programs of public events, such as speeches, lectures, and workshops, and statements 
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to the public on their letterheads.  In particular, the research staff was interested in 
those organizations cited by Attorney General Tom Clark as being subversive.190  
Committee researchers seemed to particularly prize letterhead from such 
organizations because often it had a list of board members or sponsors in a column to 
the left of the page.  HUAC staff could cross-index these lists with those of other 
front organizations to reveal their complex interrelations.   
The HUAC’s research staff did not limit itself to collecting works published in 
the United States or even in English.  For example, the archival files contain issues of 
rare periodicals from the Soviet Union and East Germany, as well as scriptsfor stage 
plays and sheet music for radical songs and revolutionary operas.191  The final 
component of this unique library was a collection of hundreds of books with subjects 
that in some way addressed radical ideologies or subversive activities.  According t  
the archivist who initially catalogued the HUAC archives, when the House of 
Representative disbanded the HUAC in 1975, portions of this massive storehouse of 
printed material were transferred to the Library of Congress.192   
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Although much of the HUAC’s library is no longer part of its archive, 
remnants survive in the form of clippings, Photostats and a number of complete sets 
of periodicals, pamphlets and programs that research staff had moved from the library 
and placed directly in files for various reasons.  Once HUAC staff members created a 
name file, they would Photostat articles from the publications library and place them 
in the new file.  Staff from the Files and Research Section would analyze the various 
source documents (periodicals, pamphlets, etc.) for names of individuals and 
organizations of interest.  Once identified, they would create a 3x5 index card for 
each name, noting the significance of the source. For example, the card might indicate 
that an article announced screenwriter ‘x’ had joined the board of an organization th  
Committee staff recognized as a communist front.  The card also contained a citation 
of the periodical and the page number from which the HUAC researchers drew the 
information.   
The cross-indexing of new materials was an on-going activity of the HUAC 
research staff and the subversive materials collection became a sort of non-circulating 
reference library.  In fact, if one thinks of the HUAC’s large collections of 
periodicals, pamphlets and other printed materials as a library, then the two card 
indices – one for names of individuals and the other for names of organizations – 
created by staff in the Files and Reference Section functioned like an old fashioned 
library card catalogue. However, the card indices had an importance far beyond being 
an obscure feature of the manner in which the HUAC filed its records.  Because of 
their very unique nature and scope, the HUAC library and its Files and Reference 




Congress in general, and employees of various agencies of the executive branch.  
HUAC internal reports show that they were used by agencies such as the State 
Department, the Treasury Department, the War Department (and later the Department 
of Defense), the Agriculture Department, the Commerce Department, the Labor 
Department, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Coast Guard, the Secret Service, 
and the Office of Naval Intelligence amongst others.193   
The biggest users of the HUAC’s indices outside of the members of the U.S. 
Congress in fact were agents of the U.S. Civil Service Commission and the FBI with 
the former making the most inquiries.  In a memo to Robert Stripling, chief HUAC 
investigator, complaining about lack of physical space for the Committee files, Anne 
Turner, the file chief of the F&R Section, wrote: 
The Civil Service Commission and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation have a total of seven men who are 
assigned to work here regularly all day, every day, 
including Saturdays.  The Civil Service Commission 
has repeatedly requested that they be permitted to 
assign more full time checkers here in order to speed up 
their check of our files, but the request had to be 
refused….  [O]ccasionally the overflow must be 
accommodated at a table in the hall just outside our 
door.   This makes for anything but ideal conditions for 
supervision of persons using confidential records.194 
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The demand for Committee files by representatives of executive branch departments 
and agencies was a direct result of the institution of Truman’s loyalty program for 
federal employees as outlined in Presidential Executive Order 9835 of March 21, 
1947.  It listed the HUAC files as a potential source of information “in determining 
the loyalty of employees and applicants for employment.”195  Thus, ironically while 
President Truman publicly expressed disdain for the Committee, in reality his 
administration relied extensively on the files of the HUAC’s F&R Section to 
operationalize his loyalty program. 
The F&R Section’s file access record of a single day – April 13, 1948 – 
illustrates this point.  It shows that six agents of the Civil Service Commission 
checked 2,470 names.  Three FBI agents checked 337 names.  Four CIA agents 
checked 924 names, which represented a significant weekly spike for that agency.  
The Treasury Department sent a representative to check fifteen names, whil  
someone from the State Department checked fifty-eight names.  The Secret ervice 
checked two names and the Naval Gun Factory of the Navy Department had one 
name checked.  Thus, various government agencies in one day inquired about the 
names of more than ten times as many individuals as were affected by the entire 
decade of the Hollywood blacklist.196   
In this regard, it is important to on the one hand distinguish individual and 
organizational investigatory files on the one hand from files in the Files & Reference 
Section (known internally as F&R Files) or entries in the HUAC’s indices of name 
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files.  HUAC staff created investigative name files during phase two of the five step 
process, usually in preparation for public or executive session testimony on a specific 
topical investigation.  On the other hand, files in the F&R Section essentially served 
as a repository for the raw data collected during the first phase, which investigators 
might or might not use in later phases.  F&R file folders usually consisted of a thick 
portfolios of Photostats of newspaper clippings, newsletters, programs, etc, although 
sometimes other material found its way into the file.  F&R staff named each file 
folder for an individual or organization that the public record raised the suspicion of 
engaging in subversive activity, associating with subversive organizations or having 
knowledge of others engaging in subversive activity. Committee researchers 
underlined in red pencil on each document in the file every reference to a name 
belonging to the file folder.  Each redlined citation then merited a card entry into the 
appropriate index.  Finally, even if documents other than those drawn from 
periodicals or pamphlets libraries found their way into the F&R files, most appeared 
derived from publicly available sources. 
There are some important implications that one can draw from these 
procedural practices outlined above.  First, when members of Congress or agents of 
executive branch agencies accessed HUAC indices and F&R files, the information 
obtained represented, by and large, raw data, not analytical reports.  Second, since 
Committee researchers derived the data contained in the F&R files from public 
sources, such as the communist press, it was only as accurate as those sources. This 
was questionable at best.  (Chapter Seven will present evidence from executive 




disputed claims made about them, particularly in terms of memberships to communist 
fronts.)  Third, the impact of the HUAC’s accumulation of information had a double 
significance.  On the one hand, it affected a large group of individuals whose names 
turned up in file checks of the F&R indices.  This group essentially consisted of 
government employees, applicants for government employment, and those of interest
to the intelligence agencies.  On the other hand, a much smaller group of individuals 
became the subject of active, in-depth investigations often centering on activities 
outside of government, such as trade unions, education, the media, etc.  Thus, one 
important distinguishing characteristic between the investigative namefiles and the 
F&R files and their indices is the sheer number of names each contained and the 
scope of impact they had.  Another key difference was the raw nature of the F&R 
data as opposed to the more carefully investigated and corroborated evidence in the 
investigative name files. 
What seems certain is that the more times one’s name appeared on the 
leadership lists of subversive organizations or was cited in the communist press, the 
more likely one was to draw the attention of Committee researchers.  Furthermore, a 
laudatory citation in one of the CPUSA’s premiere periodicals, the Daily Worker, 
New Masses or Communist, was more likely to draw scrutiny as opposed to a mention 
in some other publication.  Part of the job of Committee researchers was to 
differentiate between radicals who might be subversive from those who were benign.  
For example, members of the Socialist Party of America certainly had aradical vision 
for the future of the United States, but this party never drew the intense scrutiny tha  




direction of a foreign power, whereas the preponderance of evidence indicated the 
latter undoubtedly was.  If that were the case, then the communist press was 
ultimately a propaganda instrument and an on-going cynical exercise in subversive 
polemics, serving the policy ends of a foreign power, namely the Soviet Union.  The 
Committee believed an instrumental press, as opposed to one dedicated to objectivity 
and truth-telling in support of the public good, would only accept written 
contributions, assign praise and dispense criticism for crassly ideological reasons.  
The case of Hollywood scenarist Millen Brand is instructive in understanding 
the Committee’s logic regarding the importance of citations in the communist press.  
A HUAC investigator noted in a narrative report:  
Communist publications operate under strict 
supervision and censorship.  No hostile material or 
matter not in accordance with the current Communist 
Party line is tolerated.  Hence the fact that Millen Brand 
contributed to the Daily Worker of July 6, 1937, page 7, 
official Communist Party organ, and to the following 
issues of the New Masses, is highly significant….197  
 
The report goes on to list twenty-two citations of Millen Brand in the communist 
press before noting the acclaim given Brand by the Daily Worker: “Communist 
publications reserve their acclaim only for individuals who render some service to th  
Communist Party.”198 
Thus, the HUAC congressmen and investigators understood that the CPUSA 
was a Stalinist institution and its press carefully and faithfully mirrored the party line.  
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The few instances when the communist press allowed for any divergence from 
approved dogma, such as the Maltz affair, were short-lived.  It was a matterof days at 
most before party leaders corrected the record with a reiteration of official do trine, 
usually accompanied by a recantation of the part of the original author.  Producing the 
money-losing New Masses, the Daily Worker and other titles in the communist press 
represented a considerable strain on party finances.  The Committee’s members and 
investigators clearly believed that the CPUSA reserved this precious commodity for 
written contributions from and laudatory mention of individuals who were either 
under party discipline or whose inclusion would somehow further the interests of the 
party.   
Often the HUAC investigatory process ended at the research phase and never 
proceeded to the corroboration phase.  This might be the case when the data seemed 
quantitatively insignificant or qualitatively suspect.  Usually the explanatio  was that 
a name in the F&R database simply was not germane to a broader topical 
investigation.  Thus, an individual or organizational name might appear in the indices 
of the F&R files, but never would have a corresponding investigative file created.  Of 
course, an individual whose name appeared only in the files of the F&R Section could 
still under certain circumstances experience serious negative repercussions of coming 
under HUAC scrutiny.  However, it seems clear that only a small minority of the 
names in the F&R files graduated into the second corroboratory phase of the 
investigative process.   
Generally speaking, each HUAC chairman set the investigatory agenda for the




coinciding with congressional terms in the House of Representatives.  When control 
of the House shifted from one party to another, the HUAC got a new chairman.  For 
example, when the Republicans won control of the House of Representative in the 
80th Congress, Democrat John Wood of Georgia gave way as chairman to Republican 
J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey.  Sometimes when one party retained power, the 
Committee got a new chairman because of retirement, resignation or failure of a 
chairman to get re-elected.  For example, during the first session of the 79th Congress, 
Democrat Edward J. Hart of New Jersey resigned from the HUAC and John Wood 
replaced him as chairman.  Hart himself became chairman when Martin Dies did not 
seek re-election to the House in 1944 in order to run for the Senate.  Dies lost that 
election and was out of Congress until he won an open seat in the House in 1952.  
However, despite efforts to do so, he was unable to obtain a seat again on the HUAC.  
In 1952, Wood did not seek re-election to the House for the 83rd Congress, so the 
Committee was due for a new chairman.  When the Republicans regained control of 
the House in that election, Harold Velde, a Republican from Illinois, became the new 
chairman.  Sometimes a powerful or aggressive committee member would influence 
the agenda to a degree: John Rankin, Republican Richard Nixon of California, 
Republican Karl Mundt of South Dakota, and Edward Hebert exercised significant 
influence on their chairmen.  No doubt the senior staff member for the HUAC, 
whether it was Ernie Adamson, Robert Stripling or Frank Tavenner, at times swayed 
the chairman.  Nevertheless, the opening of a new investigation required a vote of the 




Once the HUAC voted to open a formal investigation into a particular area, 
such as the motion picture industry, the process moved from the research stage to the 
corroboration phase.  Committee investigators created investigative name files from 
pertinent F&R files and populated the former with information from the latter.  The 
issue of pertinence might have constituted a gray area for Committee staff.  Certainly, 
the significance of some individuals and organizations to an investigation was 
obvious and undeniable.  It appears, however, that the investigators created many 
files for individuals that were unfruitful for the topic at hand.  There are dozens of 
these files for the Hollywood investigation that hold little or no significant 
information.  An example is the file for Henry Fonda, consisting only of one page, 
mostly taken up by a list of his screen credits, and ending with a notation indicatig 
he was interviewed on January 13, 1948.199  There is no indication in the HUAC 
archive whether Committee staff retired such investigative files early in their topical 
inquiries or kept them open until the Committee finished with them.  It is certainly 
not the case that investigators continued to collect corroborative information after a
topical investigation ended.  It is clear that many names like Henry Fonda’s 
represented a cul-de-sac and staff did not pursue further inquiry even during the 
topical investigation.  This seems to indicate that the image of HUAC investigators 
relentlessly digging up evidence to pin on innocent citizens who dared hold unpopular 
political views is unsubstantiated by the archival evidence. 
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Most likely a decision by the Committee’s senior staff person, who sometimes 
held the title of chief investigator and other times lead counsel, determined which 
files were most germane to a particular active investigation.  That decision ould 
mean the difference between a HUAC subpoena and unwelcomed national notoriety 
or historical obscurity.  In 1947-1948, during the time of the first Hollywood 
hearings, Robert Stripling, a lawyer hailing originally from Texas and originally a 
protégé of Martin Dies, served as the HUAC’s chief investigator.  Stripling 
previously served as staff secretary (1938-1940) and chief investigator (1941-1944) 
for the Dies Committee.  In 1949, Frank S. Tavenner, Jr. took over the senior staff 
position for the HUAC, but held the simple title of counsel.  He previously served as 
the acting chief counsel on the prosecution team in the war crimes trial of Japanese 
Prime Minister Tojo.200  Tavenner held the HUAC position until his death in 1964.  
Thus, he directed the Committee’s staff during the second Hollywood probe.  Under 
Tavenner’s leadership, longtime HUAC staffer and former FBI agent Louis J. Russell 
served as senior investigator through the end of 1953.  Russell was very involved in 
the investigatory preparations for both Hollywood probes.   
Given the pattern in which HUAC investigations proceeded, it is hard to 
imagine that the Committee’s chief investigator and/or senior counsel would not 
decide to which individuals and organizations the staff would devote their relatively 
slim resources for purposes of evidentiary corroboration.  However, this gives rise to
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an important reminder: the HUAC records are remarkably slight when it comes t 
internal communication.  The further back one goes, the more meager the records
appear.  Thus, this assertion is one based on deduction rather than specific archival 
evidence.  For important figures, such as the former Comintern representative to the 
CPUSA, Gerhart Eisler, the chairman, in consultation with other members of the 
Committee, made the decision to move forward with a full investigation.  
The HUAC did receive correspondence from the public asking for and in 
some cases demanding that the Committee investigate Hollywood figures.  An 
example of this from the archives is a telegram sent by a Mr. John Carter to the 
HUAC Chairman, Rep. John S. Wood in early 1951.  The telegram read: “PLEASE 
INVESTIGATE KATHERINE HEPBURN WELL KNOWN HOLLYWOOD RED 
DISOWNED BY WALLACE AS RED LEADER IN PROGRESSIVE PARTY 
WHY HAS STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED PASSPORT FOR HER.”  There is no 
indication in her file that the HUAC staff took this seriously or that it sparked any sort 
of investigation.201  There are other such letters and telegrams in the Committee’s 
records.  However, within the Hollywood files in general, there is no evidence that 
any such denouncement led HUAC investigators to subject an individual to the 
investigatory process.  Given the extent of the F&R Files, it would be clear to 
investigators that such denouncements most often arose from ignorance.  Again, it 
appears certain that the investigations were the product of Committee votes and were 
topical in nature.  It is also certainly the case that an individual’s inclusion in such an 
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investigation was primarily a product of the extent and nature of that person’s public 
record as gleaned from the communist press.   
The exception to this rule was when a witness testified under oath in either 
executive or public session that someone was a member of the CPUSA, under party 
discipline, engaged in subversive activities, or somehow had aided the CPUSA or one 
of its fronts.  At that point, Committee staff would in all likelihood create an 
investigative name file, pulling whatever information might be available from the 
F&R files.  Thus, a sworn witness bringing an individual to the attention of the 
HUAC could lead the person to investigative scrutiny, whereas the documentary 
evidence suggests this was not the case as the result of letters or telegrams to the 
Committee from the general public.  Nevertheless, a broad reading of the executive 
testimony reveals that there were a number of cases in which a witness brought forth 
a name of an actual or suspected party member and HUAC investigators were unabl  
to verify the assertions.  It seems that the HUAC congressmen and their investigator  
realized the unreliability of some testimony.  Memories could be faulty and a witness 
might recollect a rumor as being fact.  No doubt some sought to settle old scores 
through HUAC testimony.  Whether consciously so or not, witnesses could deviate 
from the facts.  Therefore, investigators sought to triangulate data so as to drw the 
correct, factual conclusions.   
Once the corroboration phase began, the on-going work of the F&R Section 
researchers of collecting data from publicly available sources continued, but 
investigators began the process of trying to verify and analyze the information they 




was already in the files.  The aim of the corroboration phase and, therefore, of the 
efforts of investigators to validate and augment the public record, was to prepare the 
way for HUAC congressmen to hear sworn testimony.   
To that end, the staff of the Investigative Section prepared a document for 
each investigative file that for lack of a better name one could call a three-column 
summary.  These summaries could be as slight as a third to half of a page in length or 
as long as six or more pages.  The length of a three-column summary typically 
indicated the perceived degree to which an individual contributed to or was cited in 
the communist press, was involved with communist front organizations, or engaged 
in other activities that might lead HUAC staff to suspect ties with the CPUSA.  The 
formatting of the summaries was fairly consistent over the years.  They wer  often, 
but not always, dated and, thus, one must sometimes deduce the approximate date of 
creation of the report by noting the last entry.  Under the heading of a file subject’s 
name, there appeared a numbered index, which listed the governmental bodies that 
had cited the organizations referred to as subversive.  Most often those citations 
originated from one or more of three sources.  The most common was a designation 
or finding by an Attorney General of the United States, either Tom Clark or Francis 
Biddle, and a notation of the document in which the designation or finding appeared.  
A second source of such a citation was a finding in a published report by the HUAC 
or its predecessor, the Dies Committee.  The third source of such a designation was a 
finding by the California Legislature’s Joint Fact-Finding Committee on Un-




the one often viewed as most credible was the Attorney General’s list about which 
historian Richard Fried writes: 
Since 1942 the Attorney General had listed 
organizations adjudged to be subversive; membership 
in them might raise a question but not conclusively 
prove disloyalty.  The list was first made public in 
1948.  One might have joined one of these groups 
because its expressed aim seemed laudable – civil 
rights, support for migrant workers, or opposition to 
Hitler.  One thus risked unknowingly entering into 
subversive company.  Communists might eventually 
take over a group, in which case the dates of one’s 
membership became crucial (but not always conclusive) 
evidence of political views.202 
Citing an organization in the three-column summaries with such a designation 
appeared to represent an attempt at a neutral and objective characterization that 
transcended politics. 
The three columns from which the summary derived its name had the 
headings “Organization,” “Affiliation” and “Source.”  Under the “Organization” 
heading, investigators might cite the CPUSA if the individual named was a known 
member.  One of the CPUSA’s known fronts or an organization suspected, but not 
proven, to be a front might appear under the heading.  Likewise, a trade union, guild 
or other professional organization designated as being under communist control or 
subject to communist infiltration were frequent candidates for the list.  Other ci ations 
could be of a much more transitory nature: a rally put on by a front or suspected front 
organization or even a published statement in the form of an advertisement in a 
periodical.  An example of the latter is an open letter, signed by Hollywood Ten 
screenwriter Samuel Ornitz, appearing in the W stern Worker, that criticized the 
                                                





American Committee for the Defense of Trotsky and denounced demands for an 
investigation of the Russian “purge” trial as “political interference in the internal 
affairs of the Soviet Union with hostile intent.”203  One regular and controversial 
citation was the Progressive Citizens of American, the political organization that 
splintered a number of Democrats away to support Henry Wallace’s presidential 
candidacy in 1948.  There was strong suspicion then and much evidence now that the 
upper echelons of the PCA included many communist political organizers.   
“Affiliation” referred to the named individual’s relationship with that 
organization.  The affiliation might seem specific and exact, such as “elected board 
member” in the case of a known or suspected front or “contributor” when the 
individual had submitted an article for publication by the communist press or one its 
fronts.  Sometimes the designation given was “sponsor” for an affiliation with a 
communist front or the equivalent of what today one might call a communist-led 
political action committee.  As Chapter Seven will explore, this label was problematic 
at best, because many individuals found themselves sponsors of organizations or 
events without their consent.  The affiliation could be as slight as “performer,” 
“entertainer,” or “singer” at an event put on by the party or a front organization.  
Although the three-column reports reveal a consistent pattern of “affiliation” with the 
CPUSA and/or its front organizations for some Hollywood personalities, for others 
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the evidence is much more tenuous and unclear.204   In some cases, the three-column 
summary is only a third of a page long and demonstrates no pattern of affiliation with 
communist organizations or causes, and such interaction that did occur seems 
incidental and casual.  Chapter Seven will return to this issue in greater detail and 
discuss the problem of front “affiliation” in more depth.    
The source column served to list citations.  An often cited source was a 
publication and the most common publication cited was the Daily Worker.  The other 
periodical that commonly served as a citation in the source column was the New 
Masses.  It appears that, if there was any citation from the sources that the F&R files 
drew upon, it would show up in the three-column summary if an individual became 
associated with a HUAC investigation.  A citation from the periodical press always 
included the date of publication and the page number on which the information 
appeared.  However, as in the case of the F&R files, the three-column summaries 
drew upon many printed sources beyond citations in radical newspapers and 
magazines.  Newsletters, pamphlets, leaflets, letterheads, press relea es, vent 
programs, minutes of union or guild meetings, printed texts of speeches, legal briefs, 
and previously published HUAC reports all served as citations in the source column.  
Occasionally, the source column cited the anticommunist publication Cou terattack 
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as the basis of the information.205  However, this was as rare as a source citation from 
the Daily Worker was common.  It is clear that the HUAC’s information originated 
predominately in the communist press rather than from private, anticommunist 
sources.  Although the form of the report varied slightly over time and became more 
detailed and thorough by the 1950s, its essential format stayed the same.   
The three-column summaries appeared designed to reveal the scope and extent 
of an individual’s involvement in CPUSA fronts and causes, but they reveal little in 
biographical terms of whom the person was and the degree to which she or he was 
important, influential or significant.  To fill this need for the congressmen sitti g on 
the Committee, investigators or research staff created narrative reports for inclusion 
in an individual’s investigative name file.  A typical narrative report included th  
subject’s birth name if different than his or her current name, which was and is 
common in show business.  The report also usually included date and place of birth, 
as well as the person’s educational background, the name of any current or former 
spouse, the date(s) of any marriages, military service records, and, if applicable, 
naturalization information.  The length of the narrative reports varied depending upon 
the prominence or obscurity of the subject of the investigation: some were barely one-
quarter of a page long, whereas others might run five to ten pages in length.   
Efforts by investigators to corroborate and supplement the information 
forwarded from the F&R files into narrative reports took many forms.  The 
Hollywood investigative name files show that HUAC investigators used Who’s Who 
in America and the International Motion Picture Almanac to glean information about 
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the subjects of their investigations.206  Since the bulk of the party members or 
suspected communists in Hollywood were active in some aspect of motion picture 
production, the narrative reports included a list of screen credits and which studio or 
studios employed them.  If a person’s name had come up in previous testimony or a 
witness named her or him as a communist, suspected communist or as someone 
involved in subversive activity, that testimony was often summarized in the narrative 
report.  A chronicle of any significant trade union or professional guide activity 
usually found its way into the narrative report, particularly if the union or guild had a 
connection in some way with the CPUSA or its leadership included known or 
suspected members of the party.   
Most often the above represented the extent of the information in the narrative 
reports, i.e. material available from public sources.  There were some exceptions to 
this pattern as investigators sought corroboration of data derived from the communist 
press. An example comes from the narrative report in the file of Jeff Kibre, a studio
technician who was almost certainly a CPUSA member and involved intimately in 
efforts to infiltrate one of Hollywood’s key technical unions, the International 
Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees.  Kibre’s file includes a statement of his 
probable income, as well as a record of arrests and convictions from the records of the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office, the Los Angeles City Police Department and 
the Federal District Court of Los Angeles.  In fact, Kibre, who had at least three 
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aliases, had joined the CPUSA under the name Barry Wood and in 1938 had been 
elected to the party’s executive committee for the Los Angeles branch.207   
In terms of documenting arrest records, Kibre represents a significant 
exception in the HUAC’s Hollywood files.  While the Committee did draw on police 
reports, they did so rarely.  Just as rare is the information collected in the file of J. 
Edward Bromberg, a veteran character actor, whose death from a heart attack at he 
age of forty-eight critics often cite as the result of the stress from being blacklisted.  
Bromberg’s file is truly exceptional in that it contains personal information not part of 
the public record: his social security number; salary; home ownership informatin, 
including his home’s then current value; the value of his government bonds; the 
amount of his life insurance policy; and the balance of funds in his bank account.208   
Bromberg was in all likelihood a member of the party and his activities in and 
with various communist front organizations, as documented by the HUAC, were 
extensive.  It is difficult to conceive of how intrusively collecting this type of 
personal information could assist Congress in fulfilling its mandate to investigate he 
extent of subversive or un-American activities in the United States and the diffusion 
of subversive or un-American propaganda, or to recommend remedial legislation to 
address either.  Nevertheless, if the Hollywood investigations are indicative of how 
the Committee conducted its other probes, then such invasive collection of personal 
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information was a rare exception.209  No other investigative name file contains nearly 
the same degree of personal and financial information.  Suffice it to say, Bromberg’s 
file was atypical.  Although in one other known case, that of Donald Odgen Stewart, 
the Committee obtained income tax records to determine the extent of financial 
contributions to communist fronts, the HUAC files do not indicate why investigators 
singled out Bromberg for such an extensive and invasive personal, financial 
inquiry.210 
An example of one of the more exotic attempts at corroboration was the 
purchase in 1955 of a set of files from the estate of William Hynes by William 
Wheeler, an investigator from the HUAC’s Los Angeles field office.  The purchase 
price remains unknown.  Hynes’ files contained a list of names of individuals who 
were members of the Culver City Studio Unit of the CPUSA.  The files also 
contained information on members of a front group called the American Peace 
Mobilization, which sought to keep the United States neutral in World War II during 
the time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.  In this case, however, the information obtained was 
not useful; a handwritten notation on the cover page of the report indicated the names 
“need not be carded…too old.”211  Thus, although Committee investigators apparently 
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resorted to creative methods to obtain information on the CPUSA, there was no 
mandate to accumulate membership data from fifteen years previous and add it to the
F&R card index.212  This seems to belie the assertion that the HUAC sought to pin the 
label of “communist” on individuals for passing associations made many years in the 
past.   
Of course the ideal piece of corroborating evidence would be a CPUSA 
registration card or membership book.  The HUAC archives do reveal that for some 
individuals the Committee obtained just such substantiation.  The Committee 
possessed in its files Photostats of such documents; how investigators obtained them 
is not clear.  Although the form and content of CPUSA registration cards and 
membership books changed over the years, the information contained on the 
Photostats gives one pause to consider why government officials might find such a 
membership alarming.  CPUSA membership books until the end of 1930s clearly 
indicate that the American party is a “Section of the Communist International.”  Thus, 
claims by revisionist historians that the CPUSA operated independently of Moscow 
find counterevidence from party documents.  The membership books essentially 
declare that the CPUSA was not simply affiliated with the Comintern, but rather it 
was organizationally a subcomponent of it.  In addition, the books have a space to 
record the date that the holder of the book “Entered Revolutionary Movement.”  
Except for the extraordinarily naïve, those signing up must have realized that they 
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were not joining a typical political party like the Republicans, the Democrats, or he 
Socialists.  The CPUSA overtly associated its mission with that of revolution.  Thus, 
by definition, it was subversive in the classic sense of the word.  Finally, the 
registration cards ask the registrant for both his or her “real name,” as well as his or 
her “party name.”213  This, of course, begs the question: if one is not signing up for a 
subversive organization, why does one need the political equivalent of a om de 
guerre?   
In an era before the internet, video recordings or even television reruns, 
attempting to determine the ideological content of movies that had played in movie 
theatres years before could be a real challenge.  However, the HUAC’s mandate 
focused on assessing the diffusion of subversive propaganda.  Thus, Committee 
congressmen believed the charge that communist writers in Hollywood had attempted 
to insert propaganda into motion pictures warranted investigation.  This raised the 
practical problem as to how to make an assessment of the ideological content of 
movies.  The result was that Committee investigators had an additional task during 
the corroboration phase of the investigatory process: to verify often subtle content of 
specific motion pictures.  In the late 1940s and early 1950s, there was only one way 
to view a Hollywood motion picture – one had to watch it projected onto a movie 
screen in the 35mm film format.  If a film was no longer playing at the local cinema, 
which was the case with the vast majority of the motion pictures that were germane to 
the Hollywood investigations, then typically the Los Angeles field investigator had to 
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arrange a special screening.  This meant securing film prints, renting a screening 
room, and paying a projectionist, all of which represented a significant expense.   
An alternative was for investigators to obtain copies of scripts.  This was 
problematic for several reasons.  They did not exist in libraries, but rather 
investigators had to acquire them from the movie studios that owned them.  Even if 
the studios extended full cooperation, often their record-keeping was poor.  The 
HUAC was sometimes interested in films that were a decade or more old at a time 
when studios typically produced more than a hundred movies a year.  Simply locating 
an accurate copy of a script that might have gone through multiple drafts by a number 
of writers could be logistically difficult.  In addition, directors often changed th  
content of movies during the process of shooting, adding or deleting lines or even 
scenes.  After production was finished, editors might trim or rearrange film scenes to 
obtain the best dramatic effect.  Thus, the writer’s final product and what audiences 
saw in the movie house could be quite different.    
Because of the difficulties of arranging special screenings or obtaining copies 
of scripts, the HUAC also relied on other methods to assess the ideological content 
and possible subversive qualities of Hollywood’s creations.  The testimony of those 
involved in the creation of the films in question often spoke to the issues of ideology 
and propaganda, but this often led to contradictory statements.  A HUAC sub-
committee discovered this in May, 1947 when it traveled to Los Angeles to take 
preliminary executive session testimony in order to determine whether the fac s 
warranted a full-scale investigation of the motion picture industry.  Several 




propaganda had found its way into the movies, whereas most of the producers and 
studio executives denied this did or even could take place. 
Another method investigators seized upon was to rely on movie reviews 
written contemporaneously with the public release of the motion pictures in question.  
Although the HUAC files show that investigators relied on the mainstream press fo  
such information, once again they used the communist press in a form of self-
reporting.  It was a difficult proposition to deny that a motion picture like North Star, 
Mission to Moscow or Song of Russia did not contain pro-Soviet propaganda if the 
communist press praised it for its content.214  For example, the Daily Worker 
regularly featured a column called “Film Front” written by David Platt, who clearly 
saw motion pictures as a weapon in the class struggle and evaluated motion pictures 
in ideological terms.  Clippings and Photostats of Platt’s reviews are well-represented 
in the Hollywood investigative name files.  Certainly, a laudatory mention by Platt of 
a film, its director and/or its writer or a commendation that a character or a scene 
exhibited appropriate “class consciousness” invited HUAC scrutiny.215  HUAC 
investigators apparently cross-referenced the movies he acclaimed against what the 
files revealed about the film’s writer or director.  Thus, as Committee staff undertook 
the logistically difficult task of analyzing the content of the American films for the 
possible insertion of communist propaganda, it was the communist press that offered 
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the simplest avenue of investigation and most direct method of analysis.  In many 
cases, the Daily Worker offered the analysis for the HUAC. 
One of the key duties of HUAC investigators during the tenures of Stripling 
and Tavenner was to interview, if possible, potential witnesses prior to their 
appearance before the Committee.  Investigators from the main office in Washington, 
DC and those in the field offices participated in this exercise.  The HUAC maintained 
field offices in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles.  During the Hollywood probe, 
only the Los Angeles office made significant investigatory contributions.216  During 
the first Hollywood hearings in the late 1940s, the “Los Angeles office” was in fact 
the law office of attorney H. A. Smith, a former FBI agent, who conducted 
investigations for the HUAC throughout the state of California.  In the early 1950s 
during the second Hollywood probe, William Wheeler served in the same capacity, 
replacing Smith as the HUAC’s key investigator in Los Angeles.      
When potential witnesses were antagonistic toward the HUAC, such a 
preparatory interview was usually impossible.  The investigator’s role was then to 
insure the potential witness was served with a subpoena.  The purpose of the 
preparatory interview was to evaluate the degree to which the potential witness had 
reliable and accurate information germane to the probe; to determine the nature of 
what that testimony might entail, which was often helpful in the preparation of 
questions to ask during testimony; and to assess the degree to which a potential 
witness might make a favorable presentation to the public.  In terms of the latter, the 
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Committee no doubt sought to avoid the past mistake the Dies Committee made of 
calling witnesses, only to have them appear to or actually be crackpots.    
The then-liberal Ronald Reagan represents a fascinating case in point.  The 
Los Angeles investigator, H. A. Smith, provided the following assessment of 
Reagan’s suitability as a witness to HUAC headquarters in Washington: 
This individual is presently President of the Screen 
Actors Guild.  He has no fear of any one [sic], is a nice 
talker, well informed on the subject, and will make a 
splendid witness.  He is of course reticent to testify, 
because he states that he is a New Deal liberal, and does 
not agree with a number of individuals of the Motion 
Picture Alliance.  I believe we straightened out a 
number of his differences, in that he felt [conservative 
actor Adolphe] Menjou and some of the others referred 
to him, Reagan, as a man who had been a Leftist and 
then reformed.  Reagan resents this very much, as he 
states he never was a Leftist, that actually he got 
tangled up in a few committees he thought were all 
right, but it took him some time to learn they were 
not.217   
The field agent happened to be from the same hometown as Reagan and struck up an 
easy rapport with him.  The investigator cautioned that he had to disabuse Reagan of 
the belief that one of the other potential witnesses, James K. McGuinness, an 
executive at M-G-M Studios and a former screenwriter, was a professional red-baiter.  
In other words, Smith warned the HUAC that Reagan was wary of participating in 
anything that smacked of red-baiting.   
The actor Robert Taylor also represented another extremely reluctant 
“friendly witness” with whom Smith worked carefully to try to win over.  Taylor had 
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testified voluntarily in executive session before a HUAC sub-committee visiting 
Hollywood on a fact-finding trip in May 1947 with the understanding that his 
testimony would remain confidential.  The popular leading man was well-known in 
Hollywood as a conservative and had very reluctantly agreed to star in Song of 
Russia, a 1944 film made by M-G-M when the United States and the Soviet Union 
were wartime allies, but which later came under criticism as pro-communist 
propaganda by Ayn Rand amongst others.  Louis B. Mayer had personally asked 
Taylor to star in the picture, which the former considered pro-Allied propagand 
rather than being pro-Soviet.   
When Smith informed Taylor he would receive a subpoena to testify in public 
session, Taylor was already angry that he admittedly had looked “silly” in his
previous testimony and that HUAC had made public the substance of his testimony 
given in executive session with the expectation it would remain confidential.  Tay or 
felt double-crossed and that, since he was not an expert on communism, his testimony 
would offer the Committee nothing of value.  He believed the HUAC was using his 
celebrity to gain publicity.  Although he expressed genuine appreciation to 
Investigator Smith for the work he had done fighting communism, Taylor, an 
anticommunist and supposed “friendly witness” made his feelings about the HUAC 
crystal clear: 
I’ve never cared a whole helluva lot for politicians, 
whether they be Republican or Democrat.  And I’ve 
certainly never believed it inherent in my job as a 
motion picture actor to aid in feathering any of their 
nests for them via publicity from my name…. 
These investigations, the way they’re being run in 




Ring Circus than of a sincere effort to rid the country of 
a real threat… 
If  I am subpoenaed – and I sincerely hope that 
something can be done to pigeon-hole that subpoena – I 
shall, naturally, go to Washington for the investigation.  
I will feel utterly ridiculous and shall resent every 
minute of the whole thing….Moreover, as a “friendly” 
witness, I shall be friendly to the cause; as far as being 
friendly to the Committee itslef [sic] is concerned that 
possibility went out the window the last time I was 
“crossed up”.218   
Taylor ended his scathing letter with a statement of hope that he could duck the U.S. 
marshal, who would serve the subpoena.  He was not successful at this and found 
himself testifying in public session approximately a month later.     
Legendary producer Samuel Goldwyn was also reluctant to testify before the 
HUAC.  Interviewed by Investigator Smith during the preliminary work leading to 
the first Hollywood hearings, Goldwyn denied communists were able to sneak any 
propaganda into American movies, which were in no way dangerous.  Smith wrote to 
Washington: “Although tending to be cooperative, Mr. GOLDWYN’s sole desire was 
to see that he did not testify in Washington, to convince us that he does not know 
anything, and if he did know anything he was not going to tell anyway, even as he 
does not desire to put the finger on anybody…. Mr. GOLDWYN polished us off in 
pretty good shape without telling us very much.”219  
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A final example of a reluctant witness was that of Walt Disney, a man often 
excoriated by critics on the left as being a reactionary.  Smith wrote that, “Mr. 
DISNEY is a gentleman, presents a nice appearance, talks well, and certainly will be 
an asset as a witness on our behalf.  Some difficulty was experienced in convincing 
him that his testimony would be of value.  He has no fear of testifying, however, he 
states that his story is an old one and that he is doubtful whether it would be of any 
value in connection with the instant hearing.”220  Disney, too, ended up receiving a 
HUAC subpoena.   
The cases of Reagan, Taylor, Goldwyn, and Disney are instructive of several 
features of the HUAC investigations into Hollywood.  First, they reveal that a key
duty of Committee investigators was to interview and determine the suitability of 
certain witnesses before they gave testimony.  Second, the instances of Reagan and 
Taylor in particular demonstrate that a talented investigator like Smith could strike a 
valuable rapport with a witness despite the latter’s antipathy toward the Committee or 
testifying in general.  Third, Committee staff created investigative files even for so-
called friendly witnesses.  Fourth, reports in the investigative name files rev al that 
interviews by field investigators conveyed the substance of the probable testimony 
friendly witnesses were likely to make.  They do not, however, indicate in any way 
that the field operatives coached the witnesses as to what their testimony ought to be.  
Finally, the HUAC Hollywood files show that in fact some of the key friendly 
witnesses were not all that friendly to the HUAC and strongly preferred not to testify.   
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On occasion, Committee investigators supplemented the corroboration process 
by gathering information from grand jury investigations and police reports on 
possible subversive activities, such as communist led strikes.  Some information 
sparingly came from the FBI, but the latter rarely cooperated well with the HUAC.  J. 
Edgar Hoover was usually very loyal to whichever president happened to be in office 
at the time, which during most of the Hollywood investigations was Harry Truman.  
Hoover was loath to assist the HUAC, which was often critical of both the Roosevelt 
and Truman administrations.  Additionally, Hoover felt the HUAC was out of its 
depth trying to run an investigation and that his agency was more properly suited to 
such work.  He feared that sharing information with publicity hungry congressmen 
would compromise his sources.  Thus, Hoover extended his cooperation sparingly, 
with great care and when he could benefit from it politically.  In some cases, the 
investigative name files contain reports from the FBI or information requested from 
other federal agencies, such as the State Department, the Labor Department, the 
National Labor Relations Board, and various other executive departments.  However, 
in the case of the Hollywood hearings, these are exceptions rather than the norm. 
Another exception from the HUAC’s general investigative pattern is the 
evidence of some cooperation with the so-called Tenney Committee in California.  
Republican State Senator Jack B. Tenney was the chairman of the California 
Legislature’s Joint Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, sometimes 
known as the CUAC, from 1941-1949.  His committee was probably the most 




at the state level during the period out of fear of subversive activities by domestic 
fascist and communist movements.221   
Tenney was a former musician, whose composition “Mexicali Rose” garnered 
some fame, and later he headed a musicians’ union local in Los Angeles.  He 
eventually lost his leadership position in the local in a power struggle with what he 
believed was a communist controlled faction.  Thus, originally a progressive himself, 
Tenney moved increasingly to the right and ultimately became a dogmatic and 
demagogic anticommunist.  In 1936, Tenney began his tenure as a representative of a 
Los Angeles district in the California Assembly from 1936-1942 and then served in 
the California Senate from 1942-1954.  His background provided him with a natural 
interest in trade union affairs along with a personal antipathy towards anyone wh  
cooperated in any manner with the communist movement.  Because California was 
the home of the bulk of the motion picture production in the United States, 
communist infiltration into the movie business was an issue of local concern, as much 
as of national security.   
Tenney testified before the HUAC in March 1947 during the preliminary 
phase leading up to the Hollywood hearings.  In addition, he sent a rambling eleven 
page letter to J. Parnell Thomas, who had become the HUAC chairman in January 
1947 when a Republican majority took control with the incoming 80th Congress.  The 
letter summarized the California Committee’s findings of its investigation of the 
Hollywood Writers Mobilization (HWM), which Tenney believed was a front under 
communist control and that its mission was “to build sympathy for Soviet Russia and 
                                                




Communism in general.”222  To supplement the letter, Tenney included thirty-five 
documents designated as exhibits.  Some of these documents showed that the CUAC 
made use of an informant, who apparently supplied the minutes of various meetings 
of the HWM at which its leadership discussed policy issues and sought to craft a plan 
to sell the services of the HWM to various government agencies.223  
Although Tenney’s testimony and the documentary evidence he forwarded to 
the HUAC was no doubt helpful to Chairman Thomas, there does not appear to be 
any record of extensive cooperation between Tenney and his federal counterparts at 
least in terms of the Hollywood hearings.  While in a number of investigative files 
HUAC investigators quote the findings of various CUAC investigations, it does not 
appear that the California committee or any other state level body served as an 
investigative arm of the HUAC.  This stands in contradistinction to the slogan: “the 
plot to control America’s thinking,” a catchphrase the HWM adopted to oppose the 
“Hearst-Tenney-Rankin threat.”224  Though the communists leading the Mobilization 
clearly wanted to paint a conspiracy of reaction, the documentary evidence in the 
HUAC archive does not support this view.  
What is not in the records left behind by the HUAC is perhaps as important as 
what is present in the National Archives.  An analysis of the files relating to the 
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Hollywood investigations reveals that there were almost no instances of Committee 
investigators conducting direct surveillance of suspects.  The exception was a report 
by a field agent who attended some speeches by Gerhart Eisler in Chicago in front of
sympathetic audiences and reported back to Washington what he witnessed of the 
public event.  On the other hand, there are no reports of investigators tailing suspects 
in order to dig up incriminating evidence.  The only events even remotely close to this 
are instances of unfriendly witnesses evading HUAC subpoenas and investigators’ 
hapless attempts at tracking them down.  Furthermore, there is no record of HUAC 
making use of informants in the manner in which the CUAC did as mentioned above.  
Committee investigators simply did not have the time or resources to track the 
movements of those it investigated. 
There is no record of wiretaps or the opening of private mail, no documents 
obtained without a subpoena, no network of domestic spies and no rifling through 
suspects’ garbage or psychiatric records.  There were no break-ins to rifle through 
private files or Watergate-style dirty tricks.  There was one instance where the 
Committee obtained a record of telephones calls, i.e. a list of telephone numbers 
called from a particular phone, in an attempt to establish that Gerhart and Hanns 
Eisler had been in touch with each other.  However, there is no record of the 
Committee tapping the telephone calls of either man.  There are no surreptitious 
recordings of private conversations nor are there transcripts of the same in the HUAC 
files.  There are no records of agents “overhearing” private conversations.   
In 1945, a representative of the Speak-O-Phone Recording and Equipment 




equipment that could bug a room or a telephone.  The company supposedly supplied 
its product to various agencies of the federal government.  The Committee chairman 
replied in writing: 
I do not know whether the use of such a device as 
referred to by you would be permissible under Federal 
law and by a Committee of Congress.  But aside from 
that, the Committee on Un-American Activities is now in 
the process of organizing and has not yet selected an 
investigative staff.  Assuming that the use of the Speak-
O-Phone would be lawful, the Committee would make no 
decision respecting its use, until after consultation with its 
Chief Investigator.225    
With that temporizing communication, the matter died.  The HUAC never availed 
itself of the Speak-O-Phone.    
Ironically, the HUAC, though tasked with the mandate to investigate 
subversive propaganda, found itself restricted by copyright law.  One can find an 
example of this in the investigative file of Lester Koenig, who was a writer and 
producer in Hollywood.  Koenig became the subject of HUAC interest because of his 
ties to three communist front organizations: the League of American Writers, th  
Theatre Arts Committee, and the Committee for the First Amendment.  Koenig’s file 
indicated he was an editorial board member of a publication called the Clipper, 
published by an organization called the Black and White Press, Inc. under the 
auspices of the Hollywood Chapter of the League of American Writers.  
Unfortunately, the Clipper was not available for inclusion into the investigative file.  
An unknown investigator wrote: “The Clipper is a copywrighted [sic] publication and 
therefore cannot be photostated [sic] for use as an exhibit.  A bound volume of the 
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magazine is available in the Library of Congress.”226  This is one example of a 
number of similar cases.  The HUAC staff would not break the law and create a 
Photostatic copy of a copyrighted publication.  Thus, whether the case was the 
surreptitious recording of conversations or the replication of copyrighted documents, 
HUAC investigators took care to abide by the law.    
Once investigators believed they had obtained sufficient corroboration of 
material forwarded from the F&R files or determined that the potential testimony of a 
prospective witness was suitably useful for a topical investigation, the chief 
investigator or lead counsel to the Committee prepared a set of questions to ask 
during the executive session testimony.  Great care went into the preparation 
questions and there is evidence in the files that often the questions would go through 
several iterations before the HUAC’s chief counsel was ready to interrogate the 
witness.  If the witness was of minor importance or was called simply to verify a 
point of someone else’s testimony, the list of questions might be very brief.  On the 
other hand, for witnesses considered important, such the Eisler brothers or members 
of the Hollywood Ten, the list could be quite long.  There were sixty-eight questions 
prepared for the executive session testimony of John Garfield.  
The lists of questions were intended specifically for the chief investigator or 
senior counsel, Robert Stripling and Frank Tavenner, respectively, to ask.  Committee 
members often asked questions during testimony, some more than others depending 
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upon the investigation.227  Of the congressmen, the various chairmen were usually the 
most active interrogators, probably because they worked most closely with senior 
staff to whom they gave direction.  Whereas the committee members’ questions were 
often desultory or attempts at clarification, the prepared questions were logical and 
intended to produce one of two results.  One goal was to use the prepared questions to 
build an argument for a state of affairs the chief investigator or senior counsel 
believed to be the case, i.e. that the witness was currently or in the past involved in 
possible subversive activity.  This was the process when questioning an “unfriendly” 
witness.  The second goal was to draw from the witness specific information that the 
Committee wanted in order to either expand its understanding of communist activity 
or gain confirmation of information gained from the testimony of others.    
The final step before executive session testimony could occur was to create 
exhibits for the chief investigator or senior counsel to use when questioning witnesses 
the Committee suspected of subversive activity.  These exhibits were evidentiary in 
nature.  HUAC members and staff investigators expected such witnesses to dissemble 
if not outright lie.  Poor or selective memories were common.  The senior interrogao  
used exhibits to confront witnesses with the evidence of their involvement with 
communist activities.  Because witnesses often tried to hide that involvement, the 
chief investigator or lead counsel sought to build the case that the witness’s 
prevarication was confirmation of subversive activity.  On the other hand, since 
membership in the CPUSA or one of its front organizations was not against the law, 
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critics argued that such tactics amounted to tarring the witnesses by innuendo and 
implication.  In any event, the irony was that once again it was the communist pres  
that provided the bulk of the material used to create the exhibits.  The evidence that 
most witnesses had to account for was the public record published by the CPUSA or 
its fronts.    
Misidentifying individuals, confusion of persons with the same or similar 
names, and the failure to adequately confirm identities, therefore, ruining reputations 
and careers, has been a common criticism of HUAC investigatory methods.  This type 
of error might have occurred with the use of the bulky F&R files, which consisted of 
the compilation of unanalyzed raw data.  Mistaken identities had occurred during the 
freewheeling days of the Dies Committee.  However, a thorough review of the
Hollywood investigative name files shows that from 1947 onwards, under the 
leadership of Stripling and then Tavenner, by the time the Committee was ready to 
subpoena a witness, investigators knew well with whom they were dealing. There is 
no evidence of mistaken identity once investigators completed the corroboration 
phase.   
Once the HUAC staff completed the tasks of compiling of corroboratory 
information, preparing lists of questions and creating exhibits, the executive session 
phase could begin.  Testimony taken in executive session could take place in a 
number of ways.  It could occur in front of a session of the full Committee with most 
or all of its members present.  Just as often, executive testimony could transpire 
before an ad hoc subcommittee, as was the case during a sub-committee’s visit to Los 




subcommittee to undertake testimony on its own, but executive session minutes seem 
to indicate that such votes were routine.  The HUAC often used a subcommittee to 
obtain testimony outside of Washington or when the House was not in session.  A 
subcommittee could be as small as one congressman and a staff investigator.228  In 
fact, there are rare instances in the record where investigators, such as William
Wheeler and Louis Russell, alone questioned friendly witnesses in executive sesson
in Los Angeles.229  A court reporter always was always present to transcribe the 
testimony and staff archived bound copies in a file series separate from either the 
F&R files or the investigative name files.   
Legal counsel rarely accompanied the so-called friendly witnesses who had no 
previous record of communist activity.  However, counsel often accompanied those 
friendly witnesses who had left the CPUSA and sought to cooperate with the HUAC.  
In the case of former Hollywood communists that counsel was usually Martin Gang, 
an attorney noted for helping ex-communists cooperate with the HUAC as a means of 
getting off the blacklist.  Gang was also a regular feature of the public sessions held 
in the early 1950s.  Non-cooperative witnesses who refused to testify under the 
provisions of Fifth Amendment privilege were always accompanied by their lawyers 
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and usually received a contempt of Congress citation.  After the higher courts ruled 
against this in the 1950s, the practice of issuing such citations ended.    
A broad reading of the transcripts of testimony given in executive session 
indicates that different interrogators had very different styles of questioning.  Ernie 
Adamson, who served as chief counsel after the government drafted the middle-aged 
Robert Stripling in 1944, was aggressive to the point of sarcasm and ridicule with 
unfriendly witnesses.  When Stripling took over as chief investigator in 1947, he 
exhibited the aggressiveness of a prosecutor, but with in a professional manner.  
Transcripts show that he attempted to maintain decorum and avoid the theatrics 
characteristic of the Dies Committee, even if at times Chairman J. Parnell Thomas 
allowed himself at times to become angry at recalcitrant witnesses and depart from 
Stripling’s script.  Frank Tavenner was the consummate, but low key professional.  
While his questioning was logical, methodical, and pointed, he never stooped to 
badgering his witness.  His contemporaries noted that Tavenner’s questioning as 
general counsel to the HUAC was vigorous, yet dispassionate and fair.230  The 
chairmanship of John S. Wood, a former judge, aided Tavenner in this respect.  
Although he had significant failings, such as the unwillingness to investigate the Ku 
Klux Klan, Wood took testimony in a calm and judicious manner.  This stood in 
contrast to predecessors Chairman Thomas, a former stock and insurance executive, 
who had no legal experience and Martin Dies in particular.  
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Not all those who testified in executive session were recalled to testify agan 
in public session, though many were.  Executive session testimony could vary from 
that given in public session, especially when the chief investigator or lead counsel 
chose to hold back new information given in executive session to allow investigators 
time to do some additional detective work.   
As succeeding chapters will make clear, there were several themes to which 
interrogators returned to repeatedly during executive session testimony.  The HUAC 
congressmen, chief investigators and lead counsel wanted to understand the inner 
workings of the CPUSA at the local level, to comprehend its use of front 
organizations and infiltration of trade unions, to grasp communist efforts in the area 
of propaganda, and to obtain confirmation from witnesses as to the correctness of the 
information in Committee files.  The last task was an exercise in triangulation to 
insure accuracy.  The same is true of new information obtained in sworn testimony.  
The transcript record shows in a number of places that, when a witness named 
someone as a CPUSA member, the Committee sought confirmation of the fact from 
other witnesses.231   
In summary, the newly available documentary evidence in the HUAC 
archives reveals a far more nuanced understanding of the Committee’s investigatory 
methods than previously supposed.  The HUAC investigatory staff did not act as a 
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police force and in fact was at the mercy of the executive agencies, such as the FBI 
for information.  The information that the Committee collected and catalogued in its 
vast files originated primarily from the public record and in particular from the press.  
In fact, the HUAC used the communist press and the public relations mechanisms of 
its front organizations to engage in a form of self-reporting that Committee 
researchers collected and analyzed.  With very rare exceptions, investigator avoided 
probing into sensitive areas of privacy, such as personal finances, not related to the 
activities of suspected communists on behalf of the CPUSA and its fronts.  
Investigators did not act like private detectives in the movies, tailing suspects, 
eavesdropping on their conversations, and surreptitiously opening their mail.  Field 
investigators spent most of their time interviewing prospective witnesses and trying to 
obtain old copies of film scripts.  HUAC congressmen and staff specifically avoided 
methods of investigation they either knew were not legal or of which they were 
unsure.  Finally, the theatrics and demagoguery of the Dies Committee gradually 





Chapter 6:  The Brothers Eisler – From Manhattan to Malibu 
Historians and critics have offered varying theses as to why the HUAC 
undertook its investigations of Hollywood, but none have appropriately emphasized 
the crucial role that Gerhart and Hanns Eisler played in this drama.  Newly avai able 
documents in the HUAC archives reveal that during the first half of 1947 the 
Committee’s investigative agenda led it in a logical progression from Gerhart Eisler 
to his brother, Hanns, and, finally, to communist activity in Hollywood.  The 
argument this chapter puts forth is that, although a number of factors brought 
communist activity in Hollywood to the attention of the Committee, it was the 
investigation of the Eisler brothers that moved the issue of communist infiltration in 
Hollywood to the forefront of the HUAC’s attention and made a probe of the motion 
picture industry all but inevitable and sooner, rather than later.  Before delving into 
what the HUAC files reveal about the Eislers, it is best to offer a brief introductory 
account of how various historians have dealt with the Eislers and their relationship to 
the HUAC probe of Hollywood.    
In explaining the motivation behind the HUAC foray into Hollywood, Larry 
Ceplair and Steven Englund focused on the efforts by “progressives” to establish he 
Screen Writers Guild (SWG) as the sole collective bargaining entity to represent 
Hollywood writers to the movie studios.  They depict the SWG as being truly 
representing the interests of the screenwriters, as opposed to either the Writers




Playwrights, both considered management sponsored entities.232  The SWG acted 
vigorously on behalf of Hollywood writers and became involved in other progressive 
causes, such as the Hollywood Writers Mobilization.  Moreover, the participation in 
the guild’s leadership by some very active progressives led to their opponents 
labeling them as communists.  Ultimately, this led to the formation of the Motion 
Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals by Hollywood’s 
conservative anticommunists to fight the influence of the Left, especially in the 
SWG.233  According to Ceplair and Englund, who considered this group 
“reactionary,” the Motion Picture Alliance invited the HUAC to Hollywood 
“…aiming to purge the studios of everyone with a strong left-wing viewpoint and 
history of activism on behalf of that viewpoint…. the job a progressive held was now, 
for the first time, at stake.”234  From this perspective, it was the Motion Picture 
Alliance that brought the HUAC to town as an ally in a war against progressive 
activism and unionization.   
The problem with this analysis is that it does not adequately account for the 
fact that, by the time of the 1947 Hollywood probe, the SWG battles were almost a 
decade and a half old.  Certainly, the Committee was concerned about communist 
infiltration into the leadership of the SWG and the HUAC files show that 
investigators researched this issue carefully.  However, what accounted for he
HUAC’s decision to hold public hearings on Hollywood in late 1947 and not earlier?  
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Other historians have given various other reasons as to why the HUAC 
undertook a full scale investigation of the American motion picture industry.  Some 
explanations were better than others, but none paid adequate attention to the Eisler 
connection.  Billingsley wrote of the union jurisdictional disputes between the AFL 
affiliated International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (commonly known in 
the movie business as IATSE or the IA) and the CIO affiliated Conference of Studio 
Unions (CSU), which communists had infiltrated to a degree.235  Both unions sought 
to represent the behind-the-scenes crew members at the studios: the carpenters, s t 
painters, grips, and electricians.  In particular, Billingsley emphasized the role of IA 
leader Roy Brewer in bringing to the attention of the HUAC the communist issue in 
Hollywood.  Certainly, the CSU-IA jurisdictional battles were an important fctor, 
one which the HUAC knew about and studied carefully.  Brewer, a New Deal liberal, 
was a key member of the Motion Picture Alliance and defeating the communist 
controlled CSU became his professional and personal crusade.  Although transcripts 
were not available to Billingsley at the time he wrote, it is worth noting that the 
Committee took testimony from Brewer in December 1946, ten months before its 
public Hollywood hearings.236   
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The weakness of Billingsley’s argument also turns in part on the issue of 
chronology.  Why did the HUAC not initiate hearings earlier when allegations of 
communist infiltration of the CSU began airing in the press during the bitter studio 
strikes of 1945?   Again, the HUAC was already well aware of the antics of Herb 
Sorrell, a secret member of the CPUSA who headed the CSU, and was building a file 
on him.  Furthermore, if the CSU issue was the primary trigger of the 1947 hearings, 
why did the Committee call so few of the witnesses capable of addressing it?  Also, 
why did Chief Investigator Robert Stripling prepare and ask so few questions focused 
on the CSU?  Thus, while Billingsley is correct to identify communist infiltration of 
the CSU as an important concern of the HUAC, this cannot adequately explain why 
the Committee launched its inquiry into communist activity in Hollywood in 1947. 
Other critics and historians have offered other explanations.  One often cited 
reason was the fruitless search for propaganda in American movies as the key
motivation for triggering the HUAC’s foray into Hollywood.  This explanation again 
raises the issue of timing.  Those films most noted as candidates for labeling as pro-
Soviet propaganda – Mission to Moscow, North Star and Song of Russia – were 
released during World War II: 1943 in the case of the first two and 1944 in latter 
instance.  Why should they become the object of scrutiny at the end of 1947?  Robert 
Vaughn treated the Hollywood probe as a phenomenon of social paranoia in which 
both the extreme Right and Left engaged during the early Cold War era.  
Unfortunately, this is an unverifiable hypothesis and the “witch hunt” thesis is the 




Thus, the question remains: to what extent have the various historians of the 
era recognized the importance of the Eislers in instigating the Hollywood hearings?  
The answer this chapter offers is “not enough!”  Comparatively, the HUAC 
investigators engaged in research of much greater depth and sought to understand 
what the Eislers were up to far more than the historians addressing this question.  
Certainly, none have realized the pivotal nature of their connection to the HUAC’s 
interest in the American movie business.  Robert Vaughn mentions Hanns Eisler, 
whom he calls a “suspected communist,” only in passing and certainly does not make 
any connection between him and why the HUAC launched its probe of the American 
motion picture industry.237  He ignores Hanns’ elder brother entirely, one assumes 
because Vaughn did not consider Gerhart’s story germane to his narrative of 
blacklisting.  If he had paid attention to both of the Eisler brothers, the extensive 
history of Gerhart’s subversive and illegal activities would have undercut his paranoia 
thesis.   
Ceplair and Englund depicted Hanns Eisler as the member of a non-
communist salon composed of European émigrés living and working in Hollywood 
and a part of “a small group of non-Party left-wingers.”238  Gerhart Eisler, mentioned 
in passing, received the label of “alleged Comintern delegate to the CPUSA.”239  
Victor Navasky confined Hanns to a footnote and simply described Gerhart as “…the
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man accused, probably wrongly, of being the top Communist in the country.”240  To 
Hollywood Ten screenwriter Lester Cole, Hanns Eisler was simply an anti-N zi 
refugee and artistic collaborator of the great Bertolt Brecht.241  Gerald Horne notes he 
had lent his name and talent to help with the launch of the Hollywood Writers 
Mobilization and was a signer of a joint telegram to Jack Warner backing the CSU 
picketers, who were striking Warner Brothers Studios.242  Goodman dealt with the 
Eislers at greater length, but was dismissive as to any importance of the case of 
Hanns, seeing it merely as a ploy to embarrass the previous Roosevelt 
Administration.  He certainly failed to perceive any significant link to the Hollywood 
inquiry.243   
Richard Fried implied an incorrect chronology and, thus, either misunderstood 
or ignored the importance of the Eislers’ case in triggering the Hollywood probe.  
Fried dealt with Hollywood and the Eislers in reverse order as compared to the 
evidence in the archives.  Although his dates were correct, he discussed Hollywood 
first, then the Eislers.  He stated: “For all of HUAC’s efforts against Hollyw od and 
the entertainment business, the Committee’s main hunt was for still bigger gam.  On 
February 6, 1947, it summoned Gerhard Eisler, reputedly the chief Comintern agent 
in the United States.”244  Thus, Fried made it appear that the Hollywood 
investigations preceded that of Gerhart Eisler, rather than the latter leading into the 
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former.  In actuality, the HUAC took preliminary, executive session testimony in 
Hollywood in May 12-15, 1947 and held its public hearings on Hollywood on 
October 20-30, 1947, well after the “big game,” Gerhart Eisler, had been the subject 
of Committee hearings during the previous February.  Additionally, although Fried
related that the Committee next investigated Gerhart’s brother, Hanns, whom he calls 
“a composer and a radical,” Fried failed to mention Hanns’ close ties with the 
Comintern.  He also neglected to relate that the younger Eisler composed musical 
scores for motion pictures, lived in Malibu and socialized with both Hollywood big 
shots and officials from the Soviet consulate.  In other words, Fried did not realize the 
HUAC’s logical path to Hollywood was through the Eislers. 
 The post-revisionist historians Ron and Allis Radosh got the chronology more 
correct and understood that the HUAC started their investigation with Gerhart Eisler 
and then moved onto Hanns before focusing on Hollywood.  However, they place the 
emphasis on the Committee’s confrontation with Hanns during his testimony on 
September 24, 1947 in Washington.  After Eisler’s evasive testimony at that hearing, 
according to the Radoshes, “…the HUAC members decided that he was only the tip 
of the iceberg.  They informed Eric Johnston, the studio lobbyist that they had 
decided to look at Communism throughout the film industry….”245   
In fact, this chapter will offer evidence that the crucial event was the 
aforementioned executive session testimony on May 12, 1947 in Los Angeles, the 
transcripts of which were sealed in the HUAC archives for over forty years.  For the 
Radoshes, the importance of Hanns Eisler seemed to lie more in the close friendship 
                                                




between him, his wife, Louisa, and the film star John Garfield, whose wife, Robbe, 
was also a party member.  This friendship made Garfield vulnerable to investigation 
and, therefore, central to his downfall.246  They did not seem to realize that it was 
Hanns Eisler’s relationship with Hollywood as a whole that made it ripe fruit for the 
HUAC to pick.   They then moved on to also tell the story of the Motion Picture 
Alliance, albeit from an anticommunist perspective absent in Ceplair and Englund or 
the other revisionist historians.  Their narrative pattern follows fairly closely to that of 
Billingsley, who wrote several years earlier.  The principal difference between the 
two accounts is that Billingsley offers greater detail in terms of what the HUAC knew 
about the Eisler brothers through the public reports it had released at the time of the 
investigations.247  However, Billingsley also, as noted earlier, underestimated the 
impact of the investigation of Hanns Eisler on the Hollywood probe as a whole.     
 To understand the story fully, one needs to remember the themes of the 
previous two chapters.  The HUAC focused much of its attention on the issue of 
subversive propaganda.  As such, Committee staff scrutinized the press – both 
mainstream and communist – for information of possible subversion.  The Hollywood 
inquiry occurred during the time immediately following an era of highly successful 
Nazi, Fascist and early Soviet propaganda, when early communication theorists 
touted the hypodermic needle theory of persuasion.  A key activity that the 
Committee concerned itself over the years was the possible subversive use of the 
various mass media – newspapers, films, radio and later television – by groups 
seeking revolutionary political change in the United States, particularly if they had 
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ties to foreign governments.  Thus, on October 13, 1946 when the former managing 
editor of the Daily Worker, Louis Bedenz, charged in a radio address that a German 
communist was operating in the United States as the real head of the CPUSA, the 
HUAC took immediate notice.248  In 1945, deeply unhappy with the party’s hard turn 
to the left and Browder’s expulsion as party chief, Budenz had resigned from the 
CPUSA and renounced communism in order to reconvert to Roman Catholicism.  He 
now asserted that this German communist, working under the pseudonym Hans 
Berger, was the Comintern’s representative in the United States.  Budenz alleged 
Berger had given him specific written guidance as to the ideological position vari us 
articles should take when published in the Daily Worker.249  Further, Budenz charged 
that the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 was a sham and that, not only did the 
national communist parties around the world continue to take direction from the 
Soviet Union, veteran CPUSA party bosses joked about it at the national headquarters 
in New York.   
Within days of Budenz’ speech, Frederick Woltman, a journalist for the New 
York World-Telegram, published Hans Berger’s real identity: Gerhart Eisler.250  
Woltman would go on to win the 1947 Pulitzer Prize for his reporting “during 1946 
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on communist infiltration in the U.S.”251  Once Eisler’s picture appeared in the press, 
many former communists recognized him as having previously functioned in the 
early to mid-1930s as the Comintern’s representative with full plenipotentiary 
powers, under the name “Edwards.”  Budenz assumed that, when Eisler returned in 
the early 1940s, he had the same mandate.  This appears to be in doubt with various 
historians having argued that Eisler’s earlier service was probably the las  time a 
Comintern representative had such authority.  Nevertheless, during Eisler’s second 
stay in the United States, he spoke with authority, especially in areas of ideolgy and 
propaganda policy.  According to Budenz, as Hans Berger, Eisler was also a regular
contributor to the Daily Worker and the Communist, often offering subtle clues as to 
how veteran communists ought to interpret the current party line.252  This was 
necessary because the party line at any given time was tactical in nature, not a set of 
principles.  As conditions changed, so did the tactics and the party line.  A veteran 
party member who confused an articulation of tactics with a statement of principle 
would find herself in a woeful predicament with a sudden and radical change in the 
party line.  Through a careful inspection of the HUAC’s periodicals library and 
information supplied by the FBI, investigators later determined that Eisler-Berger had 
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also written articles that appeared in the New Masses; Political Affairs, which was the 
successor to the Communist; a party magazine, entitled Readers Scope; the CPUSA’s 
New York City paper for German immigrants, entitled the German American; and the 
party’s New York City paper for a Jewish readership, the Morning Freiheit.253   
Given that Budenz had been a CPUSA insider of high position and part of the 
party’s propaganda machine, and because of Frederick Woltman’s investigative 
reporting that established Hans Berger’s real identity, a full-fledged investigation by 
the HUAC was inevitable.  Committee staff immediately began investigating Budenz’ 
charges and soon had compiled a rather large file on Eisler.  In fact, the investigative 
files on Gerhart and Hanns Eisler are substantially larger in size than the files of any 
of the individuals investigated as part of the Hollywood hearings.  Budenz testified at 
length before the HUAC on November 22, 1946.  Even though he had no face-to-face 
interaction with Gerhart Eisler, he asserted both Jack Starobin, the Daily Worker’s 
foreign editor, and Jack Stachel, the representative of the Political Committee to the 
paper, passed draft articles to him from “Hans Berger.”254  Although in later years his 
credibility as a witness would be called into question, Budenz’ account in 1946 was 
detailed and credible.  He painted a picture of the CPUSA as an organization captive 
to and taking direction from Moscow, both in terms of the articulation of current 
policy and in the selection of senior leadership personnel.  In spite of their years of 
careful scrutiny of the communist press, Committee researchers had not figured out 
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that Gerhart Eisler, Hanns Berger, and “Edwards” were the same person.  Ironically, 
it was a former communist journalist and a working anticommunist reporter from the 
mainstream newspaper business who made the connection and broke the Gerhart 
Eisler story to the American public and not the HUAC or the FBI.    
Within a few short months, HUAC investigators developed an extensive 
portfolio of information on Eisler.  However, most of what they learned came from 
other federal agencies, particularly the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service.  For example, a copy of a long letter dated October 14, 1946, from J. Edgar 
Hoover to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, found its 
way into the Committee’s hands.  After outlining a long list of suspected illegal 
activities by Eisler, Hoover asked that the INS deny the issuance of any exit visa for 
him pending the outcome of the FBI’s investigation and possible prosecution.255  A 
Committee investigator underlined in red pencil the following assertion by Hoover, 
alleging Eisler’s illegal entry into the United States in 1941: 
At a hearing before the board of special inquiry of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service at Ellis Island, 
New York, on June 14, 1941, Eisler denied that he was 
or had been in the past a member of the Communist 
Party, denied membership in any Communist 
organization, and stated that he had never been 
sympathetic to the Communist cause, all of which 
statements were obviously false in view of Eisler’s long 
term activity as an important international Communist 
and responsible representative of the Communist 
International.256 
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Thus, the FBI believed and later confirmed that Eisler perjured himself to gain entry 
into the United States and in doing so entered the United States illegally. 
Although there are claims that the FBI had been tracking Gerhart Eisler sinc  
he arrived in the United States in 1941, it appears much of what the FBI knew about 
him at that point was of relatively recent origin with agents attempting to flesh out 
leads offered by Budenz and Eisler’s sister, Ruth Fischer.257  The latter had come 
forward with information about Eisler, once the story appeared in the national press.  
Fischer was once a senior member of the leadership of the German Communist Party 
and a member of the Presidium of the Executive Council of the Comintern.  Purged 
from leadership in 1926, Fischer developed a strongly antagonistic reaction to the 
Stalinization of the German party and became an anti-Stalinist, before evolving into a 
leftwing opponent of Soviet-style communism as a whole.  She was sentenced to 
death in absentia during the Moscow show trials of the 1930s.  Her break with Stalin 
and the Comintern also ruptured her relationship with both Hanns and especially 
Gerhart.  Like her brothers, Fischer eventually found her way to the United Stat s and 
settled in New York City.  Writing with great intensity and fervor, she became the 
editor of an anticommunist and anti-Soviet newsletter, The Russian State Party: 
Newsletter on Contemporary Communism, copies of which found their way into the 
HUAC files.   
With the Budenz, Fischer and the FBI as their sources, the HUAC now had a 
fairly complete biographical outline of Eisler’s career.  To supplement this, they 
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subpoenaed Eisler’s INS records.  The Committee now knew he was Austrian by 
birth, but during the 1920s became very active in the German Communist Party and 
was instrumental in the downfall of his sister as a party leader.  In the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, Eisler became a Comintern agent with international assignments, which 
included work in China, where he allegedly conducted bloody purges on behalf of the 
Soviet Union.  His success doing Moscow’s bidding in the Far East led to a plum 
assignment in 1933 with an appointment as the Comintern’s plenipotentiary to the 
American party.258   
The American assignment lasted until after the CPUSA’s congress in 1936.  
During this time he worked under the name “Edwards,” but traveled to Moscow 
several times under a forged passport with the name Samuel Liptzen.  According t  
Treasury Department handwriting experts, the handwriting on the passport 
application belonged to a party member by the name of Leon Josephson.  Even 
though the name on the application was Samuel Liptzen, the photograph was of 
Eisler.  The witness signature, again in Josephson’s handwriting, was of a fictitious 
person, named Bernard A. Hirschfield.  Josephson and the real Samuel Liptzen tried 
to avoid subpoenas by the HUAC and were uncooperative once they finally 
appeared.259  Josephson turned out to be a key player in the CPUSA’s fake passport 
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mill, whose work allowed the party’s leadership to regularly travel undetected to the 
Soviet Union.   
The Committee had little doubt that Gerhart Eisler was indeed the Comintern 
representative to the CPUSA in the mid-1930s.  Investigators knew he had attended 
the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in July and August, 
1935 and served as a member of the Comintern’s Anglo-American Commission, 
which established policy and supervised directives for the American, British and 
Canadian communist parties.  The HUAC assumed Eisler exercised similar powers 
upon his return to the United States in 1941 and believed that Eisler had sided with 
party leader Earl Browder in his internal political battle against hardline a d rival 
William Z. Foster in 1944-45.  The Committee presumed that Eisler’s ability to 
suppress Foster’s ideological aspirations for the party pointed to his ability as the
Comintern’s representative to direct major Party policy decisions.  The Committee 
specifically believed that Eisler conveyed instructions to the CPUSA through Jack 
Stachel, a party functionary and the labor editor of the Daily Worker, and Eugene 
Dennis, who later became the General Secretary of the CPUSA after the puge of Earl 
Browder.260 
The FBI was more circumspect about whether Eisler was still directing party 
affairs after his return in 1941.  The HUAC had a letter from Hoover that stated:  
Eisler’s primary contacts since his arrival in the United 
States have been important Communist functionaries, 
many of whom are strongly suspected of involvement 
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in Soviet espionage operations.  Although Eisler, under 
his pen name, is comparatively unknown to the rank 
and file of the Communist Party, the investigation of 
him reflects without doubt that he is and has been in 
recent years a figure of paramount importance in the 
determination of Party policy.  Whether he is still 
engaged in activity as an actual operating Soviet agent, 
as he is known to have been in the past, is not 
completely clear.  However, his known contacts, his 
clandestine activities, and the care with which he has 
concealed and protected his identity, raise the very 
definite possibility that in addition to his other activity, 
Eisler may be involved with intelligence work as 
such.261 
Whether or not Hoover or the HUAC was correct about Eisler’s Comintern authority 
after 1941, it is certain that he was quite active as a propagandist and his opinion was 
highly influential on the interpretation of policy line.   
 According to Fischer, as a former protégé of Nikolai Bukharin, in the mid-
1930s Eisler fell out of favor with Stalin, who likely marked him for exterminatio .  
In order to save himself during the Great Purges, Fischer alleged that Eisler gave false 
testimony alleging treasonous activity by Bukharin, his former mentor and protector, 
as well as others with whom Eisler had interaction.262  After serving as a propagandist 
for communist forces during the Spanish Civil War, he ended up in a prison camp.263  
Eisler insisted he was placed in a concentration camp about the time of the fall of 
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France because of his anti-Nazi activities.  Fischer argued that Eisler end d up in a 
camp because of his pro-communist agitation in France, not his resistance efforts 
against fascism, because after all, his internment occurred during the time the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was in force.264  Eisler returned to America in June, 1941, 
posing as a political refugee from Nazism.  It was during this second tenure in the 
United States that Eisler worked as a “journalist” and commentator for varius 
CPUSA publications.   
Gerhart Eisler appeared to be the perfect stereotypical secret agent who 
operated under a bewildering array of cover names and fake identities in a manner so 
effectively parodied by Peter Sellers in the role of Inspector Clouseau.  In the 1930s, 
he sat in secret CPUSA meetings as “Edwards” at a time when his passport read 
“Samuel Liptzen.”  At other times, he traveled under the name “Brown.”  In the 
1940s Eisler wrote propaganda under the name “Hans Berger,” while he drew a salary 
under the name “Julius Eisman” from a communist front called the Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee.  He did not pay income tax on those funds.  For good measure, 
he also wrote articles for the Morning Freiheit under the pen name C. Kelner.265      
The case of Gerhart Eisler became nationwide, front page news.  With the 
public exposure, Eisler’s usefulness to the CPUSA had come to an end.  In fact, the 
Committee now knew that since 1945 he had sought to leave the United States and 
                                                
264 See reproduction of Ruth Fischer, “Departure and Arrival,” which was part 
of a six-part series, entitled “The Comintern’s Agent in America,” published in the 
New York Journal American and found in Box 199, Exhibits, Evidence, Etc., “Hanns 
Eisler Gerhart Eisler,” Records of the Investigative Section. 
265 See untitled document consisting of prepared questions for Gerhart Eisler 
and J. Edgar Hoover to Ugo Carusi, October 16, 1946, both found in Box 199, 





return to Germany in order to, in Eisler’s words, “…participate in the building of a 
new German democracy.”266  Clearly, Eisler intended to make his way to the Soviet 
occupied zone in eastern Germany to serve in the nascent communist regime that 
Stalin would impose on the Soviet zone of occupation.  The HUAC and the 
Department of Justice each had other plans for Gerhart.  The Committee wanted to 
put Eisler under oath in order to learn about internal party and Comintern operations, 
the CPUSA’s phony passport ring, and particularly Eisler’s role as a propagandist.  At 
first Hoover sought to have Eisler deported, but Ugo Carusi, the INS commissioner, 
replied that there was no legal basis for deportation due to a lack of admissible 
evidence. 267  The Justice Department then reversed course and decided to prosecute 
Eisler for passport fraud, lying to the INS board of inquiry and income tax evasion.  
Thus, after initially wanting to rid him from American soil, the United States 
government did an about face and repeatedly blocked Eisler’s requests for an exit 
visa. 
Though Eisler wanted to leave the United States, while he remained, he 
nevertheless began a counterattack as he awaited the inevitable subpoena from the
HUAC.  True to his training in agitation and propaganda, Eisler activated his 
offensive primarily through the news media, both print and broadcast.  Whether or 
not he realized it, Committee researchers kept close tabs on this maneuver.  Gerhart 
wrote and released a fifteen page pamphlet, entitled Eisler Strikes Back, the tone of 
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which indicates that it clearly aimed at building support within the leftwing 
community.  The Committee obtained and analyzed a copy.  In his biting polemic, 
Eisler portrayed himself as entirely innocent and facing persecution because of hi  
pro-American, pro-Allied, and anti-fascist writings.268  He set Congressman Rankin 
up as a symbol of the HUAC, calling him ignorant, intolerant and motivated by Nazi 
philosophy.269  In an attempt to make Rankin the issue, rather than his own past 
activities, Eisler wrote: “I never liked Prussian reactionaries, even if they come from 
your South and speak English.”270  Claiming that reaction, warmongering and fascism 
are on the rise in the United States, Eisler averred that the HUAC congressmen 
“…dream about the ‘century of the investigated man.’  For everyone an investigator 
in the garage and a subpoena in the pot!”271  
Eisler followed the pamphlet up with a trip to Chicago in mid-January 1947, 
where he spoke at three rallies.  The venues were all minor communist fronts and 
organizers raised hundreds of dollars for Eisler.  Attendance ranged from 110 to 400 
people and was modest at best, but it included the HUAC Chicago field investigator, 
who reported the proceedings and the substance of Eisler’s speech back to 
Washington.  Gerhart asserted in the speeches that he was a “…genuine political
refugee.”  He asserted that he was in no way the head of the CPUSA: “The only 
orders I have given to anyone in the United States since my arrival which were 
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obeyed, were those orders given to my butcher, baker and grocer.”272  Although Eisler 
stayed on message, the result of this sojourn to Chicago must have been disappointing 
to Eisler because it did not motivate any major public protest in his support.  
Although Eisler and his comrades in the party did not realize it, with the Great 
Depression over, the Popular Front long dead and the Cold War taking shape, the 
American public no longer had an appetite for the radical rhetoric in which the 
communists seemed to have trapped themselves.   
Eisler must have had higher hopes three weeks earlier when he proclaimed his 
innocence on the Meet the Press radio show on December 27, 1946.  A confident 
Eisler made his case to the American people as five prominent journalists grilled him 
about his past and present connections with the communist movement.  The 
journalists were Albert Warner, host of Meet the Press; Bert Andrews of the New 
York Herald-Tribune; Cecil Dickson of Gannett Newspapers; Kenneth Crawford of 
Newsweek; and Lawrence Spivak of the American Mercury.  Right at the beginning of 
the show, Eisler admitted to Andrews that he was a communist and had lied when he 
denied being one in order to get a transit visa.  Andrews asked: “Then that rightly 
came under the heading of perjuring yourself to get a transit visa?”  Eisler repli d: 
“You can call it what you want, but I told the FBI this, and then asked them, ‘What 
would you have done in the situation where the question of getting out of France was 
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a question of your life?’  Then the FBI man told me, ‘Well, I may have done the same 
as you.’”273   
Lawrence Spivak wanted an explanation as to why Budenz and Fischer would 
make accusations against him if he were innocent.  Eisler offered no answer about 
Budenz’ allegation, except to claim he had never previously spoken, written or 
otherwise communicated with Budenz.  On the other hand, the personal animosity 
between Eisler and his sister was raw and bitter as this exchange illustrates: 
Spivak: “Why did your sister, Ruth Fischer, whom I 
have known for a long time, tell me last year you were 
an agent of the Russian Government?”   
Eisler: “Because this lady has turned into a very well-
known lady informer.  No decent man or woman would 
talk to her in Europe.” 
Spivak: “Why would she inform against her own 
brother?”   
Eisler: “Because she became a vile enemy of the 
Communist movement, and that is why she talks also 
untruth about her brother.” 
Andrews: “Did you mean she is a vile enemy of the 
Communist movement or a vile enemy of the Soviet 
movement?”  
Eisler: “Mr. Andrews, she is a violent enemy of the 
Communist movement.  She was expelled from the 
German Communist Party.  In her expulsion I played a 
very important role.”274 
Eisler overreacted at that point, because he let it slip that he had a significant role in 
her purge from the German party, which gave credence to charges of his role as 
Stalin’s hatchet man in other countries.  Andrews pressed him on the point and Eisler 
tried to retreat.   
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 Under vigorous questioning Eisler denied any role in the American party, 
arguing that Joseph Starobin was the one who had used the Hans Berger pseudonym 
and that he, Eisler, only offered a few ideas for articles.  When Spivak questioned 
Eisler’s credentials as an anti-Nazi fighter by noting that he had not lived in Germany 
since 1928, five years before the Nazis came to power, Eisler lied and insisted he 
remained in Germany right up to 1933.275  Eisler also contradicted one of Budenz’ 
claims, namely that even though the Comintern was formally dissolved de jure, it was 
de facto still in existence and directing the affairs of communist parties all over the 
world.  Albert Warner then wanted to know: “…how is it that the Communist Parties 
in all these different countries always have the same views on every question, if there 
is no directing authority to help coordinate them?”  Eisler’s retort was that they had 
all reached the same conclusion because they had all taken the scientific approach to 
politics and, therefore, science had led them all to the same correct conclusion.276   
Throughout the interview, Eisler tried to cast his pro-communist sympathies 
and activities in light of his active opposition to fascism.  For example, if he believed 
in overthrowing governments, it was the overthrow of fascist governments.  If he 
engaged in polemics in the press, it was to carry an anti-fascist message.  Was 
Lenin’s dictum to use trickery, deceit and law-breaking in pursuit of political goals 
acceptable?  Yes, Eisler answered, it is in the battle against fascism.  Overall, his 
interviewers displayed a high degree of skepticism in the veracity of Eisler’s tory 
and his depiction of himself as a noble fighter for freedom against the tyranny of the 
Nazis.  Eisler apparently wanted the American public to see him as a misunderstoo  
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victim of the HUAC, who only wanted to go home.  At one point the narrative strains 
credulity to the point where Bert Andrews becomes sarcastic about the Hans Berger
story.277   
Eisler no doubt guessed that Committee investigators followed the interview 
carefully.  If so, he was correct.  HUAC staff obtained the transcript of the radio show 
and carefully underlined in red pencil numerous places where they suspected Eisler 
being untruthful or where they might have opportunity to check his facts.  Eisler had 
given the HUAC his best defense in advance.  He had telegraphed his best arguments 
more than a month before his scheduled testimony and now the Committee had plenty 
of time to prepare its case even more carefully, finding witnesses and verifying facts.  
In addition to coverage in the CPUSA press, the archival evidence shows that 
Stripling’s investigators also clipped and studied articles about Eisler in mainstream 
newspapers, such as the N w York Daily News, the New York Daily Mirror and the 
New York Herald Tribune.  Therein Eisler gave statements in which he re-emphasized 
the same themes: his only “crime” was to fight Hitlerism, American communists were 
not so meek to take orders from a lowly refugee, and he just wanted to go back home 
to Germany.278 
One aspect of the preparation by the HUAC investigators was to compare the 
ascertainable facts against what Eisler said versus what his critics harged.  In terms 
of Eisler’s role as the Comintern’s representative in the United States, Committee 
researchers encountered some difficulty in substantiating the charges mad  by 
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Budenz and Fischer.  An investigator approached a former party member named 
George Hewitt from New York, who asserted that it was “pretty generally known in 
the party that Eisler, alias Edwards, was a representative of the Communist 
International in the United States.”  However, Hewitt, whose party name was Tim 
Holmes, was reluctant to testify “…because he fears for the safety of his wife and 
child.  He said the Communists have made his life miserable since he left the party 
and have even gone so far as to destroy his personal property and a short time ago 
attempted to have him evicted from his home.”279  Another party member brought in 
from Chicago to testify of what he knew about Eisler as “Edwards” had to stay in the 
home of a Washington DC police officer for his safety due to death threats from 
communists.   
Chairman Thomas wrote Attorney General Tom C. Clark, stating that the 
HUAC had subpoenaed Gerhart Eisler to obtain his testimony because he had been 
“…identified by witnesses before the Committee on Un-American Activities as being 
a representative of the Communist International.”  Believing Eisler was trying to 
leave the country, Thomas asked Clark to “…direct agents of the FBI to put Eisler 
under an immediate twenty-four hour surveillance in order to insure his appearance 
before our Committee.”280  The Director of the FBI accommodated Thomas’ request 
without revealing that Eisler had already been under constant surveillance for months.   
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On February 6, 1947, Gerhart Eisler appeared before the HUAC.  It was a 
short hearing.  In a fairly rare circumstance, all the members of the Committee were 
present, as was Robert Stripling and one of his key investigators, Louis J. Russell.  
Eisler was not worried that he had given his defense away a month earlier on M et the 
Press.  Eisler wanted desperately to return to Germany.  Barring that, he appeared to 
want to make himself a martyr.  He certainly wanted to appear as a persecut d vi tim 
as much as he did not want to testify.  Eisler refused to be sworn in unless he could 
first read a prepared statement, which he said would only take three minutes.  
Chairman Thomas replied that after he was sworn in and answered the Committee’s 
questions, he could then read his statement into the record.  Eisler refused to do so 
and called himself a “political prisoner.”  After some shouting, the congressmen 
moved to cite him for contempt of Congress and two officers from the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service escorted him to the District of Columbia jail.   
Stripling had prepared forty-seven questions for Eisler, which went unasked in 
that short, stormy session.  Amongst other issues, the questions centered on the 
passport fraud in which Eisler participated in the mid-1930s, the perjury he 
committed before the INS board of inquiry in 1941, his extensive work in the service 
of the Comintern both in the United States and abroad, his involvement in communist 
front organizations in the United States and activities in the United States as a 
propagandist.281  Several other witnesses testified instead, including Ruth Fischer.  
Stripling then swore in one of the HUAC investigators so that he could ask what 
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investigators had discovered about Eisler.  This allowed the documentary evidence 
collected by the Committee staff to be read into the official record.      
The work of the post-revisionist historians has shown that the information that 
the HUAC collected and publicized was essentially correct.  The Venona decryptions 
have revealed that during the mid-1930s, Gerhart Eisler indeed carried an American 
passport obtained fraudulently under the name Samuel Liptzen with the assistance of 
Leon Josephson, who was a key player in a “CPUSA-Soviet fraudulent passport 
ring.”282  Also, when Eisler came to the United States in the mid-1930s as the 
Comintern’s representative with plenipotentiary powers, he put his political weight 
behind Earl Browder in order to end a political leadership deadlock.  Browder became 
the undisputed party leader thanks to Gerhart Eisler.283  A cable exchange between 
New York and Moscow confirmed that Eisler was the Comintern representative in h  
CPUSA and that the latter was subservient to the Comintern.  When the CPUSA 
asked for greater freedom to decide the size of its Politburo, Moscow declined to do 
so in a decision addressed to both Browder and Eisler.284  Soviet archives have 
revealed that in September, 1935 Earl Browder communicated with Georgi Dimitrov, 
the General Secretary of the Comintern, and asked that Eisler be allowed to return to 
the United States in order to help the American party prepare for its party congress in 
early 1936.285  This confirms the allegations, such as that of former party member and 
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journalist Howard Rushmore, who testified before the HUAC that high party officials 
followed instructions issued by Eisler.286  
It is crucial to understand how the HUAC congressmen and investigators 
understood the importance of Gerhart Eisler and his activities.  Based on the archival 
evidence, it is clear that this case had multifaceted significance for the key players of 
the HUAC.  Gerhart Eisler’s ability to repeatedly enter the United States illegally and 
carry out communist activities was symbolic for what they perceived as an on-going 
laxity in national security matters by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.  
Also, in their eyes this affair offered concrete evidence that a foreign power, namely 
the USSR, in general directed the policy line, if not particular activities, of the 
CPUSA.  However, the big spy probes for which the HUAC became famous, 
including that of Alger Hiss, were at this point still off in the future.  The primary 
focus of the Committee had been investigating the infiltration of unions and both 
fascist and communist propaganda.  The significance of Gerhart Eisler also resided in 
the latter.  His work as a communist propagandist in the service of a foreign power 
appeared to be of distinct importance to the Committee.   
Gerhart Eisler’s biography after his encounter with HUAC serves to illustrate 
the appropriateness of the Committee’s concern with his career in propaganda.  In the 
summer of 1947 as the HUAC began to prepare in earnest for the Hollywood 
hearings, the Justice Department prosecuted Eisler for making “false sttements on 
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his exit visa application.”287  While awaiting an appeal, Gerhart jumped bail and 
escaped as a stowaway on a ship bound for Europe.  After the United Kingdom 
refused to extradite him to the United States, he made his way to the German 
Democratic Republic, where “…he became the chief of the Information Office in 
East Germany, and in 1962 was named chairman of the East German State Radio 
Committee.”288  
In terms of its investigations into communist activities, subversion and 
propaganda, Gerhart Eisler represented the most important person that the HUAC 
interrogated up to that time.  Later the Hiss-Chambers episode would overshadow the 
Gerhart Eisler case, but at this time, after years of criticism that the Committee had 
engaged in witch-hunting and red-baiting, it played an important role in highlighting 
the dangers it perceived from the activities of the CPUSA.  Thus, from the point of 
view of the HUAC congressmen and investigators, the dénouement of the Eisler 
affair was an unqualified success.  It also propelled them directly into an investigation 
of his brother, Hanns.  Not to do so would have been unthinkable in light of the 
charges made by Ruth Fischer and the preliminary evidence they already had in their 
files regarding communist infiltration into the motion picture industry.   
Information that the Committee collected and archived shows that Ruth 
Fischer did not just have a bone to pick with her brother Gerhart.  She also wrote 
stingingly about Hanns as well.  She asserted that, for Gerhart, Hanns “…was a 
valuable link to the world of swarming literati, professors, actors, and other American 
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intelligentsia who have found in Stalin’s Russia their spiritual fatherland.”289  Fischer 
alleged that Gerhart “conditioned” Hanns “…for Party assignments on the cultural 
front.”  The younger Eisler then made regular pilgrimages to Moscow, because “[a] 
Party member active in the propagation of Soviet culture is required to demonstrate 
his continued loyalty by regular visits to Moscow.”290  If one believes her account, the 
composer by this time had become thoroughly subservient to the Soviet secret 
police.291  Fischer argued that Hanns worked under Gerhart’s direction to raise funds 
for the party from sources in Hollywood, which supported the testimony of Howard 
Rushmore.292   
The sixth part of Fischer’s series published in Hearst’s New York Journal 
American, a newspaper known for a strong anticommunist stand, was entitled “The 
Comintern in Hollywood” and was devoted to Hanns instead of Gerhart.  She 
emphasized Hanns’ Comintern ties and his admiration for and closeness with Gerhart.  
Once in Hollywood, Fischer averred that Hanns regularly socialized with the Russian 
Consul in Los Angeles.  Investigators read her assertions that: “The people who stood 
around the piano in his Santa Monica home and drank whiskey were curious 
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companions for NKVD terrorists.  [German émigrés] Bertold Brecht and Lion 
Feuchtwanger also attended these parties.”  Hanns’ role, according to Fischer, was the 
same as all cultural workers: “Outside as well as in the Soviet Union, a crust of 
literature and a cloud of music surround the NKVD kernel of Soviet life.  In a 
totalitarian state, the function of the artist is to soften the sharp angles of ugly reality.”  
Finally, she declared that Hanns Eisler and Bertold Brecht were instrumental in 
Gerhart’s propaganda efforts, which at times appeared to take the form of Gerhart 
acting like an American version of Willi Munzenberg, building a propaganda empire, 
which included a German-language publishing house in New York.293 
 One cannot underestimate the effect of allegations or testimony about the 
Comintern on the members of the HUAC or its investigators.  The Comintern as an 
instrument of foreign control of a domestic fifth column was a fundamental concern 
of the HUAC.  An articulation of that concern came when a sub-committee of the 
HUAC went to Hollywood for a preliminary investigation, Rep. John McDowell of 
Pennsylvania asserted during the executive session testimony of actor Richa d Arlen: 
“It is not the purpose of Congress to send a committee out here to attempt to dig into 
the private affairs of the industry, but we are concerned with everyone in the movie 
industry who might be used as agents of a foreign power in an effort to destroy our 
country.  That is why we are here.”294  Ruth Fischer’s writings, which investigators 
scrutinized carefully, and her executive session testimony on February 6, 1947 played 
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directly to those fears.  The testimony of Budenz, Rushmore and others, as well a 
Woltman’s original reporting corroborated the case against Gerhart Eisleras an agent 
of a foreign power.  Now with Fischer’s help, the evidence seemed to point to Hanns 
Eisler as having some role in his elder brother’s operation.  Federal authorities had 
barely locked up Gerhart on Ellis Island to await trial when HUAC investigators 
began pulling data from its F&R Section and digging into Hann’s past for fresh 
information.   
Three months later Hanns Eisler gave testimony in executive session before 
that same subcommittee as Richard Arlen on May 12, 1947 at the Biltmore Hotel in 
Los Angeles.  Until 2001, the transcript of this testimony was part of the HUAC files 
at the National Archives sealed to historians.  Ben Margolis, known to the HUAC as a 
CPUSA member and a key player in the National Lawyers Guild, a communist fro t, 
accompanied Eisler as his legal counsel.  Later, Margolis would lead the legal team 
that represented the Hollywood Ten in a disastrous legal strategy that would send 
them all to jail for contempt of Congress. 
At the beginning of the hearing, Chief Investigator Robert Stripling stated hat 
Public Law 601, Section 121, Sub-Section Q 2 authorized the HUAC “to conduct 
investigations and hearings into the subject of un-American propaganda activities in 
the United States.”  The HUAC “considers the activities of the Communist Party of 
the United States to be an organization or conspiracy which comes within the purview 
of the Committee’s investigation….”295  Chairman Thomas permitted Eisler to read 
an opening statement in which he denied participation in American politics, asserted 
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he was guilty only of being Gerhart Eisler’s brother, and spoke extensively about his 
artistic career.296  Apparently recognizing that the link between himself and the 
Hollywood communists would endanger the party’s efforts in Tinsel Town, Eisler 
tried instead to focus the issue on the supposed unjust assault on his reputation and 
the inappropriate nature of the hearings.  Thus, implying that the HUAC’s aim was to 
target him in order to attack Hollywood, Eisler argued that “…what is most unfair in 
the announced investigation of my ‘Hollywood activities,’ is the attempt to intimidate 
my friends and the artists with whom I have had professional contacts.”297   
Knowing that his entry visa into the United States was predicated on his 
denial of any communist affiliations, Eisler denied being a “real” member of the 
communist party and averred he had made application to the party in Germany twenty 
or so years before as a protest against military spending, but went to Paris instead of 
becoming actively involved in the party.298  The composer avoided answering clearly 
whether he was a “theoretical communist” and dissembled as to whether he had gone 
to any communist party meetings, stating only that it was possible.299  Finally, he 
evaded answering whether he attended more than one meeting and where those 
meetings might have taken place, before getting upset or pretending to be upset that 
Stripling had supposedly called him a liar.300 
One should keep in mind that Hanns Eisler’s testimony did not occur in 
isolation, but rather within the context of an exploratory expedition of a HUAC 
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subcommittee to America’s film capital to determine as to whether there was 
sufficient evidence to warrant a full investigation.  The subcommittee consisted of 
Chairman Thomas, John McDowell, Chief Investigator Robert Stripling and 
Investigator Louis Russell.  Rep. John Wood, who would succeed Thomas as 
chairman of the HUAC, was a member of the subcommittee, but did not attend the 
hearing the day Eisler testified.  On that same day, the subcommittee also heard 
testimony from union boss Roy Brewer of IATSE; James K. McGuinness, an 
executive at Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studios; and movie critic and former screnwriter 
John Charles Moffitt.  Eisler appeared immediately after Brewer.  The next day, after 
Moffitt completed his testimony, Henry Ginsberg, General Manager of Paramount 
Pictures; Lela Rogers, manager of her daughter, Ginger Rogers; actor Richa d Arlen; 
and leading man Robert Taylor all appeared.  On Wednesday, the subcommittee’s 
research trip concluded with the questioning of the dapper character actor Aldophe 
Menjou; screenwriter Howard Emmett Rogers; studio boss Jack Warner; film director 
Leo McCarey; and screenwriter and film director Rupert Hughes.  Thus, contextually 
the HUAC obtained Hanns Eisler’s executive session testimony as part of its 
preliminary research to determine whether conditions warranted a full scale prob  of 
the motion picture industry.  In that respect, it represents a bridge between the 
Committee’s concern about the propagandizing efforts of Gerhart Eisler, its 
suspicions that Hanns might be part of those actions, and its misgivings about other 
known communist activity in Hollywood. 
Although the sub-committee members and Chief Investigator Stripling 




into the United States and his possible connections with his brother’s work, the 
executive session came to an abrupt end when Eisler’s testimony became so evasive 
that he could not clearly answer the simplest questions regarding his communist party 
affiliations.301  Nevertheless, before the unceremonious end to the session, Eisler’s 
work in Hollywood was the subject of inquiry.302  The Committee wanted to know on 
which motion pictures had Eisler worked and for what movie studios.  Because this 
testimony was hitherto not available to historians, who had only the public testimony 
taken months later before the full HUAC, it appeared the Committee was more 
interested in how Eisler got into the United States than what activities he undertook 
after he arrived.   
 A study of HUAC files reveals that Committee investigators were aware of 
the affiliations of many of Hanns Eisler’s friends and professional collaborators in 
Hollywood either directly with the CPUSA or with its front organizations.  The 
circumstance to which the HUAC’s data appeared to point seemed to confirm the 
picture painted by Fischer and others, namely Hanns was at the center of a clique of 
communists and communist sympathizers engaging in propaganda and fund-raising 
for the CPUSA while giving it an aura of cultural respectability with elites and a 
certain prestige with the wider public.      
One such person in this group was Hanns’ friend, Vladimir A. Pozner, an 
émigré, whose family left Russia during the Revolution of 1917.  Pozner, whose 
name was sometimes spelled Posner, became an engineer and worked for Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer in Paris in the 1930s.  Around that time, he also became a 
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communist.  With the collapse of France in 1940, Pozner fled to the United States and 
worked for a film unit in the War Department.  He later moved his family to 
Hollywood where he became friends with Hanns and Louisa Eisler.  Another set of 
Pozner’s close friends were the screenwriters Ben and Norma Barzman, who were 
also communists and later blacklisted.303  Years later, historians learned, thanks to the 
revelations of the Venona decryptions, that Pozner allowed the KGB to recruit him as 
a spy, operating under the code name “Platon.” This occurred during the period while 
he worked at the War Department in Washington.304  Of course the Venona project 
was unknown to the HUAC congressmen, but the Committee’s archives reveal that 
investigators knew of Pozner’s communist front affiliations and his friendship with 
Hanns Eisler.   
Paul Henreid was the handsome actor who played, Victor Laszlo, a resistance 
fighter and the longsuffering husband of Ilsa Lund (Ingrid Bergman), who was torn 
between her duty to Laszlo and her love for Rick Blaine (Humphrey Bogart) in the
film Casablanca.  Like Hanns Eisler, Henreid was Austrian by birth and no doubt 
shared a sense of common experience with many of the other European émigrés in 
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Hollywood.  Eisler was well-known in these circles, which during World War II was
broadly anti-fascist from Popular Front liberals to communist sympathizers to actual 
communists and included such luminaries as writers Thomas Mann and Lion 
Feuchtwanger, actor Peter Lorre, filmmakers Berthold and Salka Viertel, ac or Oskar 
Homolka, and playwright Bertolt Brecht.305   
It is in such society that Henreid probably first met Eisler.  One report in 
Henreid’s investigative name file in the HUAC archives notes Henreid’s connections 
to both Hanns Eisler and Vladimir Posner.  It also highlighted the investment by 
Henreid and his wife, Lisl, in the Hollywood Community Radio Group, considered a 
communist front project.306  The same report comments: “PAUL HENREID was 
reported as being a close associate of Communist Party members and has been a 
member of the Council of American Soviet Friendship.” 307  It is doubtful that 
Henreid was a communist party member or engaged in any subversive activity.  
Unless new documentary evidence comes to light, the truth may never be known.  
However, it was this very sort of issue that the HUAC saw itself as mandated to 
investigate, i.e. determining whether individuals were involved in subversive 
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activities.  Thus, Henreid’s association with Hanns Eisler made it more likely that he 
would fall under the Committee’s scrutiny.  Moreover, as the documentation of many 
of such associations between Eisler and Hollywood figures existed in its files, it was 
also likely that this gave the HUAC additional and significant impetus to launch a 
full-scale probe.   
The HUAC was also aware of Hanns Eisler’s association with another 
prominent Hollywood figure, that of film director and sometime actor William 
Dieterle.  His friendship with Eisler was close enough that when Eisler became the 
target of an active HUAC investigation, Dieterle was one of four persons who 
organized a meeting at the home of screenwriter and director John Huston to rally 
support for the composer.308  Whether Dieterle was an official member of the CPUSA 
remains unknown, but he certainly was very active in known communist fronts and an 
effective advocate for the Soviet Union.  Born in Germany, Dieterle began his 
professional career in the German film industry when Expressionism was the 
predominant aesthetic style.  He immigrated to the United States in 1930, finding 
regular employment in Hollywood almost immediately, and became an American 
citizen in 1937.  Soon Dieterle was in demand and in the years 1936-39 directed Paul 
Muni in such classics as The Story of Louis Pasteur, The Life of Emile Zola nd 
Juarez. The Hunchback of Notre Dame starring Charles Laughton further added to his 
reputation in 1939.   
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In the spring and summer of 1947, as investigators began to assemble 
materials for the forthcoming Hollywood hearings, Hanns Eisler’s connections 
became apparent, again perhaps making a full-scale probe more likely.  HUAC
investigators knew that in 1940 Dieterle had written to the American Consul in 
support of Eisler’s application for permanent residency in the United States.309  
Another of the links between the two friends that appears in Dieterle’s investigative 
file is the appearance of both men together at an event sponsored by the Daily 
Worker.310  That Dieterle was very sympathetic to the Soviet Union is hard to dispute.  
Investigators noted that he visited the USSR in 1937 and compiled selected quotes 
from an article in Soviet Russia Today called “Reflections on Soviet Pictures” in 
which he praises Soviet cinema.  In that article Dieterle naively asserted that “…the 
actor in the Soviet pictures is freed from exploitation….”311   
The American communist press apparently returned the favor because 
Dieterle received positive film reviews in Daily Worker and the New Masses reported 
for The Life of Emile Zola, Juarez and Blockade.  The last film, written by senior 
Hollywood communist John Howard Lawson for which he received an Oscar 
nomination, in particular invited the scrutiny of the Committee.  Produced in 1938 
and set in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, Blockade told the story of a farmer, 
played by Henry Fonda, who falls in love with a Russian, played by Madeleine 
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Carroll, while fighting to save his property from marauding soldiers.  The HUAC was 
also interested in Juarez, compiling quotes from the script regarding land reform that 
sounded somewhat anti-American and communistic in nature.312  The Committee 
reached no conclusions about whether Dieterle was a member of the CPUSA and 
inexplicably never called him to testify.  However, his known connections with 
Eisler, his record of support for the Soviet Union and CPUSA fronts, and his 
collaboration with John Howard Lawson on the production of Bl ckade, in all 
likelihood weighed to a degree on the HUAC’s decision to launch its Hollywood 
hearings.  The HUAC appeared to look for patterns in its investigations and Dieterle 
fit in the pattern of Eisler’s possible influence in Hollywood.   
 Yet another friend of Hanns Eisler’s whom the HUAC scrutinized was the 
playwright, screenwriter, and film director Clifford Odets, whose thick file abounded 
with numerous citations from the Daily Worker and the New Masses that accrued in 
the years 1935-37.  His relatively long biographic narrative and three-column 
summary reports revealed an extensive list of activities and affiliations with front 
organizations.  Because Odets had been so prominent in leftwing theatre, having 
written and directed the influential play Waiting for Lefty in 1935, the HUAC 
investigators created a separate report on reviews of his plays published in the 
communist press and developed an extensive file of newspaper clippings as 
documentation.   
Although not called to testify in the truncated 1947 probe of Hollywood, as 
the Committee organized for the second round of hearings in 1951-1952, HUAC 





Counsel Frank Tavenner prepared one of the most extensive sets of questions 
intended for Odets of any witness during either of the Hollywood inquiries.  The 
document contained some 170 questions and ran twenty-eight pages in length.313  In 
executive session testimony given in 1952, but sealed until 2001, Odets admitted that 
he joined the CPUSA in the mid-1930s as a response to the recruiting activity of actor 
J. Edward Bromberg when they were part of the famous Theatre Group in New York 
City, which had several communists as members, including at the time Elia Kazan.314  
Odets viewed communism favorably as a possible antidote to the Great Depression 
and his own on-going unemployment.315  However, because he rebelled against any 
sort of discipline imposed by the party, found Marxist theory boring to study, and 
could not endure having writing themes dictated to him, Odets claimed he resigned 
from the CPUSA in less than a year.  Before he left New York for Hollywood, he had 
already alienated party loyalists by denouncing crass party aesthetic  in terms of 
writing, especially as articulated by John Howard Lawson.  Thus, when Odets arrived 
in Hollywood, he claimed he stayed away from the local communists and leftist 
themes in the films he made.316  In fact, Odets argued that it was impossible to 
influence the content of Hollywood movies with radical ideas.317  In 1947, the HUAC 
did not know this.  What they did know was that in the early 1940s Odets had written 
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the State Department on the same day as William Dieterle to urge the grantin  to 
Hanns Eisler permission to stay in the United States permanently.318  Investigators 
also knew that Odets later remained on friendly terms with Eisler, whom he 
considered “not political,” when both worked for Hollywood and employed him to 
write the musical score for his film None But the Lonely Heart in 1944.319  The 
Eisler-Odets relationship represented yet another important red flag for the 
Committee as it considered in mid-1947 whether to move forward with public 
hearings on the motion picture issue.   
The well-known relationship of Hanns Eisler and Charlie Chaplin admittedly 
represents a challenge to the premise that Eisler’s role in Hollywood was a key factor 
in triggering the Hollywood probe.  The reason is that there is an unexpected 
documentary weakness when it comes to what the HUAC knew or presumed to know 
about Chaplin.  Astoundingly, there is no investigative name file for Charlie Chaplin 
in boxes devoted to the Hollywood hearings.  In fact, Chaplin’s file is nowhere to be 
found in any of the related file series.  Given that even minor Hollywood figures 
earned an investigative file, it is difficult to believe that the HUAC research rs 
overlooked Chaplin.  Chaplin’s associations with communists and sympathies for 
communist fronts were well-known in Hollywood.  During the 1947 public hearings, 
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Robert Stripling asked several witnesses questions about Chaplin.320  Gossip 
columnist Hedda Hopper made no secret of the fact that she regarded Chaplin as 
“…either a card-carrying Red or the next thing to it.”321  In his 1951 public session 
testimony, actor John Garfield spoke of a party in the mid-1940s that he attended on 
board a Soviet ship at which Chaplin and his wife were present.  Furthermore, the 
FBI had been investigating Chaplin since the early 1940s as a result of his romantic 
involvement with Joan Barry, a young actress who filed a paternity suit against him.  
Through that investigation, the Bureau became aware of Chaplin’s close associations 
with communists and communist fronts.  During the sub-committee hearings in Los 
Angeles in May, 1947, several witnesses pointed to Chaplin as an individual who 
likely had communist affiliations.322  The point here is not that any of this proves that 
Chaplin was a party member.  Rather, given that there was such a general awareness 
in the industry about Chaplin’s political sympathies and witnesses raised suspicion  
about him in executive session on the one hand, and the pattern of routine Committee 
practices on the other, it is implausible that investigators would have not studied 
Chaplin’s activities and created an investigative file on him.   
The obvious and reasonable presumption must be that a file on Chaplin in fact 
did exist and some curious congressman or staff member either misplaced or 
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purloined it.  The former circumstance is very possible, as evidenced by the fact that 
in the HUAC archives there are some file folders located in boxes for the wrong
investigation and sometimes a decade or so out of chronology.  If the Chaplin file is 
still in existence and misfiled, some historian or archivist will no doubt discover it 
someday hidden in the massive HUAC collection.  In the meantime, it is reasonable 
to presume that the HUAC knew of the fond friendship between Hanns Eisler and 
Charlie Chaplin.  That friendship was not a secret in Hollywood and, when after 
Hanns’ testimony before the HUAC the United States government sought to deport 
Eisler and his wife, Chaplin attempted to influence the situation.  Failing to gethe 
INS to stop deportation proceedings, Chaplin worked out an arrangement whereby he 
would support the Eislers financially, if the “…government would allow them to 
leave the United States voluntarily, rather than under the stigma of a warrant.”323  
Given the pattern of relative thoroughness exhibited in other HUAC files and the high 
level of public knowledge, it seems inconceivable that investigators were not aware 
of Chaplin’s radical sympathies in general and his friendship with Eisler in particul .  
Although there is no known documentary evidence in the HUAC files to support this 
suggestion, a reasonable but provisional assumption would be that Hann’s 
relationship with Chaplin was yet another factor that influenced the Committee to 
investigate Hollywood more thoroughly.   
 In assessing whether Hanns Eisler represented a subversive threat, the archival
evidence shows that HUAC investigators looked most closely at his relationship with 
the famed German playwright Bertolt Brecht, who had also ended up working for the 
                                                




Hollywood studios, in this case writing several screenplays.  His extensive 
investigative name file reveals that Committee investigators knew well of his contacts 
and professional collaboration with Hanns Eisler.  An undated and unsigned report to 
the Committee summarizes Brecht’s film credits and activities within the motion 
picture industry, as well as noting the favorable reviews of Brecht and his work by the
Soviet press. Further, the report details how his various works reflect a pro-Soviet 
stance.  Finally, the report offers the particulars of Brecht’s affiliations with Wilhelm 
Pieck, a leader of the German Communist Party and later the first head of stte of the 
German Democratic Republic, i.e. East Germany.  A second and much longer report, 
some nineteen pages in length, cites the writer’s activities for and affiliations with a 
number of known communist front organizations, as well as what investigators 
considered revolutionary and/or subversive material in a number of works by Brecht.  
As usual, Committee staff also prepared a comprehensive list of citations of Brecht in 
the American communist press and, as they had with the Eisler brothers, inspected his 
INS file.  Finally, investigators took a look at the production credits of the film 
Hangmen Also Die, for which Brecht provided the story scenario.  Party stalwart John 
Wexley wrote the screenplay and Hanns Eisler created the music score.  The cast 
included CPUSA member Lionel Stander.324 
 Of particular interest to the Committee, as reflected in its prominence in both 
reports, was Brecht’s collaboration with Eisler on a play known in English as 
Disciplinary Measures or more recently as The Decision.  Titled in German as Die 
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Massnahme, it was one of Brecht’s “teaching plays” for which he was known in the 
1930s.  Heavily didactic, it told the story of a secret, illegal communist mission from 
Moscow to China during which one of the team members accidentally and 
unintentionally betrays the mission.  His crime is the inability to maintain the 
discipline necessary to keep his identity as a communist agitator concealed.  His other 
comrades conclude that for the good of the mission, they must execute him.  The 
doomed communist realizes his error and agrees to his own death for the good of the 
party.  This concept seems to illustrate the logic during Stalin’s Great Purge that 
communists accused of imaginary crimes were rendering the party one final service 
by confessing to crimes that they did not commit.  In a plot vaguely reminiscent of 
Gerhart Eisler’s Comintern activity in China, Brecht’s verse justified murder in the 
cause of revolution and the necessity of individual sacrifice, as well as the sacrifice of 
individuals, for the greater good of the revolutionary movement.  
 When Hanns Eisler returned for additional testimony before the Committee in 
September 1947, this time in public session, Stripling quizzed him repeatedly about 
Disciplinary Measures and other works by Eisler that had lyrics, usually written by 
Brecht.  The HUAC archives reveal that investigators had obtained a translation of 
Disciplinary Measures and focused on passages that advocated revolution or 
violence, such as:  
The Young Comrade: 
In the interest of Communism 
In accord with the march of the proletarian masses 
Of all countries 
Saying “Yes” to the revolutionizing of the world. 
and: 




The we shot him and 
Threw him into the quicklime pit 
And when the quicklime had eaten him  
We returned to our work.325 
During the testimony of Eisler and a month later Brecht, Stripling pointed to librettos 
like this to demonstrate that the two were not telling the truth when they claimed at 
varying times either that their work was not political or that its politics wa  simply 
anti-fascist.  The libretto of Disciplinary Measures in particular would figure 
prominently later in questioning during both Hanns Eisler’s and Bertolt Brecht’s 
appearances before the HUAC.  However, many other examples of “revolutionary 
lyrics,” in addition to what Stripling introduced into evidence, reside in the 
Committee’s archives, many of which advocate violent action in pursuit of a workers’ 
revolution.326   
Through the use of the dramatic device of characters wearing masks, 
Disciplinary Measures explicitly endorsed clandestine conspiracy by communists to 
prepare for a revolution.  Investigators noted in Brecht’s file that “referenc is made 
in a laudatory fashion to the teachings of Lenin, the ‘A B C of Communism’, and the 
activities of the Chinese Communist Party in general.”327  Furthermore, the text 
translated in the Committee’s files clearly advocated in the importance of agitation 
through the means of propaganda.  The protagonists are overtly communists working 
                                                
325 Translation of the libretto of Disciplinary Measures (also known as The 
Decision, The Rule, or Doctrine) found in Box 199, Exhibits, Evidence, Etc., “Hanns 
Eisler Gerhart Eisler,” Records of the Investigative Section. 
326 See Box 198, Exhibits, Evidence, Etc., “Hanns Eisler,” Records of the 
Investigative Section, Records of the House Un-American Activities Committee, 
1945-1975, RG 233, National Archives. 
327 See unsigned, undated nineteen page report found in “Brecht, Bert,” Box 2, 
Exhibits, Evidence, Etc. Re: Committee Investigations: Hollywood Blacklist, Records 




on behalf of the party on a mission under the orders of the Central Committee in 
Moscow.  Ironically, both men appeared to have mimicked in their professional lives 
the example advocated in their play: undertake propagandistic activities in the service 
of the communist party while hiding ones formal affiliations with the party and, if 
challenged, deny, minimize or trivialize those ties.    
There is a final potential, but important thread in the web of links between 
Hanns Eisler and Hollywood.  When Eisler and his wife, Louisa, entered the United 
States at the beginning of 1938, they did so with an affidavit of support from a Mrs. 
Ida C. Guggenheimer, the wife of a prominent Manhattan lawyer.328  On July 21, 
1947, Walter S. Steele, representing a coalition of rightwing organizations named the 
American Coalition of Patriotic, Civic and Fraternal Societies, testified before the 
HUAC.  This organization tracked communist activities and the Committee allowed 
Mr. Steele to testify to present the views of his organization on anticommunist 
legislation then pending in Congress.  During that hearing, Steele noted the 
incorporation of an organization called the People’s Radio Foundation, which in fact 
was an effort to create an FM radio station that could broadcast a pro-Soviet, pro-
CPUSA message in the New York City area.329  According to Steele, a charter 
member of the foundation was Mrs. Guggenheimer, who had a fairly extensive list of 
associations with communist front organizations.  Also serving along with her as 
charter members were a long list of well-known communists and fellow-travele s, 
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such as Howard Fast, a board member of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 
which paid a salary to Gerhart Eisler in the 1940s when it was illegal for him to work 
in the United States; Frederick V. Field, an editor of New Masses; Langston Hughes; 
CIO union leader Joseph Curran; and others.  Included in that list of founding 
members, asserted Steele, was Charlie Chaplin.330  Allegations of this sort of 
testimony of course required the verification and corroboration of further 
investigation, which was part of the mandate of the Committee.  Given past HUAC 
practices, it would be difficult to imagine that in the summer of 1947 Committee 
investigators would not further scrutinize these connections between communist front 
activity in terms of attempts at radio broadcasting in New York and the friendship of 
Hanns Eilser with Charlie Chaplin.   
 Given the archival evidence presented above it is reasonable to conclude that 
the HUAC investigators did understand that Hanns Eisler represented an important 
communist presence in Hollywood.  He had strong professional ties in the motion 
picture community to the point where non-communist filmmakers sought him out to 
create the musical scores for their films.  Hanns was very active in the German 
émigré community in Tinsel Town, as well as in the robust cluster of communists that 
had congregated in the movie colony.  On the other hand, he had familial relations to 
a senior Comintern official, Gerhart Eisler, who at one point gave direction to the 
CPUSA.  As we shall see below, Hanns himself had strong organizational ties to 
various aspects of the Comintern apparatus.  Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize 
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that, if the investigation of Gerhart Eisler led HUAC investigators to scrutinize his 
brother, Hanns, then the latter in turn was key to the full-scale launch of the 
Hollywood probe.   
The question then arises: why did Hanns Eisler not figure more prominently in 
the public Hollywood hearings held October 20-30, 1947?  Based on what transpired 
at those hearings, it would prima facie appear that the only connection between Hanns 
Eisler and the Hollywood hearings was the HUAC’s decision to subpoena Bertolt 
Brecht.  Because Brecht did not refuse to testify under a First Amendment defense 
similar to the Hollywood Ten and permanently left the country immediately after his 
testimony before the HUAC, historians have treated him almost as an afterthought by 
the Committee and a historical quirk.  The fact that Hanns had no other significant 
role or apparent connection with the October hearings seems to support the historians 
outlined at the beginning of his chapter, who minimized the importance of Hanns 
Eisler to the Hollywood investigation.   However, the case of Hanns Eisler was 
exceedingly complex, involving four aspects and their possible interrelations: his 
extensive known activities on behalf of the Comintern in the cultural field; his 
possible associations with his brother’s propaganda apparatus in the United States; 
the highly unusual circumstances of his immigration to the United States; and his 
activities in Hollywood as a composer for the motion picture industry.  To understand 
the importance of Hanns Eisler to the HUAC is to understand all four of these area .  
As the discussion below will demonstrate, the circumstances surrounding his 
immigration into the United States became highly controversial and politically 




officials, including former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles.  The HUAC 
leadership, i.e. Chairman J. Parnell Thomas and Chief Investigator Robert Stripling, 
no doubt decided that it would be cleaner and less confusing to separate the 
Hollywood aspect of Eisler’s case from the immigration portion, which they 
addressed in Eisler’s appearance before the full Committee in that fall.   
 On September 24, 1947, Hanns Eisler presented himself in Washington to 
testify once again, this time in public session, before the HUAC.  Chairman Thomas 
refused to allow him to read an opening statement, but took it “under advisement.”  
The Committee did not publish Eisler’s statement as part of the hearing proceedings.  
One can find a copy of the statement in the HUAC’s archives.  In the statement, 
Eisler again took the committee to task, as the portions below indicate: 
The only thing of any public importance about me is 
my standing as a composer…. On the contrary, the 
Committee has called me only in order to continue its 
smear of me in the press, hoping that it will thereby 
intimidate artists throughout the country to conform to 
the political ideas of this Committee…. The answers to 
all these questions are very simple.  I am accused of 
being the brother of Gerhart Eisler, whom I love and 
admire and whom I defend and will continue to defend.  
Does the Committee believe that brotherly love is un-
American?  More important, the Committee hopes that 
by persecuting me it will intimidate many other artists 
in America whom it may dislike for any of various 
unworthy reasons.  The Committee hopes to create a 
drive against every liberal, progressive, and socially-
conscious artist in this country, and to subject their 
works to an un-Constitutional and hysterical political 
censorship.  It is horrible to think what will become of 
American art if this Committee is to judge what art is 
American and what is un-American.  This is the sort of 




successful, and neither will be the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities.331   
Leaving the disingenuous aspects of his rhetoric aside, this statement reveals that 
Eisler himself realized that he represented a significant link between Grhard Eisler 
and the Comintern’s aims in the American cultural scene on the one hand and 
individual artists on the other.  Those artists with whom Eisler had the closest 
associations were active in the motion picture industry.  Eisler appeared to understa  
that by attracting the attention of the HUAC, he had brought the Committee’s scrutiny 
to all of Hollywood.  To obscure those associations, Eisler sought to redirect attention 
to the HUAC itself by impugning its motives and making invidious comparisons of 
Committee methods with fascism.  This practice of trying to divert attention from the 
investigation’s substance and redirecting it to an indictment against the legitimacy of 
the investigators is the same technique unsuccessfully employed previously by 
Gerhart Eisler and later by the Hollywood Ten.   
With the HUAC’s intention to focus the September testimony on 
circumstances of Hanns Eisler’s immigration to the United States and his effort to 
obtain permanent residency, Stripling ignored attempts by Eisler to redirect att ntion 
to Hollywood.  When Eisler asked that the Committee adjourn and hear his testimony 
at the same date as the other witnesses from Hollywood, Chairman Thomas denied 
his request.  During his testimony there was an exchange regarding Eisler’s 
employment by RKO Studios.  In response, Stripling made a statement that hisorians 
have apparently overlooked: “Mr. Chairman, Mr. Eisler will be subpoenaed, as you 
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know, in connection with the investigation of Communist infiltration in the motion 
picture industry.  However, I suggest that these questions [regarding Eisler’s 
Hollywood employment] be deferred until the hearing at that time.”332  Chairman 
Thomas agreed to do so. 
Documents in the HUAC archives reveal that Committee investigators knew 
that, before Eisler went to Hollywood to compose musical scores for motion pictures, 
he already had experience in the area of filmmaking.  The library of subversive 
publications maintained by the HUAC yielded information that Eisler had some 
experience in writing music for movies in the Soviet Union.  For example, the Daily 
Worker ran accounts of Eisler’s 1932 collaboration with the Dutch communist Joris 
Ivens on the film Komsomol and plans for a new film in 1935 depicting Dimitrov’s 
“heroic conduct at the Reichstag fire trial in Leipzig.”333  During Eisler’s testimony, 
Stripling failed to develop this during his questioning, even though he had carefully 
documented material note in his prepared questions.  At one point, Stripling said: 
“We will get to Mr. Ivens later,” but thorough reading of the hearing’s transcript 
shows that he never did.334   
Often Stripling stuck to his script, but sometimes he did not.  There was 
sometimes an overabundance of information in the Committee files, which was the 
case both with Gerhart and Hanns Eisler, and it would have been repetitious and 
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tedious to cover it all during testimony.  When one compares Stripling’s prepared 
questions, as found in the HUAC archives, with the transcripts of testimony, there are 
occasional deviations.  In this instance, Stripling departed from his prepared script. In 
any event, Stripling clearly meant for this line of questioning to function only as a 
prelude for latter testimony during the Hollywood hearings.  Stripling’s primary aim 
was to document Eisler’s propagandizing activities before he entered the United 
States, which would have made his sworn statements to the State Department and the 
INS perjures.  These activities included writing the music for the anthem of the 
Comintern, not surprisingly entitled “Comintern,” the lyrics of which were composed 
by V. J. Jerome, the CPUSA cultural commissar.  Thus, the emphasis in the October 
Eisler hearings was on the composer’s activities during his pre-Hollywood career.  
Stripling clearly wanted the preserve testimony regarding Eisler’s activities in 
Hollywood for the subsequent hearings.     
The story of Eisler’s immigration to the United States is exceedingly complex, 
but a summary is as follows.  As early as the spring of 1936, the State Department 
knew of Eisler’s communist associations because he had undertaken two visits to the 
United States in 1935-1936 on temporary visas that generated a degree of notoriety 
amongst anticommunist groups.335  Eisler returned to the United States with his new 
wife on January 21, 1938, again on a visa valid for six months, which was extended 
twice for a total of six additional months.  During this time, he taught music courses 
at the New School for Social Research in New York City and wrote music for 
Broadway shows.  When he reentered the United States in 1938, State Department 
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officials somehow overlooked INS information pointing to Eisler’s communist 
activities.  Moreover, at that time, he represented himself to the INS at Ellis Island as 
a non-political person with no ties to communism.  The Eislers left the United States 
briefly in 1939 for Mexico and returned a short time later on yet another visitor visa.   
When this temporary visa expired, the Department of Labor sought to deport 
the Eislers, while they in turn began the process of applying for permanent residency.  
The law required the Eislers to leave the United States and make such an application 
from an American consul at an embassy.  This they were reluctant to do.  The Eislers 
sought permanent residency as non-quota immigrants, which would essentially bring 
them to the front of the line of those seeking to enter the United States.  However, the 
law had very strict criteria on how one might obtain non-quota status and it was not 
entirely clear the Eislers could meet them.  Fearing they could not obtain non-quota 
status or perhaps that the discovery of Hanns Eisler’s past communist affiliations 
would disqualify his application for permanent residency, the Eislers procrastinated 
until authorities ordered them to leave the United States.  Eventually, they gaind 
reentry into the country, again through Mexico.    
During the Eislers’ application for permanent residency, numerous important 
individuals exerted significant pressure on the State Department to admit Hanns 
Eisler to the United States in 1940 as a non-quota immigrant.  These included the 
First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt; Robert LaFollette, Jr., the Progressive Party Senator 
from Wisconsin; Hollywood film directors Joseph Losey and William Dieterle; 
theatre director Harold Clurman; theatre and film luminary Clifford Odets; Oscar 




Johnson, president of the New School for Social Research; journalist Dorothy 
Thompson; Freda Kirchwey, editor of The Nation; Russell Davenport, managing 
editor of Fortune magazine; and Malcolm Cowley, the assistant editor of The New 
Republic.  Film director George Cukor sent letters to FDR, Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull and A. M. Warren, chief of the State Department’s Visa Division.  Raymond 
Gram Swing, a journalist with the Mutual Broadcasting System, wrote to the State 
Department: “I believe there is some prejudice against him in your department 
because he has composed music for workers’ choruses.”336     
Such pressure on State Department officials was enormous.  Evidence 
presented by the HUAC in public session, as well as additional information residing 
in the Committee’s archives, shows that officials at the State Department were 
reluctant to grant the Eislers’ application for two reasons.  First, it was now obvious 
the Hanns had extensive communist affiliations and, second, it did not appear they 
were eligible under the law.  When the Eislers changed their application from the 
American consul in Havana to the one in Mexico City, a State Department official 
observed: “The interested persons may believe they can bring greater pressu e to bear 
on the Consul General at Mexico City – possibly through Ambassador Daniels – than 
they have been able to bring on the Consul General at Habana….”337  The First Lady 
wrote Sumner Welles, the Undersecretary of State, three times advocating for the 
Eislers’ admittance.  While Mrs. Roosevelt may or may not have been naïve about 
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Eisler’s communist past, she was well-known for her concern for Jewish refugees 
fleeing persecution from the brutal Nazi regime in Germany.  Her initial le ter to 
Welles came less than two months after the launch of the Kristallnacht pogrom, 
making assistance to such refugees even more pressing.  It was no doubt this 
humanitarian motive that led her to intervene on behalf of the Eislers.   
Despite Mrs. Roosevelt’s intervention with Welles, who had been a member 
of her wedding party years before, the Undersecretary politely declined to make 
special accommodations for them as suggested by “well-meaning” friends of the 
Eislers, “…[who] seem to think that there is some special consideration or treatment 
which can be given him which is not provided for in our law or that perhaps certain 
liberties could be taken with the law.”  Welles reminded his old friend, Mrs. 
Roosevelt, that the law strictly limited the actions of the Department of State.  Welles 
wrote: “There is nothing that we can do or suggest that Mr. Eisler should do that does 
not fall within these statutory prescriptions.”338  
A passage in a letter between two State Department officials illustrates he 
degree to which the Eisler immigration case became a political hot potato within the 
American government: 
I think you are wise in leaving the political phase of the 
case for future consideration.  However, when the time 
comes, I hope you will go into this matter with your 
usual care and skill.  If this alien obtains an 
immigration visa and enters the United States we are 
likely to hear from anti-communist organizations in this 
country.  Of course, if he is refused an immigration visa 
there will also be some repercussion among the so-
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called liberal elements in this country.  We have a 
Congressional investigation hanging over our heads, 
however, and I am sure we will be called to render an 
explanation concerning the issuance of visas to so many 
of the reds and pinks who have been filtering into the 
country in recent years.  If I were handling the case I 
would reach a conclusion I could defend before all the 
world and let the future take care of itself.339  
The Eisler immigration saga was even more complex than can be recounted 
here in detail in its entirety.  In the end, the Eislers received permanent residency 
status and ultimately began the process of becoming American citizens.  However, 
they obtained this result only after an INS special board of inquiry first denied them a 
non-quota immigration visa because of Hanns Eisler’s lack of qualifications as a 
university professor prior to his initial admittance into the United States.  The Eislers 
immediately appealed that decision and ultimately the Board of Immigration Appeals 
in Washington, DC overturned the decision of the board of inquiry, issuing what the 
HUAC believed was a highly dubious finding that Eisler was qualified as a university 
professor under the law, and ordered that the Eislers be admitted to the United 
States.340  When the HUAC obtained documents pertaining to the Eislers’ 
immigration case, investigators were suspicious that the Board of Immigration 
Appeals had reached its conclusion based on political pressure, rather than a proper 
application of the law.   
In the wake of the HUAC hearings, however, the American government 
revoked the Eislers’ residency status after it became clear that Hanns lied about his 
communist affiliations and activities before he entered the United States.  Had it not 
                                                
339 Robert C. Alexander to Paul C. Hutton, August 9, 1939, found in Box 199, 
Exhibits, Evidence, Etc., “Hanns Eisler Gerhart Eisler,” Records of the Investigative 
Section. 




been for the Gerhart Eisler investigation, Hanns Eisler’s immigration case and the 
unusual circumstances surrounding it might have been forgotten.  Ultimately, the 
enormous pressure brought to bear on State Department officials made Hanns’ case 
memorable.  Thus, when Robert Stripling began to request documents in order to 
scrutinize Gerhart Eislers’ passport irregularities and the circumstances surrounding 
his entry to the United States in 1941, State Department employees in the Visa 
Division suggested that he look into Hanns Eisler’s records as well.341   
It appeared to the leadership of the HUAC that the Hanns Eisler immigration 
saga illustrated two important points.  First, the Roosevelt Administration had been 
lax in securing the nation’s borders from the infiltration of avowed communists, who 
were loyal to and sought to undertake the policy directives of a foreign power.  This 
would explain how Hanns Eisler was able to repeatedly obtain temporary visas to 
visit the United States.  Second, when officials of the government of the United Sta s
recognized such an individual and attempted to stop him from obtaining permanent 
residency status, they appeared to be overruled due to political consideration and 
enormous pressure brought to bear from a number of individuals, some of whom had 
extensive connections with communist front organizations.  In any event, the Hanns 
Eisler hearings caused quite a stir in Washington in part because of the association f 
the beloved former First Lady with the possibility that Hanns and Louisa Eisler 
gained immigrant status in the United States.  
 The following month during the Hollywood hearings, the HUAC aborted its 
original intention to further investigate Hanns Eisler’s suspected communist 
                                                




associations in Hollywood.  That testimony never occurred because Chairman 
Thomas suddenly adjourned the Hollywood hearings on October 30, 1947.  Robert 
Stripling has asserted that this transpired for three reasons.  First, he said the hearing 
had become repetitive, the implication being that the Committee was not making 
progress in its investigation with suspected communists refusing to answer questions 
and the Chairman unceremoniously removing them from the witness chair.  Second, 
he averred, “I had every reason to believe that New York communist circles wer 
about to mass-picket the House Office Building and pack the caucus rooms.”  Thus, 
he feared an even further circus-like atmosphere surrounding the hearings, though he 
does not say why the House could not take measures to counteract those plans.  Third, 
Stripling asserted that Chairman Thomas became ill and was reluctant to allow 
another congressman to fill in as temporary chairman.342   
Although the Hollywood hearings ended early, a line of questioning that 
Stripling began to develop during the testimony of Bertolt Brecht demonstrates that 
he planned to return to the activities of Hanns Eisler.  However, right in the middle of 
Stripling’s questioning of the playwright about his contacts with Gerhart and Hanns 
Eisler and his activities in Hollywood, Chairman Thomas interjected: “Mr. Stripling, 
can we hurry this along?  We have a very heavy schedule this afternoon.”343  Thus, 
scheduling exigencies prevented Stripling from delving deeper into the Eisler-Brecht 
relationship in Hollywood. 
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Thus, the HUAC was well aware that Brecht was a friend and professional 
collaborator with Hanns Eisler.  Investigators knew that together they were in th  
forefront of the revolutionary theatre movement in Germany before the Nazis took 
power.   
However, Stripling’s prepared questions revealed an interest in whether 
Brecht also knew Gerhart Eisler.  The Committee wanted to know whether Brecht 
had any contact with the older Eisler brother.  This was apparently an effort to follow
up on Ruth Fischer’s charge that Gerhart was in the process of developing a 
propaganda apparatus in the United States and that his composer brother and Bertolt 
Brecht were his assistants in that undertaking.  Brecht admitted he had met Gerhar in 
the presence of Hanns and three or four times when Hanns was not present.  He 
asserted that they merely played chess and discussed German politics.344   
This was one of a number of occasions during the Hollywood hearings in 
which Stripling was able to establish direct links to Gerhart Eisler and individuals 
involved in the motion picture industry.  Historians seem to have overlooked much of 
this additional testimony apparently because it consisted of an effort to summarize a 
great deal of information in the Committee’s files without having to call any more 
celebrity witness and continue to feed the circus-like atmosphere that surrounded 
such testimony.  Instead, Stripling called HUAC investigator Louis J. Russell to offer 
testimony under oath about what HUAC investigators had discovered in the course of 
the probe.  Russell testified that in 1940 Gerhart Eisler contacted Hanns for assistance 
in raising a large sum of money for the purpose of “…buying [his] way out of 
                                                




concentration camp in France.”345  Several of Hanns’ contacts in Hollywood, Charles 
A. Page, a freelance writer and former employee of the State Department, and Louise 
Bransten, an heiress and former wife of the owner of New Masses, led the campaign 
to raise the money.   
Hanns Eilser knew Page well and at one point resided at Page’s home, which 
was just off of Mulholland Drive in the Hollywood Hills.  Bransten made numerous 
investments in communist front companies and toured the Soviet Union in 1933.  In 
addition to the Eisler brothers, Page and Bransten were both known associates of 
Hollywood Ten members John Howard Lawson and Herbert Biberman, Comintern 
agent Otto Katz, and various officials with the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, 
including the Consul himself, Gregori Kheifets.  Bransten also had numerous contacts 
with officials from the Soviet consulate in Los Angeles.  According to Russell, on 
May 19, 1945 Bransten entertained Dmitri Manuilsky, a high official in the 
Comintern and later the Ukrainian representative to the United Nations, as the guest 
of honor at a dinner in her home.  Furthermore, in 1942 J. Peters, the former head of 
the CPUSA’s underground apparatus and the one-time assistant and close associate of 
Gerhart Eisler, visited Hollywood to raise money for the party.  During the visit, he 
met with such people as Herbert Biberman, Hollywood Ten screenwriter and director; 
Waldo Salt, screenwriter and former consultant to the Office of War Information; 
screenwriter Paul Jarrico; screenwriter and director Robert Rossen; scr enwriters 
Morton Grant and Hyman Kraft; and Hollywood Ten screenwriters John Howard 
                                                




Lawson and Lester Cole.346  That the Eisler brothers figured importantly in the 
Hollywood hearings is indicated by the fact that together they are mentioned 104 
times in the proceeding’s transcripts.      
The adjournment of the Hollywood hearings was supposed to be temporary.  
In a final statement on October 30 at the end of the Hollywood hearings, Thomas 
made clear his intentions to continue the inquiry later: 
The hearings today conclude the first phase of the 
committee's investigation of communism in the motion-
picture industry.  While we have heard 39 witnesses, 
there are many more to be heard.  The Chair stated 
earlier in the hearing he would present the records of 79 
prominent people associated with the motion-picture 
industry who were members of the Communist Party or 
who had records of Communist affiliations. We have 
had before us 11 of these individuals.  There are 68 to 
go.  This hearing has concerned itself principally with 
spotlighting Communist personnel in the industry.  
There is, however, an equally dangerous phase of this 
inquiry which deals with Communist propaganda in 
various motion pictures and the techniques employed.  
At the present time the committee has a special staff 
making an extensive study of this phase of the 
committee's inquiry.  Either the full committee or a 
subcommittee will resume hearings on this matter in the 
near future, either in Washington or in Los Angeles, at 
which time those persons whose Communist records 
the committee has will be given an opportunity to 
appear before the committee to confirm or deny those 
affiliations.  We will also have a number of witnesses 
who will deal with propaganda in the films and the 
techniques employed.  I want to emphasize that the 
committee is not adjourning sine die, but will resume 
hearings as soon as possible.347   
                                                
346 Ibid., 514-519. 
347 “Louis J. Russell,” Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the 





Given the statement by Stripling during Eisler’s testimony the previous month and the 
abundance of information in the HUAC archives regarding Hanns’ connections with 
other notables in the motion picture industry, it seems probable that had the 
Hollywood investigation resumed shortly after the October hearings, Eislerwould 
have found himself testifying yet again and his importance to the HUAC’s interest in 
Hollywood would have been clearer.   
In any event, the Hollywood hearings did not resume until 1951.  During 
1948, most of the HUAC’s agenda was absorbed with the Hiss-Chambers affair, 
which relegated Hollywood to the back burner.  When the Committee finally did 
return to the subject of communism in the motion picture industry, circumstances 
were significantly different.  Scandalized by charges of corruption, J. Parnell Thomas 
was no longer serving in Congress and in fact had gone to prison.  By then, Frank 
Tavenner had replaced Stripling as head of the Committee’s staff, bringing a new
tone to that role.  Hanns Eisler had moved on too, joining his brother Gerhart and his 
old friend Bertolt Brecht in the German Democratic Republic, where he wrote the 
music to the national anthem of East Germany.  It was no longer necessary or even 
possible to call Hanns Eisler before the HUAC for additional testimony.  Thus, this 
quirk of history has also obscured the strong connection the HUAC saw between 
Hanns Eisler and the communist movement in Hollywood.   
 In summary, when one adds the newly available archival evidence of what 
HUAC investigators knew about the activities of both Gerhart and Hanns Eisler on 
behalf of the Comintern to several overlooked portions of the existing public record, 




investigators between the propagandizing activities of Gerhart Eisler through the 
CPUSA’s newspapers headquartered in Manhattan and Hanns Eisler’s “cultural 
work” in the motion picture industry from his home in Malibu.  Those links 
represented an irresistible target for investigation.  For years the Committee had 
information about communist infiltration into the American movie industry.   
When Gerhart Eisler became the focus of the HUAC’s scrutiny in late 1946, it 
only became a matter of time until his brother, Hanns, shared that spotlight.  With 
Ruth Fischer publishing stories in the Hearst press that Hanns was the Comintern’s 
boss in Hollywood, it became inevitable that the Committee would launch a full-scale 
investigation of Tinsel Town in 1947.  As other historians have pointed out, the 
HUAC already had additional reasons for studying communist activity in Hollyw od: 
the IA-CSU labor battles, allegations that communists had infiltrated the Scre n 
Writers Guild, and charges by the Motion Picture Alliance that subversive cont nt 
was making its way into the movies.  However, the investigation of the Eislers, 
predicated on claims of Comintern involvement and propagandizing activities, made 
the Hollywood probe far more urgent in the estimation of the Committee.   
Thus, the Gerhart Eisler-Hanns Eisler-Hollywood connection answers the 
historical question of timing.  The HUAC archives reveal the substantial pool of 
information pertaining to Hanns Eisler with which Committee investigators wked.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Hanns Eisler was not a marginal figure in 
the story of the HUAC’s investigation of Hollywood, but an important individual and 





Chapter 7:  Naming Names vs. Investigating Fronts 
The central argument of this chapter is that, in terms of the Hollywood probe, 
over time it became apparent to Committee investigators that identifying whether 
individual media professionals were CPUSA members was an increasingly fruitless 
exercise given the very nature of Party membership itself.  Even though investigator  
continued to try to understand the CPUSA’s organizational structure and the conduct 
of Party business at the local level, the HUAC became more concerned with exposing 
the activities of communist front organizations and their interplay with communist 
propaganda efforts.  The Committee pursued this agenda of exposure within the 
context of a continued suspicion that communist fronts were effective instruments of 
advocating the policy goals of the principal enemy of the United States, i.e. the Soviet 
Union.  Whereas previous historians have emphasized the HUAC’s efforts to have 
witnesses “name names” as the defining characteristic of the Hollywo d 
investigations, the documentary record indicates that the Committee focused its 
attention as much or more on the issue of communist fronts.   
Furthermore, the newly opened HUAC archive reveals that executive session 
witnesses offered evidence of a pattern of mendacious behavior by the communist 
leaders of front organizations, who made fraudulent statements in the communist 
press, claiming that Hollywood professionals endorsed and/or participated in the 
activities of those fronts.  Many witnesses, whose testimony was unavailable to 
historian until now, denied endorsing such activities and even membership in these 
groups.  In some cases, witnesses even claimed ignorance of the existence of the 




then communist fronts systematically used them as pawns in a wide propaganda 
effort.  Apparently, a celebrity, who joined one organization or offered a one-time 
endorsement of an event or charitable cause by that front, could find him or herself, 
without his or her knowledge or consent, automatically a member of all successor 
organizations and an endorser of other events or charitable causes.  This pattern of 
behavior was clearly an effort to exploit the celebrity status of well-known cultural 
leaders. 
 The complex story of Gerhart Eisler is in many ways illustrative of this 
chapter’s central argument.  When Gerhart Eisler bought his way out of a French 
concentration camp with money raised through Hanns’ Hollywood connections, he 
initially intended to go to Mexico.  At least that is what he claimed to both 
immigration authorities in New York in 1941 and to the press in 1947 after his 
identity became public.  The American consulate in Marseilles issued him only a
transit visa in order to get to Mexico via the United States and this fact appears to 
support Eisler’s assertion.  Furthermore, a HUAC investigator noted in Eisler’s fi e: 
“Since June 13, 1941 he has been unable to depart from the United States because the 
State Dept did not wish to and refused to grant him an exit permit.”348  Thus, the 
reason he was in the United States from 1941 to 1949 appeared to be beyond his 
control.  Why the State Department did not allow Eisler to continue on to his stated 
destination in Mexico remains unclear, although there have been claims that at a 
certain point during the war Mexico began refusing entry to German and Austrian 
citizens.  Eisler told the FBI and the American public that he was simply a fighter 
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against Nazism, who became marooned in the United States.  All he wanted to do, he 
asserted, was to return to his homeland and help rebuild post-war Germany.  Eisler 
had been, he admitted, a member of the Communist Party of Germany, but that had 
only to do with his native country.  In the United States, Eisler argued, he maintained 
a strictly apolitical stance with the exception of promoting anti-Nazi ideas amongst 
German émigrés. 349   
A number of knowledgeable people disputed Eisler’s story and, under 
scrutiny, it began to fall apart.  The self-appointed task before the HUAC in winter of 
1946-47 appeared to be to determine where the truth lay by answering these 
questions:  Was Gerhart Eisler a member of the CPUSA?  Was Eisler engaged in 
propaganda activities on behalf of the CPUSA?  How did this relate to activities 
within communist front organizations?  Did he exercise authority over the American 
Party in the name of the Comintern?  In reality, one could boil Robert Stripling’s set 
of forty-seven prepared questions down to the above four.  The Committee was never 
able to address any questions directly to Eisler.  His refusal to take the oath and his 
loud claims that he was a political prisoner short-circuited his hearing.  The HUAC 
did its best to salvage the proceedings through the testimony of others, such as 
Committee investigators, who read into the record the information they had obtained 
from various sources.   
The same four basic questions were also at the heart of the investigation of 
Hanns Eisler with the exception of the Comintern query.  Gerhart was unique in his 
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role as a Comintern plenipotentiary.  Thus, the appropriate question to ask of Hanns 
was:  To what degree was he acting as a representative of the Comintern?  In fact, a 
broad reading of the recently unsealed transcripts of testimony taken in executive 
session by the HUAC reveals that, generally speaking, this pattern held true for th
Hollywood investigation.  The Committee consistently wanted information in four 
areas: public or secret Party membership, propaganda activities, participation in 
fronts, and the degree to which the first three reflected the policy agenda of a foreign
power through the mechanism of the Comintern and/or its successor.   
Gerhart Eisler’s sister, Ruth Fischer, ridiculed his story of being a lone anti-
Nazi stranded in a foreign country against his will, saying, “His refugee story i  a 
fake.”  She asserted he probably planned all along to come to the United States for an 
extended stay, gambling that immigration authorities would hold him up at Ellis 
Island and make it impossible for him to get to Mexico.350  Implying that Gerhart had 
to have the help of very special connections to get a transit visa, she noted how 
suspicious it was to have the capacity to apply for and get a visa from a concentration 
camp.  It is important to remember that at that time, the Soviet Union and Germany 
were allies, while the latter occupied a defeated France.  Fischer’s implication was 
that the Nazis did the Soviets a favor by allowing a key Comintern’s propagandists to 
escape France.  Furthermore, Fischer argued, Eisler could have easily booked direct 
passage from France to Vera Cruz; there was no need to go through New York.  She 
alleged that it was the help of Hanns Eisler, who raised pressure on government 
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officials through influential friends, that secured Gerhart’s release from Ellis Island 
after three months confinement.351  The HUAC in fact knew via statements made by 
Howard Fast that it was the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, a communist 
front, which arranged for Eisler’s admission to the United States.352    
The Committee knew Eisler’s claim that, as an anti-Nazi crusader, he was 
only concerned about German politics and not involved in American domestic 
politics, did not bear scrutiny.  The HUAC had evidence that Eisler had been involved 
with and/or advised numerous communist front organizations, including the 
American Slav Congress; the Win-the-Peace Congress; the Civil Rights Congress; the 
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy; the Council of African Affairs; the 
Council for Pan American Democracy; the Political Action Committee; the 
Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions; the 
Federation of Atomic Scientists; and the Southern Conference for Human Welfare.  
Furthermore, Eisler’s wife was apparently active in the American Yugoslav Relief 
Committee.353  In addition, as noted in Chapter 6, the FBI had evidence that the Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee had him on its payroll under a pseudonym.  Thus, 
Eisler’s connections with communist front organizations appeared to be on-going and 
extensive.   
Louis Budenz argued that the authority Eisler carried was not of a refugee 
from Nazism headed for Mexico, who was unexpectedly delayed in the United Stats.  
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As evidence, Budenz pointed to a dispute during the war between Party chief Earl 
Browder and his long-time rival for power, William Z. Foster.  During 1944-45, 
Foster argued forcefully against Browder’s position on the likelihood of a post-war 
spirit of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Inspired by the 
outcome of the Tehran Conference between Churchill, FDR, and Stalin, Browder 
foresaw an extended era of cooperation, whereas Foster envisioned a return to class 
struggle.  Eisler sided with Browder in an article published in Communist under his 
pseudonym, Hans Berger, and effectively ended the policy debate.  Budenz asserted: 
“It was not written by a Communist on his way to Mexico, stopping off here; it was a 
responsible and dominant person writing the article.”  According to Budenz, Eisler 
was in America by choice because it “was where he wanted to land” and once there, 
he spoke/wrote with authority.354 
 Upon entry in the United States in 1941, besides denying before the INS board 
of inquiry that he had ever been a communist, he also stated that he had no relatives 
in the United States.  The HUAC believed he did this despite the fact that he knew 
both his sister Ruth Fischer and his brother Hanns had preceded him to America.355  
This, of course, raised the question as to why Gerhart would lie to authorities unless 
his initial plan was to escape the government’s attention and engage in anonymous or 
covert Party work.  This appears to be in fact what he did.     
 If Gerhart Eisler had proceeded onto Mexico as his transit visa required, his 
paperwork stated that his destination was Mexico City to meet Otto Katz, who 
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apparently sponsored Eisler’s entry into that country.  According to J. Edgar Hoover, 
Katz was “frequently reported as a Comintern agent and is known to be an important 
European Communist.”356  Because the HUAC had access to Hoover’s written 
communication with the INS commissioner, investigators were aware of this.  It 
further confirmed the allegations by Fischer, Budenz and others that Eisler wa  a 
Comintern agent.  The Committee apparently did not know that in actuality Otto Katz 
was a protégé of Willi Munzenberg, an important Comintern operative and master 
propagandist.357  Both were members of the Communist Party of Germany and both 
were friends with Bertolt Brecht and the Eisler brothers during the 1920s when they 
were all active in the Communist Party of Germany.358  Had the HUAC known this 
without a doubt the questioning of Hanns Eisler and Bertolt Brecht under oath would 
have proceeded differently.   
During the 1920s and 1930s, Munzenberg was successful at creating a 
bewildering array of communist front organizations and media outlets in Western 
Europe that promoted the Comintern’s point of view.  This propaganda machine, 
known within communist circles as the “Munzenberg Trust,” included all aspects of 
the media: newspapers, magazines, book publishing houses, motion picture studios, 
radio and even press agencies.  For example, it was the motion picture company that 
he founded, Mezhropohmfilm, which brought the works of the great early Soviet 
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filmmakers, such as Eisenstein, Vertov and Dovzhenko, to Western audiences.  
Together Munzenberg’s media organizations and fronts formed “a network for 
molding and (not least), for secret political action.  Munzenberg had assembled what 
amounted to a huge, secretly co-ordinated media consortium.”359  He was himself a 
protégé of Karl Radek, one of the great Soviet propagandists, a leader in the 
Comintern, and for a time the editor of Izvestia, which was the official daily 
newspaper of the Soviet government. Munzenberg’s genius was the innovation of two 
propaganda practices: the use of clandestinely controlled front organizations and the 
covertly manipulated cultural luminary, who, as a non-communist, functioned as a 
public face for a communist policy position.360     
In Germany in the 1920s, Otto Katz carefully studied his mentor’s propaganda 
model and methods of operation.  Katz, who boasted that in his early years he had 
been friends with Franz Kafka and had Marlene Dietrich as a lover, started his career 
with Munzenberg by managing the business affairs of another member of the 
Munzenberg Trust, the theatre director Erwin Piscadore.361  After additional training 
in Moscow, during which time the NKVD probably initiated him as an agent, Katz 
returned to Germany to collaborate with Munzenberg on the communist propaganda 
response to the Reichstag fire and the defense of Georgi Dimitrov, whom the Nazis 
put on trial for starting the fire.362  In the mid-1930s, the Comintern sent Katz to the 
United States, where he worked to emulate Munzenberg’s methods there in active 
                                                
359 Ibid., 38.   
360 Ibid., 15.   
361 Ibid., 86 & 98. 




collaboration with Gerhart Eisler.363  Katz’ bases of operations were New York and 
Hollywood and he traveled back and forth unfettered by the American government 
for over five years.  This ended 1940 when the journalist Dorothy Thompson 
denounced him as an NKVD agent to the FBI after she became disillusioned by the 
communists’ behavior during the Stalin-Hitler Pact.364  How she obtained the 
information about Katz remains unclear.  Shortly thereafter, the State Departm nt 
revoked his visa and Katz retreated to Mexico City, where he ran a front called the 
Free German Committee of Mexico, which published the Neues Deutschland 
newspaper as its official organ.365   
In the nearly six year period between January, 1935 and  November, 1940, 
when he was expelled from the United States, Otto Katz achieved perhaps his greate t 
accomplishments for the communist cause and he did this independent of the direct 
supervision of Munzenberg. In March 1935, he arrived in Hollywood, using the 
pseudonym Rudolph Breda and posing as a freedom fighter for the Spanish 
Republican cause.  Projecting a dashing image of a mysterious leader of the resis anc  
against Hitler, the armchair revolutionaries in his Hollywood coterie came to idealize 
Katz.  Some have alleged that he was the model for the noble Victor Lazlo in 
Casablanca and writer-director Frank Tuttle named his hero Breda in his 1943 film 
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Hostages.366  Likewise, rumors abounded that Communist writers Bertolt Brecht and 
John Wexler based the character of Svoboda on Katz in Hangmen Also Die, as did 
Lillian Hellman for the role of Kurt Muller in Watch on the Rhine.367  Whether or not 
this was the case, there is little doubt that Katz certainly captured the imagination of a 
number of filmmakers during the war years.    
In fairly short order, Katz achieved his mission to establish an anti-Nazi front 
organization.  Under the nominal direction of Prince Hubertus zu und von 
Lowenstein, a classic Munzenberg follow-traveler, Katz/Breda engineered the 
creation of the Hollywood League Against Nazism, later known as the Hollywood 
Anti-Nazi League.  As one of the earliest examples of a communist front in the 
United States, there was then little awareness of communist manipulation of such 
organizations.  Thus, the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League initially attracted broad 
support across the political spectrum and raised huge sums of money for Katz.368  The 
League functioned as a classic front in which fellow-travelers or secret communists, 
such as Donald Ogden Stewart and Dorothy Parker, played the most visible role.  
Known communists kept a fairly low profile and avoided any overt communist 
propaganda in favor of the anti-Nazi, collective security policy that the Soviet Un on 
pursued at the time, and fund raising relief efforts for victims of Nazism.  (It is with 
no little irony that many of those victims were exiled German communists whom 
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Stalin forced into a suicidal policy of opposing German socialists instead of the Nazis 
on the eve of Hitler’s seizure of power.)  The League became perhaps the most well-
known and effective communist front organization in the United States during the 
Popular Front era and the first of many emanating from Hollywood.369  This success 
would lead Katz to brag: “Columbus discovered America, but I discovered 
Hollywood.”370  
Because J. Edgar Hoover, who was not a fan of the HUAC, doled out FBI 
information sparingly, in all probably Committee investigators had only the faintest 
idea of the strong connection between the Eisler brothers and the Katz-Munzenberg 
organization in the United States.  The HUAC archives show that the FBI did not 
share its file on Otto Katz, which ran some 780 pages long.  Katz’ name appeared 
only five times in printed hearing transcripts and reports by the HUAC.  His name
came up four times in 1947 in testimony and once in 1950 when his former literary 
agent claimed Fifth Amendment privilege before the Committee.371  Committee files 
show that HUAC investigators had information that Katz and Gerhart Eisler knew 
each other and collaborated.  They knew Katz was a Comintern agent and that he had 
been active in Hollywood, but they had only the sketchiest of details.372  Thus, the 
Committee appears to have remained unaware of the very extensive connections 
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between the Eisler brothers, Bertolt Brecht, Otto Katz, and the Munzenberg Trust 
going back to the 1920s.  Nevertheless, during its investigations of Gerhart and Hanns 
Eisler, the Committee opted to focus much of its attention on their activities within or 
on behalf of front organizations and the Comintern.  The ultimate center of the 
HUAC’s attention was their propagandizing activities.   
 As it investigated Gerhart Eisler, Hanns Eisler, and Bertolt Brecht, the HUAC 
faced the reality that it did not have any direct physical evidence to prove that these 
men were members of the CPUSA or working under Party directives during their 
residency in the United States.  There was significant circumstantial proof that it 
would have been foolish to ignore and there was plenty of testimony from former 
Party members, such as Ruth Fischer, Louis Budenz, and Gerhart Eisler’s first wife, 
Hede Massing, who was a self-confessed former espionage agent for the NKVD.  
However, investigators could not produce a Party registration card or a registration 
roll upon which their names appeared.  Thus, an individual like Hanns Eisler would 
attempt (unconvincingly) to explain away the circumstantial evidence, i.e. the public
record of his pro-communist activities as found in the Party press, as being simply 
documentation of his anti-Nazi efforts.  When confronted with the testimony of 
former communists, those brought unwillingly before the HUAC would invariable 
respond with ad hominem attacks, labeling the ex-Party members as stool-pigeons, 
Judases, turncoats, etc., rather than answering the charges factually.373      
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The same difficulty in proving Party membership held true of many of those 
that Committee investigators believed to be under Party discipline.  There was a lack 
of documentary evidence of de jure membership in the CPUSA.  This presented a real 
problem for the Committee.  It had circumstantial evidence, as well as the tes imony 
of non-communists and former communists, that pointed to the likelihood of 
significant communist infiltration into the motion picture industry.  The HUAC could 
not overlook the obvious link between Gerhart and Hanns Eisler with a number of 
Hollywood luminaries.  Serious allegations of Comintern connections and 
propagandizing of the movies made the issue impossible to ignore.  Yet if there was a 
subversive conspiracy, then there must be some criteria for membership in that plot.  
During the 1947 investigation, simple membership in the CPUSA proved itself a less 
than useful criterion.    
A better label for the Hollywood Ten might have been the Unlucky Ten.  It 
appears the reason the HUAC chose these ten men for testimony in October of 1947 
was that the Committee had documentary evidence of their Party membership in the 
form of their communist Party registration cards.374  (Unfortunately, the HUAC 
archives do not indicate how the Committee obtained copies of those cards.)  Given 
the professional and political record of the Hollywood Ten, one could not say with 
consistency that the criteria for selection were their importance in the CPUSA, their 
significant success in the motion picture industry, or their high degree of activity in 
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front organizations.  Certainly screenwriters John Howard Lawson, Dalton Trumbo 
and Albert Maltz were not only successful screenwriters, but also relatively important 
Party figures.  Lester Cole and Ring Lardner, Jr., also screenwriters, had gaine  a 
high degree of success in the industry, but they appeared to have focused much of 
their political activities in front organizations rather than Party organizing.  Director 
Edward Dmytryk and producer Adrian Scott were young up-and-comers and, though 
successful, did not have nearly the professional track record of the aforementioned.  
Moreover, their participation in the Party was marginal and by the time of the 
Hollywood probe Dmytryk had dropped out.  Screenwriters Hebert Biberman, 
Samuel Ornitz and Alvah Bessie were loyal CPUSA members, but not Party 
heavyweights.  Professionally, they enjoyed minor careers, although at the time of the 
1947 Hollywood probe, Bessie showed promise of greater accomplishments in the 
future.   
The point is that the one thing these ten held in common was that the HUAC 
had documentary evidence of their Party membership.  There were many other very 
prolific Hollywood communists, who were at least as important to the communist 
movement and perhaps more so, than at least half of the Hollywood Ten.  Such 
individuals would include Donald Ogden Stewart, Dorothy Parker, John Wexler, 
Lillian Hellman, Robert Rossen, Lewis Milestone and Joseph Losey.  Of course, the 
difficulty the Committee faced was the lack of written or printed evidence attesting to 
official Party membership.  The only alternative was the process of questioning 
witnesses under oath about their Party membership and that of others.  The HUAC 




which was very different than membership in other political parties.  To understand 
the extent of the Committee’s predicament, one must understand the characteristics 
and function of Party membership.   
During the 1940s and the 1950s, there were two opposing views about what it 
meant to be a member of the Communist Party.  One held that communists were 
radical, but benign.  They may have foolishly and idealistically believed in the Soviet 
experiment, but they were loyal Americans at heart and they were most concerned 
with issues such as civil rights and economic justice.  The other view held that, while 
individual communists might be naïve about the nature of the Party, as a whole the 
CPUSA sought the revolutionary overthrow of the American government or at a 
minimum served the policy interests of a foreign enemy.  Proponents of this 
perspective argued that, although communists had toned down their rhetoric of the 
Popular Front era, this was simply a short-term tactic of expediency.  Thus, this view 
held that the CPUSA was a subversive and conspiratorial organization and its cadre 
and senior leadership were likely to be disloyal to their country.   
These two perspectives have found resonance in two competing allegories 
about the nature of individual participation in the communist movement offered by 
two of the great artists of the Twentieth Century.  Playwright Arthur Miller and 
filmmaker Elia Kazan were both friends and one-time communists.  Their divergent 
artistic visions of the truth reflected the disputed perspectives of the nature of 
American communism.   
Arthur Miller argued there was no subversive communist threat.  His 




Miller only thinly veiled his metaphors.  There were no real witches in Salem, just 
mere mortals engaged in very human pursuits – illicit sex, revenge, and self-
preservation.  The denunciations of witchcraft were motivated for personal reasons, 
paranoia and religious (read ideological) fanaticism and combined with a rigid 
worldview to produce a societal hysteria leading to the prosecution and persecution of 
innocents.  The outcome was temporary social insanity, destroyed relationships, 
ruined lives and death.375  The Salem witch was a metaphor for the American 
communist and the Seventeenth Century witch-hunts for the efforts of 
“McCarthyists” to root out this imagined devious evil-doer called a communist from 
all important sectors of American society.   
Certainly Miller admitted that there were Communists in America in the 
1940s and 1950s.  However, they were not witches deserving of “a veritable holy 
terror,” first by the Truman Administration, then by the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC), and finally by McCarthy and his sympathizers.  Why 
then the witch-hunt?  Miller argued that the justification for this fanatical pogrom was 
“the politics of alien conspiracy.”  This was the real charge of witchcraft, implied 
Miller, not that there were communists, but that these radicals were in fact tre sonous 
agents of a Soviet plot, whose first success had been to infiltrate the State Department 
and allow the United States to “lose China.”  Such logic, Miller asserted, was similar 
to that at Salem centuries before.  It was “so magical, so paranoid” that it crushed “all 
nuance, all the shadings that a realistic judgment of reality requires.”  Furthermore, 
the personal and ideological desires of conservatives to take back the political ground 
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lost during Roosevelt’s New Deal were what ultimately motivated the witch-hunt.376  
Miller’s belief was that those who testified before the HUAC and “named names” of 
others as being communists were guilty of the dishonor of participating in the 
immoral witch-hunt merely to preserve their careers.   
 An alternate and competing allegory came from Elia Kazan in the film On the 
Waterfront.  According to Mr. Kazan’s film, there really were witches or in the case 
of his narrative, agents of organized crime, who had infiltrated and corrupted a 
longshoreman’s union.  Racketeers, like witches, and by implication communists, can 
only engage in conspiracy through the power of secrecy.  The criminal conspiracy of 
the unionists in On the Waterfront included bribery, fraud, extortion, and murder.  
The self-defensive practice of rank and file union members was to remain “d & d” – 
deaf and dumb – out of fear of retribution from the union bosses.  This silence 
constituted the essential element that maintained the status quo and kept the corrupt 
union leaders in power.  Anyone who spoke up for the truth met an untimely 
“accidental” death.   
The parallel that the audience was supposed to read into the film is that the 
CPUSA was a criminal organization bent on subverting the law of the land.  It 
received a great deal of its power through its ability to maintain secrecy a ound a 
number of its activities.  In Kazan’s movie, the character of Terry Malloy, pla ed by 
Marlon Brando, was a minor member of the criminal conspiracy, who allowed his 
conscience to prod him into cooperating with a government task force investigating 
union corruption.  He did this even though he knew this was not in his own personal 
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best interest, but rather the right thing to do.  The character of Malloy was a metaphor 
for those former communists who had a change of conscience caused by a new 
awareness of the true nature of the conspiracy in which they had hitherto participated.  
They, therefore, willingly cooperated with the United States government as a matter 
of conscience in order to reveal the details of that conspiracy, including identifying 
the individuals involved, i.e. “naming names.”   
 As a central cinematic metaphor in his film, Kazan used carrier pigeons, 
which are owned by a character who was murdered at the very beginning of the story 
for informing on the mob.  In recognizing his partial responsibility for this murder, 
however unintentional on his part, Terry Malloy opted to take care of the dead man’s 
coop full of pigeons.  Toward the end of the film, an unknown mobster killed the 
entire flock of pigeons in an effort to punish Malloy for becoming a “stool-pigeon.”  
Kazan seemed to say those who named names did not do so simply to save their own 
necks, but in fact encountered their own form of suffering for doing what they felt 
was right and honorable. 
Thus, in contrast to Miller’s The Crucible, Kazan offered a very different 
interpretational allegory of the events of the era and a moral justification for the 
actions of those who named names.  Interestingly enough, an ex-communist HUAC 
informer named Budd Schulberg wrote the screenplay for On the Waterfront.  Elia 
Kazan, who had named names as well, directed the film.  In addition, a HUAC 
informer, Lee J. Cobb, played the film’s arch villain, the character of the union boss 
Johnny Friendly.  Furthermore, it was Kazan’s testimony before the HUAC that 




between himself and Arthur Miller.  Thus, the conduct, relationships and artistic 
achievements of Miller and Kazan throw into sharp relief both the conflicting 
worldviews and personal tragedies of the times.   
The problem with both of these allegories is that neither accurately reflected 
the complex organizational nature of the CPUSA.  In one sense, both Miller and 
Kazan were correct in their descriptions of the Party, but each was accurate only 
insofar as it portrayed a unique and discrete aspect of the CPUSA, which was in 
reality a very complex organization.  In newly available testimony, screenwriter 
Richard Collins noted in 1951, “The Communist Party operates on so many levels.  
There is a sweet level for the sweet folk and a harsher level for the harsher folk.”377  
When describing the organization as a whole, both Miller’s and Kazan’s depictions 
are insufficient and misleading.  Writing long before the declassification of the 
Venona decryptions and the opening of the archives in the former Soviet Union, 
Miller was simply wrong about the “alien conspiracy.”  There really was an element 
of the CPUSA that engaged itself in espionage and was profoundly disloyal to the 
United States.  Likewise, Kazan’s allegory failed to distinguish accurtely between 
what the rank and file members of the CPUSA were likely to have known and what 
the cadre and senior leadership knew.  In Kazan’s movie, the rank and file union 
members clearly know their leadership is corrupt, but keep silent out of fear.  Thereis 
no credible evidence that this was the case in the CPUSA.  The overwhelming 
majority of rank and file CPUSA members joined, served, and left the Party with no 
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awareness of the organization as a criminal conspiracy.  Nevertheless, these two 
perspectives have dominated the political and historical discussion of the era, 
generating no small amount of invective and mistrust.   
A broad reading of recent scholarship, drawing upon the Venona decryption 
and archives in the former Soviet Union, as well as this research on the HUAC, 
indicates that there were at least five ways in which an individual might have had 
affiliation with the Party.  They were public rank and file membership, public cadre 
and leadership, secret formal members, secret informal members, and members 
secretly operating in the service of the Comintern or a Soviet security agency.  
Because of the last three categories, the HUAC found that probing alleged communist 
subversion with the relatively meager resources of a congressional investigative 
committee was a difficult challenge indeed.  This was because members in thee last 
three categories were the ones most likely to engage in subversive activities.  It is 
appropriate to consider a more detailed explanation of these membership categories.     
One could simply sign up and become an open, rank and file, dues-paying, 
public member of the CPUSA with both the Party and the member retaining a copyof 
a registration card and a membership book.  There were tens of thousands of such 
people on the Party rolls during the 1930s and 1940s during the Popular Front when 
membership was most popular.  In essence, this is the group that Miller had in mind 
in The Crucible.  Most joined out of noble aspirations in order to make a better world 
and/or out of despair that the Great Depression spelled the end of the capitalist 
system.  Richard Collins put it this way: 
When I came into the Party the anti-discrimination part 




the rights of Negroes, Jews and other minorities, the 
trade union policy of the Party and its willingness to 
organize the unorganized, the struggles, in other words, 
for living conditions, unemployed and so forth, social 
security, all of these were reasonable in terms of the 
United States.  And especially in that period, in the 
thirties, because there were still many people who were 
ill-housed, ill-fed and ill-clothed and there was a great 
deal of discrimination as far as Negroes were 
concerned, particularly.378 
Thus, rank and file members raised money for famine relief, marched for civil rights, 
sought better health care for marginalized parts of the citizenry, etc.  They never spied 
for Moscow nor did they encounter any espionage activity within the Party.  They 
never engaged in any subversive or revolutionary activity.   
The tenure of rank and file members in the Party was relatively short and the 
CPUSA had a high turnover rate in its membership.379  This was often the result of 
the unwillingness to endure endless, boring Party meetings or read mind-numbing 
tomes on Marxist-Leninist theory.  Clifford Odets testified in executive session that, 
although the Party expected its members to familiarize themselves with Marxist 
literature, he “found it pretty rough going” and in the end he did not do any 
significant degree of studying it.380  The Party’s undemocratic internal nature also 
drove some members away.  Moreover, the rank and file abandoned the CPUSA en 
masse each time it made one of its abrupt shifts in Party line, such as after the Stalin-
Hitler Pact in 1939, when the Duclos letter led to overthrow Browder in 1945, the 
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Party’s support of Wallace in 1948, etc.381  International events involving 
communism also tended to have a strongly negative impact on Party membership.  
Examples of these include the 1950’s outbreak of the Korean War, and in 1956 both 
the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Khrushchev’s secret speech to the Twentieth 
Party Congress in which he outlined Stalin’s crimes against the CPSU.  One must 
remember that the HUAC’s Hollywood files indicate that the Committee had little to 
no interest in investigating rank and file members.     
If one had a high level of commitment to the Party’s goals and was willing to 
make personal sacrifices for the good of the movement, one might find oneself 
promoted from the rank and file into the Party’s cadre and eventually to a possible 
public leadership position.  Generally speaking, these people tended to be “true 
believers” in communism as a solution to mankind’s problems as a whole and not 
simply individuals concerned about specific issues.  The twists and turns of Party line 
tended not to shake their faith in the cause.382  However, many Hollywood 
professionals testified that events such as the Stalin-Hitler Pact or the Duclos letter 
began a process that eventually led them to leave the Party. 
Most of the officers of the CPUSA – Earl Browder, William Z. Foster, Eugene 
Dennis, etc. – operated out of necessity in the open as the public leadership of the 
legal Party.  The legal and public side of the CPUSA was necessary for numerous 
reasons, not the least of which was to help obscure and service its covert, 
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underground operations.383  This legal, public sector of the CPUSA also served as a 
means of transmitting instructions to front organizations and for articulating the 
official policy positions of the movement, which were ultimately a reflection of or 
compatible with the views of the Soviet Union.  
Yet, there was also a clandestine element of the Party of which many former 
communist cadres attested in executive session hearings before the HUAC, although 
rank and file members of the CPUSA would rarely, if ever, gain a glimpse of this 
aspect of the Party.  At the time Arthur Miller wrote The Crucible one could deny the 
existence of a conspiracy amongst American communists with intellectual credibility.  
However, recent scholarship by post-revisionist historians has shown that the fact 
there was such an underground sector of the CPUSA is indisputable.384  The newly 
unsealed executive session transcripts seem to indicate that secret CPUSA
membership fell into two categories: those with formal membership and those with an 
informal affiliation.   
Secret formal members typically joined the Party under a false, “Party n me.”  
They might have a registration card and membership book, they might pay Party dues 
and read the Daily Worker, but there was sometimes no written record of this 
affiliation with their real, legal name.  This allowed for a high degree of anonymity.  
Actor Sterling Hayden testified that the participants of CPUSA cell meetings he 
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attended referred to each other only by their first names or simply as ‘comrade.’385  
Discretion was more important than accurate record-keeping.  Screenwriter Richard 
Collins told HUAC investigators that when he collected Party dues at cell me tings, 
he did not keep any records of who gave and how much they gave.386 
If one believes the testimony of numerous ex-communists, there existed also 
secret, but informal members, who did not register with the Party under their own 
name or a false name.  They apparently never filled out any paperwork at all to join 
the Party.  Thus, there was no documentary record of their membership.  Affiliation 
was informal and verbal.  Secret informal membership was allegedly the preferred 
status of well-known persons in American society who were reluctant to be identified 
as a communist or whose usefulness to the Party would be diminished by such public 
awareness.  In fact, the CPUSA might refuse initial membership to such a hig profile 
individual, who one might call in today’s terminology an opinion leader.  This was 
because under the guise of a non-communist that an individual could pose to the 
broader public as a reasonable person, whose views demonstrated the compatibility of 
independent non-communists and communists.   
If Party leaders refused to allow such an individual to join the Party in the first 
place, there existed no official record of that person as a communist.  He or she could 
then, in addition, serve as a “non-communist” in a leadership position of a communist 
front organization, union or guild.  This made such organizations appear as if they 
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were independent and not dominated by communists.  Thus, cultural luminaries and 
celebrities could protect their public persona and trade union leaders could hide their 
Party affiliations and yet help discretely guide the organizations in which t ey 
operated toward policies that reflected the goals of the CPUSA.   
Because of their desire to appear independent and unaffiliated, secret 
communists rarely spoke openly, even to other communists, about their real views.  
Willi Munzenberg’s widow, Babette Gross, and herself a one-time dedicate Stalinist, 
offered the following “litany” that the secret Party member would typically espouse 
in the 1930s and 1940s in order to function effectively in a front organization: 
You do not endorse Stalin.  You do not call yourself a 
communist. You do not declare your love for the 
regime.  You do not call on people to support the 
Soviets.  Ever.  Under any circumstances.  You claim to 
be an independent-minded idealist.  You don’t really 
understand politics, but you think the little guy is 
getting a lousy break.  You believe in open-mindedness.  
You are shocked, frightened by what is going on right 
here in our own country.  You are frightened by racism, 
by the oppression of the workingman.  You think the 
Russians are trying a great human experiment, and you 
hope it works.  You believe in peace.  You yearn for 
international understanding.  You hate fascism.  You 
think the capitalist system is corrupt.  You say it over 
and over and over again.  You say nothing, nothing 
more.387 
The question then arises: if one is a secret informal communist who never 
advocates the Party line, then what qualified them for the label of “communist?”  The 
defining characteristic here is control: was the individual willing to submit to the 
authority of the Party?  Budenz asserted: “There are many people today…who accept 
Communist discipline or are members of the Communist movement, but have no 
                                                




vestiges of membership because that is the policy of the Communist Party.”388  Time 
and again during executive session testimony, when asked whether such-and-such a 
person was a member of the Party, the answer would come back something to the 
effect: ‘I understood him (or her) to be subject to Party discipline.’  Yet Party 
discipline is an abstraction, difficult to prove and based entirely on the perception that 
one’s actions consistently served CPUSA.   
One could have a leadership position within the Party and yet be a secret 
member with no public Party affiliations.  Budenz testified he was for six years 
publicly a member of the CPUSA’s National Committee, the equivalent of the 
CPSU’s Central Committee, but held secret membership in it for an additional three 
years.389  Also, one might hold a Party post under a “Party name,” rather than a legal 
name, even if one’s registration was under a real name.  There were members of th  
CPUSA’s National Committee who did not know the real, legal names of some of 
their comrades also serving on that body.390   
Communist practice got even more confusing, and intentionally so, in order to 
throw off investigators.  An individual could have once been a formal member, but 
then dropped out of the Party in order to go undercover.  In the case of many 
communist émigrés, such as the Eislers brothers, Bertolt Brecht, Salka Viertel, 
Vladimir Pozner, and others, once they came to the United States, they kept their 
previous communist affiliations quiet and did not publicly join the American 
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communist movement.  In any event, it was the established practice that Party 
members who engaged in underground work, such as espionage, should operate as 
secret members, maintain a distance from the legal Party apparatus, avoid Party 
meetings, and limit interaction with ordinary members.  Ideally, it should be 
exceedingly difficult for the casual observer to deduct the political loyalties of a 
secret member. 
It is at this point that great confusion resulted during the HUAC’s Hollywood 
investigations.   Often former Party officials, such as Louis Budenz, Paul Cro ch, or 
Max Silver, testified about individuals they firmly believed were communists.  
However, since most celebrities sympathetic to the communist cause sought to keep 
their association with the Party discrete, the Committee found it exceedingly difficult 
to obtain confirmation for that testimony.  Apparently, the CPUSA too was 
exceptionally eager to protect high profile motion picture professionals from any 
exposure of overt association with the communist movement.  Based on the pattern of 
questioning of numerous witnesses in executive session, the HUAC apparently 
established a criterion for witnesses to designate someone else as a communist.  That 
criterion was that the witness had to have been present with the person being named 
as a communist in a meeting that was recognized as a closed Party meeting.   
An example of the necessity of such a criterion arose from the testimony of 
Paul Crouch, a former communist organizer in Alabama and editor of a communist 
magazine entitled The New South.  Crouch testified that in 1939 during a fund raising 
effort, the CPUSA’s cultural commissar, V. J. Jerome, gave him a list of Hollywood 




addresses and private, unlisted telephone numbers.  Crouch testified that the names 
included John Howard Lawson, Sylvia Sidney, Clifford Odets, Humphrey Bogart and 
James Cagney.  Jerome indicated that Crouch should in particular approach Edward 
G. Robinson and Charlie Chaplin with special care and quote Jerome’s name when 
making the call.  Crouch asserted that in most cases, celebrities such as these mad  
contributions directly to the national Party and did not go through local or state Party 
organizations.  The national leadership rarely allowed local Party officials to 
approach such luminaries directly and, in order to do so, one had to get permission 
from the very top of the national organization.391  Although Jerome did not explicitly 
tell Crouch the individuals on the list were CPUSA members, Jerome did supposedly 
tell Crouch that they were financial contributors to the Party.392  When the HUAC 
called Jerome to testify in order to verify Crouch’s story, he alternatively all ged that 
he could not remember or claimed Fifth Amendment privilege.  Although Jerome said 
he wanted to be helpful to the Committee, he disclosed no useful information.393   
Leaving aside the case of John Howard Lawson, for whom the HUAC had 
independent documentary corroboration of his Party membership, the Committee 
investigators knew that Crouch’s testimony did not mean that any of those on 
Crouch’s list were Party members or had even contributed directly to the Party’s 
national office.  Crouch never witnessed those contributions or saw physical evidenc 
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of them, such as a canceled check or a receipt.  All Crouch had was the word of V. J. 
Jerome, who might have been bragging about access to celebrities, and this 
constituted hearsay of a conversation that occurred twelve years previously.  Cagney 
and Robinson had already admitted to giving donations to several fronts before they 
realized the organizations had communist connections.  In the absence of any 
documentary evidence, there was no way of proving otherwise.394  Robinson 
adamantly denied Party membership “or anything that smacked of communism.”395  
He offered to submit his financial records for the previous ten years for the 
Committee’s inspection.  Ultimately, this line of investigation came to nothing.  The 
HUAC never called Chaplin, Cagney, or Bogart.  Contrary to popular belief, 
Robinson appeared at his own request in order to clear the record, because his “good 
name has been besmirched and dragged through the mire by a lot of wicked, 
irresponsible people, by hearsay, gossip, innuendo, and unsubstantiated charges.”  He 
did not say who those people were, but he specifically indicated he did not mean the 
Committee members, whom he called “wonderful.” 396  
The probable main reason that the HUAC never subpoenaed these stars was 
this on-going phenomenon of conflicting testimony.  Besides Crouch, other witnesses 
had brought up Charlie Chaplin’s name.  For example, Hede Massing, Gerhart 
Eisler’s first wife, told the Committee that Hanns and Louisa Eisler “wee v ry 
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friendly with the Chaplins.”397  Certainly testimony of any direct connection with one 
of the Eislers would raise an alarm with investigators.  Yet, it was a dead end.  
Screenwriter Richard Collins, a Party member for over a decade and very active in 
the Hollywood section, told the Committee that with regard to Charlie Chaplin: “[I]n 
my experience he was not in [the Party as a member], and not only was he not in but 
they were always a little unhappy with him….Because he was always such an 
individualistic fellow and they never could quite know what he was going to do next.  
You know, I know he is supposed to be the big Red and all that, but in my experience 
this was not true.”398 
Thus, the HUAC learned nothing of certainty about either secret Party 
membership or clandestine contributions.  It represented one of the many 
investigative cul-de-sacs when it came to accurately naming names.  This was 
symptomatic of the problem in general of obtaining names of secret Party members.  
Investigators had to rely on the perceptions of witnesses, who did not necessarily see 
documentation of membership.  Witnesses had to recollect conversations and events 
occurring years and even decades earlier.  Numerous times witnesses had difficulty 
recollecting if they had seen a certain individual at an actual Party meeting or in some 
other context where Party members might have been present with non-communists.  
Finally, the Committee had to deal with the on-going problem of hearsay. 
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Thus, the HUAC faced the dilemma of ascertaining the Party membership of 
celebrities and motion picture professionals.  Unless investigators could, through the 
testimony of witnesses, accurately place such an individual at a formal Party meeting, 
certitude of Party membership was impossible.  However, secret Party members wer  
unlikely to attend open meetings.  Thus, it appears that the HUAC investigators 
discovered over time that placing emphasis on formal membership in the CPUSA was 
actually in many ways, if one will pardon the expression, a red-herring.   
Secret Party membership was just one example of how the CPUSA simply did 
not function in the same manner as conventional political parties in the United Stats.  
The Party did seek to operate within the mainstream of American politics from the 
Popular Front era through to the Wallace candidacy for president under the 
Progressive Party banner.  To that end, as a tactical step, the CPUSA deemphasized 
its revolutionary rhetoric and stressed those parts of its program likely to resonate 
with the American public.  By and large, with the exception of 1939-1941 during the 
Stalin-Hitler Pact, this reflected the strategy of the Soviets to form a broad coalition 
of alliance with the West against Nazi Germany.  After the defeat of the latter in 
World War II, that coalition quickly broke down and the foundational aspiration of 
the CPUSA reemerged into the forefront, namely the revolutionary overthrow of both 
the American economic and political systems.   
Because of this, even during the Popular Front years, the CPUSA did not 
deviate from its practice of organizing itself into cells.  Furthermore, Party members 
in the Hollywood branch maintained a high degree of discretion in terms of where 




headquarters or at a meeting room rented from the local Elks Lodge or VFW post.  
Many ex-communists testified that cells would consistently hold meetings in private 
homes.  For example, character actor Marc Lawrence testified that the meetings he 
attended were at the homes of fellow actors J. Edward Bromberg, Karen Morley and 
Morris Carnovsky.399  Sterling Hayden told the HUAC that his CPUSA cell held its 
meetings in a different house just about every week.  He would get a call the same 
day as the meeting telling him where the meeting would take place.400  This practice 
apparently existed outside of Hollywood.  Budenz asserted that beginning in 1939 it 
became standard practice for Party leaders to hold meetings with union leaders who 
were secret communists in apartment houses rather than at Party headquarters.401  
This made it even harder for ex-communists to testify about broader Party 
membership, because they likely only knew the dozen or so individuals in their cell.  
Moreover, they might only know them by their Party names and, unless they knew 
them in other professional or social capacity, they could remain ignorant of their true 
identities.    
Screenwriter Richard Collins testified as to how segmented and separated the 
various cells in the Hollywood Party really were.  One would know those in one’s 
own Party group as being members of the CPUSA, but would likely remain ignorant 
of those outside one’s own cell.  Moreover, members of the same cell tended to work 
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together as a group within fronts.402  Thus, Collins knew Albert Maltz, Samuel Orniz, 
Abe Polonsky, Gordon Kahn, Robert Rossen, J. Edward Bromberg, Arnold Manoff, 
Waldo Salt, Paul Jarrico, Frank Tuttle, and John Howard Lawson were members of 
the CPUSA.  Yet he was unaware of the Party affiliation of many other prominent 
communists, such as Lillian Hellman, John Garfield, Howard DaSilva, Francis 
Faragoh, John Wexler, Sidney Bruchman, Gale Sondergaard, Jules Dassen, Jack 
Berry, Michael Blankfort, Edward Dmytryk, Adrian Scott, and Dalton Trumbo.  The 
last three men were notable enough to be members of the Hollywood Ten.   
At one point, when responding to a list of names cited by Wheeler, Collins 
asserts: “You’ve got guys in here who are way, way off….By off I mean not o ly that 
they weren’t in the Party, but that they were really kind of conservative men.”  The 
HUAC’s West coast investigator, William Wheeler, responded: “I am just reading 
names of people who are in front organizations.  Their names are not going to be 
mentioned when you are in Washington.  I’m just getting a negative answer.”  
Collins’ attorney, Martin Gang, chimed in: 
Understand that a lot of these questions that are asked, 
they have informants, people who write letters and stuff 
like that, and all they are doing is checking off, because 
part of the process is not only to find people who 
should be known but people who shouldn’t be called.  
For example, if an informer puts Dr. Harlow Shapely 
in, for example, they check with a lot of people and 
they get ten, twenty or thirty people who didn’t know 
him to be a member of the Communist Party, they 
wouldn’t call him.403   
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Wheeler remained silent about Gang’s assertion.  However, if the HUAC’s archival 
files are complete enough to give a true picture of how the Committee operated, then 
Gang was wrong about informants and people writing letters.  Investigators appear to 
have been operating from lists of names culled from data about front organizations.  
As the information presented in Chapter Five indicated, this data came primarily from 
the communist press and material published by the front organizations themselves.  
Nevertheless, this exchange does show that the Committee sought multiple 
confirmations of an individual’s communist affiliations before issuing that person a 
subpoena.   
 Although the HUAC never stated this as a reason for its policy of asking 
witnesses to name names, the process did have the advantage (from the anti-
communist perspective) of preventing the person named from conducting subversive 
activity in the future or working for a front activity under the guise of a non-
communist.  That person could no longer work anonymously in pursuit of Party 
policy goals.  Furthermore, the person doing the naming was never again suitable for 
conspiratorial activity, should he or she eventually rejoin the CPUSA.  In other 
words, the process of having witnesses name the names of other individuals he or she 
knew to be communists represented an effective tool to blunt the Party’s ability to 
make effective use of secret members and engage in alleged conspiratorial activity.  
However, this appears to be a byproduct of the HUAC’s procedural policy.   
 At a minimum, the HUAC did not believe that asking witnesses to name the 
names of those individuals whom they knew to be members of the CPUSA was 




not believe it befits this committee or its purposes to force me to do this….I don’t 
think it is in the spirit of real Americanism….These are not people that are a danger 
to this country, gentlemen, the people that I knew.  These are people like myself.”  He 
asserted his belief that the American people did not consider it “honest, just, and in 
the spirit of fair play.”404 Chairman Wood replied simply, “Nobody on this 
Committee has any desire to smear the name of anybody.  That isn’t of benefitto this 
committee in the discharge of its duties….I think all of the American people who 
have viewed the work of the Committee dispassionately and impartially will agree 
with that.”405  In any event, with its only other significant source of information being 
its on-going survey of the communist press, it appears that the HUAC had little 
choice but to seek such information from witnesses if it were to fulfill what it 
interpreted its mandate to be.    
What the evidence appears to indicate is that the Committee insisted on the 
process of naming of names for several reasons.  First, it gave the HUAC an idea of 
the scope of Party membership in the motion picture industry.  Second, it supported 
the Committee’s mandate of exposure of subversion; naming names was a form of 
exposure.  Third, naming names by multiple witnesses over time was an exercise in 
triangulation in an effort to improve accuracy, which the HUAC found necessary 
because of the unreliable nature of individual testimony.  This is a contrarian 
hypothesis that offers an alternative explanation to those who assert that the 
Committee’s practice was a deliberate ritual in humiliation that was totally 
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unnecessary since the HUAC already knew who was and was not a communist.  
Fourth, as Wheeler indicated in response to Collins, investigators used the exercise of 
naming names as a process of elimination, removing unnecessary names from its lists 
as opposed to adding names through ritual denunciations.  Fifth and perhaps most 
importantly, by drawing from lists of front organizations, the Committee used the 
process of naming names to determine the degree to which communists had infiltrated 
those organizations. 
In fact, as HUAC efforts to obtain names from witnesses showed evidence on 
increasingly diminishing returns, attempts to investigate the activities of communist 
fronts appeared much more promising.  A broad reading of testimony offered in both 
executive session and public session reveals several significant features of th  
Hollywood investigations that historians, absorbed by the HUAC’s controversial 
practice of having witnesses name names, have overlooked to this point.  This 
circumstance might be because of the fact that until recently executive session 
testimony was unavailable for scholarly research.  First, the Committee’s 
investigatory focus changed from the 1947 probe to the 1951-1952 inquiry.  In 1947, 
with the Eisler investigations still fresh, the HUAC essentially worried about three 
things: Comintern connections, Party membership, and possible propaganda in 
specific films.   
By 1951-1952, however, the Committee’s concerns had changed significantly.  
Executive session transcripts from these years show that the HUAC wanted to 
understand the conduct of Party business at the local level, as well as how 




the degree to which the Hollywood branch interacted with county and state Party 
leaders, as opposed to dealing directly with the national office.  Interest in 
propaganda attempt of individual films had nearly evaporated and investigators had 
refocused their attention to how front organizations furthered the CPUSA’s 
propaganda efforts more generally.  Certainly, the Committee still des re  to obtain 
information about which Hollywood professionals were members of the Party.  
However, not only was this not the only focus of the executive sessions, it was 
arguably not the main focus.   
Simply put, the HUAC wanted to know about communist fronts: why did the 
witnesses join?  Who was in charge of the front?  What were the objectives of the 
front?  Why did the witness participate in a particular front activity?  Often questions 
about CPUSA membership were related to fronts: was such-and-such a member of a 
front’s board also a member of the Party?  Contrary to the emphasis historians have 
placed on the significance of the HUAC practice of naming names, a comprehensive 
reading of the executive session testimony of 1951-1952 indicates that the Committee 
was at least as interested in communist fronts as it was in verifying names as 
members.   
Hollywood offered the CPUSA a ready pool of “joiners,” who served as 
patrons of numerous communist fronts, lending them the prestige of their names.  
This is perhaps a key reason why the CPUSA went to great lengths to infiltrate the 
motion picture business and court sympathetic Hollywood insiders.  As Richard 




that if there was anything to join I probably joined it.”406  In fact, Collins had joined 
so many fronts over the years that he could not remember the objectives of all the 
organizations.  Besides the typical reasons cited for joining such organizations, such 
as the desire to contribute to advance civil rights or give assistance to the poor, there 
was another interesting motivation for becoming a joiner: the idea of Hollywood 
guilt.  One could define this as a sense of shame for making large amounts of money 
in a profession often considered trivial, while others during the Great Depression and 
World War II experienced great suffering.  As actor Sterling Hayden told the 
Committee, “…I was becoming extremely interested in…doing something 
constructive in addition to simply hauling down a good pay check as an actor.  It 
occurred to me that by working as an actor, and at the same time taking an interest i  
what I considered to be the underdog, I could justify in my own mind the very 
lucrative contract that I had in Hollywood.”407   
However, Michael Blankfort appeared to articulate the more mainstream view 
when he argued that the communists were superb at identifying a worthy cause worth 
the support of the American people, such as advocating for civil rights and 
unemployment insurance or resisting Nazism.  Communists would then form an 
organization in support of such a cause, then they would move in and surreptitiously 
take over the group in an effort to use the organization to further communist Party 
goals.  People joined because they supported the stated goals of the organization, not 
realizing the Party members dominating the group’s leadership would exploit the 
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front and pervert it to achieve their own ends.408  When they do this, Blankfort 
believed, the organization eventually but inevitably died or split up.  Ultimately, “the 
people they would influence leave” and the organization withers into 
insignificance.409   
Irrespective of why individuals joined, the HUAC wanted to know about the 
leadership, organizational goals and internal operations of fronts.  Contrary to the 
belief of some, it appeared that the Committee was not after liberal or left-leaning 
organizations in general.  As William Wheeler told Abe Burrows during the latt r’s 
executive session testimony, “I might say that all this material here, w  have it also, 
but we have eliminated some of it because they were organizations we did not 
consider important.  We are mostly interested in organizations that are cited fronts.”  
In fact, the only organizations Wheeler questioned Burrows about were the ones 
previously cited as fronts on the Attorney General’s list of subversive 
organizations.410   
Wheeler gave a clue as to why the HUAC was so keen to investigate fronts.  
He appeared to indicate that the act of exposing an organization was key to its 
demise: 
Over the course of years there has been [sic] consistent 
fellow travelers or dupes or Party line followers who 
have belonged to these fronts.  It is true that the fronts 
cease to exist after a period of time but if you check the 
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membership and the officers of these fronts you will see 
a consistent pattern, and the reason that these fronts 
change their name is that they get exposed and 
neutralized, and when they are exposed and neutralized 
they are of no further use.  But there have been a lot of 
important men in the United States who have followed 
this pattern for a period of a great many years.411   
Critics have charged that the HUAC used membership in a front organization 
as a method of smearing an innocent individual with a charge of Party membership.  
The documentary evidence, at least as far as the Hollywood files indicate, does not 
support this assertion.  Certainly investigators were aware that in general terms that 
the more front organizations an individual had joined, the more likely it was that 
person held Party membership.  Nevertheless, during testimony of Richard Collins it 
was clear that investigators sought the screenwriter’s help in deciphering which 
members of leadership of the Writer’s Congress were in the Party and which were 
not.  With a court reporter present transcribing the testimony, HUAC investigator 
William Wheeler did not even want Collins to read aloud the list of names of the 
front’s leadership, but instead only say a name if Collins recognized that person as a 
Party member.  As Wheeler put it, “There are a lot of people there whose names 
shouldn’t be in the record.”412  
In a democratic society in which economic and especially political change 
was highly unlikely through revolution, the HUAC believed front organizations 
provided a means for the CPUSA to exercise more influence than it otherwise would 
operating solely as a political party.  Committee investigator William Wheeler 
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appeared to indicate that the HUAC believed “the Communist Party gains its power 
through its fronts rather than the main hard core of the Communist Party itself….In 
other words, as opposed to the power or influence of the Communist Party as such, 
the power or influence exerted through non-Communist Party organizations has been 
much greater….”413   
In essence, front organizations amplified the voice of the Party, giving it an 
audience greater than it otherwise would have.  Known within the communist 
movement as “transmission belts,” fronts had the advantage of an ability to “advance 
the Party’s program far more effectively than the Party itself since they do not carry 
an open communist stigma.”414  This ability to influence policy debates and influence 
public opinion toward a particular goal came to the HUAC’s attention during the 80th 
Congress.  Robert Stripling noted an incident that occurred when the Senate Judiciary 
Committee announced about 4:00 p.m. one afternoon that it would hold hearings on 
the Nixon-Mundt bill.  By the next morning, 10,000 telegrams from various 
individuals and front organizations protesting the holding of such proceedings had 
already swamped the office of the committee’s chairman.  The effectiveness and 
speed of such a campaign amazed the HUAC staff.415  It appeared obvious to the 
                                                
413 “Blankfort Executive Session Testimony,” Box 15, Records of the 
Investigative Section, 37-38. 
414 Harvey Klehr, Far Left of Center: The American Radical Left Today (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990) 18.  Additionally, in executive session 
testimony, Budenz described the legal Party and its various publications as 
transmission belts between the underground element of the CPUSA that received its 
orders from Moscow and front organizations.  See “Budenz Executive Session 
Testimony,” Box 5, Records of the Investigative Section, 46. 




Committee that fronts exercised significant power on behalf of the CPUSA to sway 
public opinion and, therefore, should come under investigative scrutiny.   
The HUAC heard testimony in executive session that front organizations 
served to obscure the fact that the CPUSA was at work on an issue or in an area.  It 
provided camouflage for efforts to promote that party line.  The HUAC had reason to 
believe that one method Moscow used to convey the details of the line it wanted the 
CPUSA to take was through publications originating in the Soviet Union.  Louis 
Budenz told the Committee in 1948 that the publication called N w Times, which 
came as a supplement of the Soviet trade union magazine Trud, served as the 
disguised Comintern magazine.  He alleged that the Party’s leadership carefully read 
New Times, as the leadership and cadre around the country read Political Affairs and 
the Daily Worker, for clues as how to interpret and enact the current line.  In the case 
of the Daily Worker, editors and writers designed articles to attract a wide readership 
and yet offer subtly disguised directives in the form of editorials for a targeted f w 
around the country, such as CPUSA district organizers.  These fulltime Party workers 
would then mobilize action on particular issues as indicated by the editorials and try 
to generate public support around the Party’s position through the use of communist-
controlled unions and front organizations.416    
 The manner of control by the CPUSA of front organizations was similar to 
how the CPUSA worked to control unions.417  Membership might consist of a 
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minority of CPUSA members or, as in the case of the National Lawyers Guild, 
communists and non-communists might appear to work side by side within the 
organization.418  In fact, the communist membership might be a very small minority.  
In many cases, the less obvious the connection was between the CPUSA and the 
front, the better from the Party’s point of view.  Because the Party had a well-trained 
and disciplined fulltime cadre with experience in organizing, it had a good chance of 
controlling organizations where most of the officers and staff were unpaid.  The first 
object was to get Party members elected to the organization’s board in higher 
numbers than the proportion of Party members overall.  A communist majority on the 
board was not necessary, especially if there were also reliable fellow-travelers serving 
too.  This was possible by using the same techniques at board meetings as in general 
membership meetings.   
One such technique was to schedule meetings at inconvenient days/or times 
and then rely on Party members to turn out in mass while non-communists would 
have a high absentee rate.  Party members tended to be highly disciplined in terms of
attending every meeting expected of them.  Richard Collins testified that he attended 
an average of two Party meetings a week for eight years and three other meetings a 
week on behalf of the Party.  With no small irony, he said: “It takes a lot of time and 
energy to be a Communist.”419  Communists were also legendary for their willingness 
to stay to the bitter end of very long meetings.  Thus, the communist leadership would 
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work to insure that important measures appeared at the end of the agenda with voting 
taking place late in the evening, when many non-communists had left and gone home.  
Thus, by the end of the meeting, the minority had become the majority.420   
This process could be enhanced by getting a secret Party member elected or 
appointed to the senior staff position of the organization.  In other words, capture the 
highest position of that organization that ran its day-to-day affairs and, thus, control 
important factors, such as the flow of information, the creation of meeting agendas, 
etc.  For example, Margaret Maltz, who was a CPUSA member and the wife of 
Hollywood Ten screenwriter Albert Maltz, served as the administrator for the Sc ool 
for Writers, an entity run by the Hollywood branch of the American League of 
Writers.421  One of Hollywood’s most effective fronts during World War II was the 
Hollywood Writers’ Mobilization.  Richard Collins told the HUAC that the Party 
managed to have a communist functionary named Pauline Lauber appointed as 
executive secretary to the Mobilization.  She, therefore, essentially ran the day-to-day 
affairs of the organization.422  Screenwriter Leo Townsend confirmed that Lauber was 
a communist.423  In addition, the CPUSA sought to have a reliable communist, often a 
secret one, appointed as the editor of the front’s official newsletter or magazine.  This 
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technique was also used for the official publications of trade unions secretly 
dominated by the CPUSA.424 
 Clifford Odets testified about his disgust with an event in which secret 
communists within a front manipulated him for publicity purposes.  His story is 
highly illustrative of communist techniques within fronts, which entailed the 
manipulation of figurehead leaders by secret communists to achieve Party goals.  
Odets told the HUAC that someone, he could no longer remember who, from a front 
known as the League of American Writers, of which Odets was the non-communist 
chairman, in mid-1935 asked him to head a delegation to Cuba to report on conditions 
there, because the government was in the middle of a political crisis caused by a 
popular revolt.  The purpose of the trip, as expressed to Odets, was to bring publicity 
upon efforts to repress intellectuals and students in the hope of easing their condition.  
Unknown to Odets, there were secret communists assigned to the delegation, which 
was supposedly broad-based.  Odets first became angered because, as head of the 
delegation, he had no input in its composition nor was he apprised as to what the 
criteria for selection were.  Nevertheless, out of a sense of obligation he continued his 
participation.425  
 Odets’ executive session testimony, unavailable until the unsealing of the 
HUAC archives, indicates the level of his disenchantment with this communist front 
episode:  
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It angered me because I was apparently the head of this 
delegation and all the decisions were made without me.  
No one asked me anything.  The whole matter seemed 
to be a routine, cut and dried matter, and I was always 
presented with the fait accompli….[A]ll they wanted to 
do was get the story on the front page.426 
In fact, the episode did appear in the Daily Worker and it left Odets bitter that some 
unknown “steering committee” used him as a “dummy.”427  To a HUAC investigator, 
Odets spoke acidly of “the real humiliation I felt of being used as a front.  I was
supposed to be the chairman of this delegation.  All decisions were made behind my 
back and I was always presented with the fait accompli.”428  No one asked Odets to 
write a report of the trip and “there was no practical result except that in a slack 
summer season in the press it certainly hit all the front pages, in the New York 
papers, at least” with publicity for the Party.429 
 One of the concerns the HUAC had with front activity was its direct affect on 
individuals.  The Committee received testimony that a key function of communist 
front organizations was to serve as a pool for the recruitment of members into the 
Party.  Joining a front was, thus, often the first step in the process of joining the Party.  
As noted earlier, an unsuspecting individual might join a front because of its laudable 
stated goals, such as opposition to fascism, aid to the poor, or support for civil rights.  
The Committee heard testimony that the Party used a “soft sell” approach with front 
organizations to recruit new members by getting them to join in degrees.  The method 
entailed extending an invitation for involvement in a front of which there was little to 
indicate that the organization had ties with the CPUSA.  When the prospective 
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member had become comfortable with the work of that organization, he or she 
received an invitation to become involved in a second organization, cause or event 
and so on.  The potential recruit often formed friendships and created social ties that 
were then exploited with an invitation to join the Party.   
Another communist front, Peoples’ Educational Center, which offered courses 
to the general public, was a very helpful venue for recruitment.  The PEC carefully 
hid its CPUSA affiliation and in general stayed away from politics.  Radio entertai r 
Abe Burrows reported that he taught a course for the PEC on the process of writing 
for radio.  The course had no political content and he did not encounter any overt 
politicking at that school.430  Many other Hollywood communists served as teachers 
there, including Richard Collins.431  Edward Dmytryk was asked to teach courses on 
film production and editing at the PEC, which he found genuinely exciting because 
the nature of instruction in filmmaking at the time was rudimentary with little in the 
way of college-level courses.432  This followed on his participation in the Writers’ 
Congress in 1943, after which he was asked to join the Hollywood Writers 
Mobilization.  The HWM was organizing the work of a number of writers in the radio 
and film industries in support of the war effort, such creating plays and skits for 
performance at the USO, and sponsoring educational seminars on the methods of the 
enemy.  Dmytryk believed that the HWM did good work in support of the war effort 
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and its membership was broad-based across the political spectrum.  Thus, after 
joining a series of fronts for what he consider worthwhile, even noble reasons, 
Dmytryk finally joined the Party during the era, mid-1943 through the spring of 1945 
in which it had transformed itself into the Communist Political Association.  Dmytryk 
said he was convinced that “any idea of revolution against the government was 
completely dismissed” by the Party’s leadership and “I never heard any such talk [of 
revolution] in any of my associations with the organization.”433  Dmytryk appears to 
represent a classic example of someone who was eased into the Party through the 
work of the fronts.   
Otto Katz’ front, the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League was perhaps the earliest 
venue for such recruitment.  Hollywood agent Meta Reis Rosenberg told the HUAC 
that after she became a member of the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League, she wa, 
through its activities, led into membership of the CPUSA itself.434  Character actor 
Marc Lawrence (1910-2005) was featured in some very notable motion pictures 
before his HUAC testimony, including The Asphalt Jungle, The Oxbow Incident, and 
Dillinger.  Lawrence was a onetime member of the Actors Lab and also joined during 
the several years when the Party operated as the Communist Political Association.  
Lawrence testified that it was his participation in the Actors Lab, a communist front, 
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and his interest in economic issues centering on the concerns of actors that led him to 
join the Party.435   
Michael Blankfort joined the League of American Writers in the mid-1930s, 
because it was the only organization “that was concerned in the fight against Hitler 
and Fascism.”  He also asserted that he did not realize its ties to communism, 
although he certainly knew there were communists in the organization.  Blankfort 
assumed that the League of American Writers was a genuine coalition of communists, 
socialists and people who were neither in neither camp joining together to oppose 
fascism.436  He swore he was never a member of the Communist Party, but he did 
admit, however, that to a degree he was under the influence of the Party in the mid-
1930s, although he was critical of much of it.437  If one is to take his testimony at face 
value, in the case of Michael Blankfort recruitment through a front organization was 
only partly successful.  It did not lead to formal Party membership but it did affecthis 
political thought and action.   
 The HUAC questioned the Hollywood witnesses about many communist 
fronts, because as a group they had been involved with a bewildering number of 
them.  However, some fronts were more important than others and, thus, demanded 
more attention by investigators.  In any event, the formulation of the questions 
typically made it clear that the genesis of the query came from informati n found in 
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the communist press and most often from the Daily Worker.  There were exceptions, 
but this was the general rule.    
First and foremost was the American League for Peace and Democracy, which 
has been aptly called “the mother of all front groups.”438  It was the national umbrella 
with which Otto Katz’ Hollywood Anti-Nazi League had affiliated.  In other words, it 
served as the national Popular Front organization dedicated to opposing Nazism and 
fascism.  It stood for a policy of collective security to oppose territorial expansion by 
Germany and Italy, which threatened their neighbors.  Like the Hollywood Anti-Nazi 
League, communist organizers suppressed their revolutionary rhetoric and stressed 
themes acceptable to a broad political spectrum, especially the center-left portion.  
The result was broad political support and active participation by many liberals and 
even some non-isolationist conservatives.  Then came the Stalin-Hitler Pact late in the 
summer of 1939, which created the necessity for the American communists to 
radically shift their party line to one on non-cooperation with the Western European 
democracies and a policy of strict neutrality.  The CPUSA’s shift in its line, as well as 
its attempt to have both the American League for Peace and Democracy and the 
Hollywood Anti-Nazi League adopt a corresponding shift in policy, led to a rift 
between the communists and most of their coalition partners and to a collapse of both 
organizations.    
Abe Burrows, like many others, left the League because of the Stalin-Hitler 
Pact.439  When questioning Richard Collins, William Wheeler stated that the 
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Committee was “interested” in how the CPUSA managed the changes of the Party 
line in 1939 with the Pact and then again in 1941 after the German attack on the 
Soviet Union.  The HUAC specifically wanted to know how CPUSA managed such a 
complete and abrupt about face in Party line and who enunciated and justified it.  
Collins asserted that he stuck it out with the Party after a lecture by Hollywo d Ten 
screenwriter Samuel Ornitz, whom he called Ornitz “the great explainer,” because the 
latter rationalized the Stalin-Hitler Pact.  Ornitz claimed the Pactw s an arrangement 
of expediency for the Soviet Union, which was no less anti-Nazi than it had ever 
been.  Although he accepted Ornitz’ argument, for the first time, Collins asserted, he 
felt “out of step with the rest of the country and I also found this very uncomfortable, 
didn’t like it.”440   
With the raison d’etre of the American League for Peace and Democracy 
shattered, the CPUSA needed to create a new national front with policy aims 
congruent to those of the Party and of the Soviet Union.  Thus, during the 
approximately twenty-two months of the life of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, the shell of the 
League was quickly transformed into a successor organization named the American 
Peace Mobilization.  It advocated the argument that World War II represented a  
imperialist war between the West and Germany, and the United States should remain 
strictly neutral.  The group opposed American rearmament efforts, as well as milit ry 
aid to Great Britain. Of course, this line perfectly fit with the Soviet position now that 
the USSR was a non-belligerent ally of Nazi Germany.  The day before Germany’s 
attack on the Soviet Union, which occurred on June 22, 1941, the American Peace 
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Mobilization was finishing up a peace vigil outside of the White House with plans to 
return the next month.  Eight days after Germany’s attack, the group officially 
dropped its opposition to the war, now arguing that peace could only come with 
Germany’s defeat.  Thirty-one days after Germany’s assault on the USSR, the 
organization removed the word “Peace” from its name and became the American 
People’s Mobilization.441 
Abe Burrows averred that the purpose of the Hollywood Independent Citizens 
Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions was the reelection of Roosevelt in 
1944.442  Of course, the CPUSA supported Roosevelt for president that year, so the 
HICCASP’s position was in line with that of the Party’s.  However, HICCASP started 
as a classic communist front with the hand of the Party carefully hidden and Party 
rhetoric suppressed in the effort to attain broad support.  Michael Blankfort, who 
described himself as a lifelong Democrat, was a member and saw the organization as 
“a kind of branch of the Democratic Party out here.”443  It is important to remember 
that the HICCASP arrived on the scene at the time when the CPUSA had transformed 
itself into the Communist Political Association in the hopes of working within the 
Democratic Party.  Although Blankfort knew there were communists who were 
members, he never suspected that they were in leadership or that the organization 
functioned as a Communist Party front.444  Sterling Hayden joined the HICCASP, as 
well as the American Veterans Committee, as a step toward his entry into the 
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Communist Party.445  Ronald Reagan was a member of HICCASP before resigning in 
1946 along with his friend Olivia de Havilland and many others when the similarities 
between HICCASP’s agenda and the CPUSA Party line became increasingly obvious 
and undeniable.446   
There was a national organization from whence the HICCASP derived.  It was 
the Independent Citizens Committee for the Arts, Sciences and Professions and Jose 
Ferrer, then at the height of careers both on Broadway and in Hollywood, was the 
chairman of its Theatre Division.447  Budenz asserted that this front “…was first 
conceived in my office in the Daily Worker, that it was created completely by the 
Communists and was controlled by them throughout its entire existence, although a 
number of non-Communists were involved – at least, their names were lent to it.”448  
In fact, it was ultimately the Political Committee, i.e. Politburo, of the CPUSA that 
undertook the decision to create the ICCASP.449  Budenz averred that Alexander 
Trachtenberg, a cultural figure in the CPUSA and head of the Party’s book publishing 
company, International Publishers, was a key figure in the conception of the ICCASP.  
He also claimed that the Party intentionally kept Trachtenberg’s role in the ICCASP 
secret to downplay in significant influence on direction of the organization.  Budenz 
told the HUAC: “Sometimes they demote people because they think they haven’t 
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served, and sometimes they demote them for their own protection.  That is done quite 
frequently in order to deceive governmental agencies and the general public.”450  If 
Budenz is correct about its creation, then Arthur Schlesinger is wrong when he wrote 
that the CPUSA took over the ICCASP as a pre-existing organization.451  This in turn 
shows how deeply clandestine communist methods of creating fronts actually were.  
A key person present at the formation of the ICCASP was Lionel Berman, a 
CPUSA organizer and a member of the Party’s Cultural Committee.452  The 
Committee had information derived from the court transcripts of the Judith Coplon 
espionage trial that an informant advised the FBI that Lionel Berman, “had been 
successful in using well-known Hollywood personalities to further the Communist 
Party aims….”453  Berman was the husband of Louise Bransten.  This was the same 
Louise Bransten mentioned earlier as the friend of Otto Katz and was the millionaire 
socialite who raised the funds necessary to spring Gerhart Eisler from the French 
concentration camp in 1941.  Thus, Ms. Bransten was very active in front 
organizations in both New York and Hollywood.454   
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When it came to choosing the leadership of the ICCASP, the Party leadership 
very carefully chose Hannah Dorner as the front’s executive director.  Chosen 
because senior Party officials were convinced of her secret loyalty to the cmmunist 
cause, Ms. Dorner was a former reporter for the New York Herald Tribune.  She was 
also a close friend of playwright Lillian Hellman, an apologist for Stalin and herself 
extremely active in a number of communist fronts. 455  From 1952-1962, Dorner 
worked in the United Kingdom under her married name, Weinstein, successfully 
producing a series of swashbuckling television shows, starting with The Adventures of 
Robin Hood.  In that capacity, she was able to employ such blacklisted Hollywood 
writers as Robert Lees, Ian McLellan Hunter, and Howard Koch, as well as 
Hollywood Ten members Adrian Scott and Ring Lardner, Jr.  During her time in the 
United Kingdom, Dorner/Weinstein was also a close friend of the blacklisted director, 
Joseph Losey, himself a friend of Bertolt Brecht.456  Returning to the United States in 
1962, she became a successful motion picture producer of such films as Claudine, 
which was directed by Jack Berry, who was blacklisted in the 1950s.  Finally, the 
Party chose prominent sculptor Jo Davidson, who was not formally a Party member, 
but according to Budenz, “under Communist discipline for many years,” as the 
figurehead chairman of the ICCASP.457   
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 The successor organization to the ICCASP was the Progressive Citizens of 
America, probably the last great communist front of any broad significance.  The 
extent to which the CPUSA controlled the PCA and the unknowing impotence of its 
figurehead non-communist leaders was illustrated by ignorance of Dr. Frank 
Kingdon, the front’s co-chairman, that the PCA planned to endorse Henry Wallace 
for president and would transform itself in the Progressive Party.  Kingdon wrote in 
the New York Post that it was the CPUSA that asked Wallace to run and his “saddest 
lesson” of 1947 was that his belief that “American liberals [could] cooperate with 
Communists for social ends immediately desirable” was impossible.458 
 According to Budenz, the Party worked hard and successfully to replace 
Wallace’s chief political advisor and obvious choice as a campaign manager, Harold
Young, with C. B. Baldwin, who the CPUSA leadership believed would be more 
compliant with Party directives.459  Baldwin in turn suggested to Wallace that John 
Abt be given the job of chief legal counsel to the Progressive Party.  Recall that 
Chapter Four of this study noted that historians now know Abt was as a source of 
espionage for the Soviets as part of the Ware Group.  Abt represents an example of 
someone who denied his communism while working actively in the service of the 
CPUSA as a secret communist.  Although serving as the CPUSA’s chief legal counsel 
for years, it was not until his 80th birthday that Abt admitted he had been a life-long 
communist.460  Henry Wallace’s biographers reveal that Abt’s wife, Jessica Smith, 
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was the editor of the magazine N w World Review from 1936-1977.  She was also the 
widow of Harold Ware, who was in turn the son of Ella Reeve Ware, also known as 
Mother Bloor, the “godmother” of American communism and a longtime member of 
the CPUSA’s National Committee.461  Harold Ware was also the titular head of the 
spy cell that included Nathan Witt, Alger Hiss, and Harry Dexter White.  For years, 
Smith was also active in the leadership of the National Council of American-Soviet 
Friendship, an organization cited by Attorney General Tom Clark as subversive and 
communist in both 1947 and 1948.462   
Hollywood Writers’ Mobilization was one of the Party’s most successful 
fronts.  It functioned at one of those rare moments when the American national 
interest coincided with that of the CPUSA.  The United States was at war with 
Germany and sought its unconditional surrender.  The Soviet Union was at war with 
Germany and the CPUSA followed a policy line supported the national security 
interests of Moscow.  As long as the interests of the USA and the USSR coincided 
during the war, Party members were free to be ultra-patriotic. 
Non-communist writer Emmett Lavery was the HWM’s president, while 
Robert Rossen, who was a communist, served as its chairman.  Radio writer Abe 
Burrows served as the front’s treasurer, but he said that he “never did any 
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treasuring.”463  Hollywood Party boss and screenwriter John Howard Lawson “was 
extremely active in the Mobilization.  He was its center, in a way.”464  Burrows 
denied that his work with the HWM had anything to do with politics; it was all about 
supporting the war effort.465  Or, as Collins put it, “The purpose of the Mobilization 
was to write stuff to help win the war.”466  Although the HWM had more non-
communists in it than communists, “the Communists were the most eager for this 
kind of work and since they had some control over the [Screen Writers] Guild…they 
were the most active in the Mobilization.”467 Like most front organizations, the HWM 
published its own official organ entitled Communiqué.468         
The HUAC a specific interest in the Mobilization because it had at least a 
passing concern about possible espionage.  Investigators had some sort of suspicion 
that Robert Rossen and Archie Gottler, both associated with the HWM, turned “over 
a package to the American-Russian Institute containing scientific information 
regarding the Manhattan Engineering Project.”469  Richard Collins, who was on the 
board of the HWM, testified that he knew nothing about the incident.  Likewise, he 
found surprising HUAC information that in 1944 the journalist Anna Louise Strong, 
who had worked on Song of Russia, took a package to the Soviet Union given to her 
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by the Executive Council of the HWM.470  Collins speculated that the “scientific 
materials” in the package was information about medicines or perhaps “cultural 
materials” like scripts.471  Investigator Wheeler replied that the “material was 
gathered by the Los Angeles branch of the Federation of Artists, Engineers, Ch mists 
and Technicians,” which was a union. 472   
The Atomic Energy Committee represented a little known front in which the 
Committee expressed a great deal of interest.  The organization started as a course 
taught in the Hollywood Writers Mobilization “on the uses and control of atomic 
energy.  This course was conducted under the auspices of the Pasadena branch of the 
Federation of Atomic Scientists at California Tech.”  According to Collins, the 
organization functioned to organize American physicists in opposition to the United 
States as a nuclear weapons power and to work for the abolition of the atom bomb as 
a weapon.  He said this occurred during the mid-1940s era when the United States 
was the sole nuclear power, which many genuinely believed was “the most dangerous 
country in existence.”  Screenwriter Abraham Polonsky, who was a Party member, 
headed this organization and Collins asserted that he did not believe that Polanksy 
seriously thought he could elicit information from these scientists.  Rather, it was an 
exercise raising awareness, but frightening and disturbing the public.   
Wheeler noted the attendance of Drs. Robert Cornog, Charles Lewis and 
Robert Emerson at a seminar sponsored by the HWM, and that Dr. Cornog received 
the distinction of being made a member at large of the HMW.  Wheeler also made 
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mention of a June 14, 1946 meeting of the Executive Council of the HWM “at which 
Abraham Polonsky reported that Professor David Hawkins, historian of the Los 
Alamos project, had sent him more factual information on the A bomb.”473  Collins 
had no recollection of this meeting.  Wheeler asserted that the importance of the 
questioning lay in the fact that Hawkins turned out to be a member of the Communist 
Party.474   
Another alleged front organization that the HUAC appeared very interested in 
exposing was the Civil Rights Congress.  President Truman’s Attorney General, Tom 
Clark, had cited the Congress as communist and subversive on December 4, 1947 and 
again on September 27, 1948.  Created in April, 1946 from the merger of two other 
communist front organizations, the International Labor Defense and the National 
Federation for Constitutional Liberties, the Civil Rights Congress was a competitor to 
the American Civil Liberties Union.  Unlike the ACLU, the CRC was either “a 
communist organization or manipulated by the communists.”475  Michael Blankfort 
was briefly a member, but left the organization because it seemed only interested in 
defending the rights of communists and those on the extreme left.  He opted instead to 
join the American Civil Liberties Union because he believed the ACLU “had a record 
of defending anybody, right, left or center, whom they felt was a victim of civil 
injustice.”476  The Committee appeared concerned that citizens might confuse the 
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ACLU with the CRC, which Blankfort thought was the Party’s purpose when 
choosing the name.   
The executive session testimony of numerous Hollywood professionals, if 
taken at face value, indicates several things.  First, when New York entertainers with 
radical connections moved to Hollywood, the CPUSA attempted to contact them and 
move them closer to the movement once they arrived on the West coast.  For 
example, Michael Blankfort testified that communists contacted him after he moved 
to Hollywood and tried to get him more deeply involved in radical activities.  
Second, communists used the names of celebrities without their knowledge or 
permission to promote front organizations through fictitious sponsorships and office 
holders.  In the wide circles in which celebrities socialized, both prominent and secret 
communists were not uncommon.  The phenomenon of the Popular Front in which 
liberals and progressives had made common cause with radicals and communists in 
support of Roosevelt and the New Deal heightened these trends.  In this on-going 
context, it appears that celebrities and cultural luminaries were often invited to join a 
front or endorse a cause or event for purposes of social action or charity.  Clifford 
Odets told the HUAC that in a typical week he would receive fifty requests for such 
endorsements.477  Often having accepted such requests, a famous or influential 
individual would find his or her name used repeatedly without permission.   
Richard Collins testified to an experience that appears to confirm the 
communist tactic of hijacking celebrities’ names.  In February 1950, there was a 
program in Los Angeles called “a Conference to Strengthen American-Soviet 
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Relations.”  John Howard Lawson asked Collins to make a speech for it on Soviet 
film.  Collins refused, but his name remained on the program advertisements 
anyways.478  Michael Blankfort had a similar experience.  He told the HUAC that the 
organizers for the Conference for World Peace contacted him and asked to use his 
name as a sponsor for the event.  He did not reply to their request and yet they used 
his name anyway.479   
During his testimony, Academy Award winning actor Jose Ferrer repeatedly 
averred that various front organizations used his name without his permission, 
particularly naming him as a sponsor for events of which he did not participate.  
Ferrer’s credibility is somewhat undermined by the fact that on many occasi ns he 
did participate in such events.  Thus, three eventualities are possible.  First, Ferrer lied 
in order to minimalize his apparent connections with Communist Party fronts.  
Second, communist front organizers used his name without his explicit permission, 
perhaps by agreement and knowing that his sympathies were for communist causes.  
This allowed him to deny he gave his permission and still allow for the intended 
consequence.  The third eventuality is that the actor testified truthfully and, once he 
allowed the use of his name for selected front events, communist organizers then took 
the liberty to use it as they needed without his permission.  Given that many other 
celebrities testified to a similar experience and the existence of any documentary 
evidence to the contrary, it appears that this third possibility is likely the truth.
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In any event, the HUAC came to believe in the testimony of many media and 
entertainment personalities who claimed their names had been hijacked.  Investigator 
Appell told Jose Ferrer: “The Committee has found that in some front organizations, 
the communists have taken names of people who never sponsored the organization 
and used them in a letter as a sponsor and later their names have never been shown on 
the official letterhead.”  To this Ferrer replied: “I am convinced my name has been 
used without my authority, because I cannot forget quite as many things as I seem to 
have forgotten.”480  
Collins reported that John Howard Lawson and Jay Leyda had approached 
him in 1950 about making a speech on Soviet films at an event called “A Conference 
to Strengthen American-Soviet Relations.”  Collins said he had second thoughts about 
doing the speech, told Lawson and Leyda he was backing out, and asked that his 
name be taken off the program.  However, the organizers never removed his name.  In 
response to HUAC questions about a number of endorsements of communist inspired 
events or causes, such as the Stockholm Peace Petition, the Communist May Day 
Parade, and a petition to the United Nations on behalf of the Hollywood Ten, Clifford 
Odets indicated that the communist organizers had used his name without his 
permission.  Moreover, Odets asserted that in the past the Party had twisted his 
endorsements and used them for propaganda purposes by the Party.  Therefore, he 
had to exercise much greater care about how he lent his name.481     
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 Apparently, membership rolls of front organizations were freely padded with 
names of individuals, who had joined a predecessor organization, but not the 
successor group.  There are enough examples in the executive session testimony to 
indicate this was a pattern of behavior.  One example comes from the testimony of 
Abe Burrows, who claimed his nomination for election as an officer of the 
Progressive Citizens of America, the communist front that was a successor 
organization to ICCASP, was without his knowledge or permission.  Burrows did say 
he had been a member of the HISCCASP, the Hollywood group affiliated with the 
ICCASP.  He in fact never recalled joining the PCA and he and his counsel, Martin 
Gang, speculated that the membership rolls of the HISCCASP, which Burrows had 
joined much earlier, were “taken over bodily” by the PCA.  Despite his name on a 
PCA ballot, Burrows asserted that he never joined because “[t]hat was the group for 
Wallace, and I was not for Wallace.”482  Jose Ferrer did not remember joining the 
PCA and found it puzzling that his name should appear on their membership rolls.  
Ferrer seems to be another person whose connection with the ICCASP carried over to 
the PCA.483 
These are but a few examples of many detailing how communist front 
organizations abused the trust of cultural luminaries and manipulated their sentiments 
for worthy causes in order to score propaganda points for the Party.  It appears that 
communist operatives in front organizations lied about the endorsements of motion 
picture professionals and their participation in causes espoused by those fronts.  Time 
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and again, the HUAC heard testimony that indicated when a front organization went 
out of existence, its membership rolls seem to have been transferred to a successor 
organization and a celebrity found him or herself a member of an organization he or 
she never joined.  The implication of this practice is that communist organizers, 
especially of successor organizations, must have greatly inflated membership tallies 
and those groups in reality represented far fewer members than they claimed.  A 
careful reading of the executive session transcripts found in the HUAC archives 
provides ample evidence that this was a consistent practice.   
The HUAC wanted to know about many other communist fronts for which 
space does not allow an extended discussion.  Committee investigators and 
congressmen queried witnesses about well-known fronts, as well as very obscure 
ones.  Some of the fronts lasted for decades; others were based on specific short-term 
causes and disappeared after a numbers of months.  The most notable of such 
organizations that the HUAC consistently inquired about included the Committee for 
the First Amendment, the Actors Lab, Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, 
American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, and the Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refuge Committee.  
When reading the testimony of so many ex-communists, one cannot help but 
be moved by the moral and intellectual plight of these Americans.  They joined the 
CPUSA either during the Popular Front period or else during World War II when the 
USA and the USSR were allies.  Most found the Party’s humanitarian agenda to be 
very attractive during the most traumatic economic era in the history of peacetime 




abruptly found themselves at intellectual and moral odds with the organization in 
which they had placed their hope for the betterment of humanity.  Ultimately, many 
articulated a sense of betrayal – they felt like they had signed up for one thing and 
found out the reality was very different.   
Some, like screenwriter Leo Townsend, believed the circumstance of a 
changing Party line was the direct result of changing dictates from Moscow.484  The 
change in line after the Duclos letter and the ouster of Browder is what finallyled 
Townsend to leave the Party, although it took him three years to make the final break.  
He argued that it was hard for a Party member to make the break for two reasons.  
The first is because members were subject to a constant barrage of propaganda.  
Second, members tended to socialize only with other members and leaving the Party 
meant losing all of one’s friends.  “You have to face the fact,” he asserted, “that these 
people are going to be your enemies; that you are cutting yourself off from them.”485  
Richard Collins echoed the negative impact of the Duclos letter, Browder’s 
removal from office and the Party’s reaction to these events, which he called 
“absurd.”486  It was the beginning of the end for Collins, who did not relish the idea of 
the Party returning to “its old-time revolutionary position.”487 “The people who had 
loved Browder on Monday were now cursing him on Wednesday.”488  When, as a 
response to Browder’s ouster, the Party line shifted hard to the left, mass confessions 
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of ideological error by Party leaders struck Collins as “absolutely ridiculous” and 
“useless.”489   
Another event that caused Richard Collins to begin reevaluating his Party 
membership was Albert Maltz’ famous article in New Masses arguing that the Party 
needed to give more intellectual freedom to communist writers.  When his fellow 
communist writers gathered at the home of screenwriter Abe Polonsky and 
denounced Maltz’ position, Collins was outraged.  They said Maltz’ desire for such 
intellectual freedom was a middle-class desire and, thus, he did not understand the 
necessities of class struggle.  Collins testified that he was angered at how Maltz, a 
man of significant talent, was treated by men with little talent or integrity for their 
work.  “I felt [Maltz] was absolutely right and that anyone with a brain in their head 
could tell he was right.”490   
Finally, Collins realized that internal Party democracy was a sham.  He 
testified that after the Duclos letter and the ouster of Browder, the Hollywood Section 
Committee, of which he was a member, removed Lawson as the head of the 
Hollywood Party, because of his support of and associations with Browder.  
Nevertheless, the Country Committee appointed Lawson to a new post that was only 
nominally different from the last and this in effect subverted the local section’s 
decision.  The rejection of Browderism was obviously only a ritual to bring the Party 
in line with Soviet policy and Party leaders wanted Lawson to stay put in his role.  
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This episode disabused Collins of the belief that there was any real democracy in the 
Party.491   
Almost two years after Hayden left the Party, Karen Morley visited him in an 
attempt to get him to rejoin, but he refused.  Morley “then suggested that if I didn’t 
want to participate actively, I could assume a passive position and contribute money, 
which was done to a certain degree in Los Angeles.”492  Hayden declined that offer as 
well.  In a statement submitted to the HUAC, Hayden asserted why he left the 
CPUSA:  
The disgust arose from my dissatisfaction with the 
narrowness of the people I met in that short period of 
time.  They differed from the men and women I had 
met in the Yugoslav underground.  Their fight for social 
justice was and is a sham, a mere façade to attract 
people like myself who had an honest and sincere 
desire to do something worthwhile.  Their boundless 
bigotry and their intolerance of opinions which differed 
from their own was revolting to me.  Their absolute 
conviction and fanatic belief that Russia could do no 
wrong and their constant criticism of everything 
American – whether truly faulty or not – convinced me 
of their insincerity.  Their mouthings about freedom, 
which at first impressed me, turned out to be hollow 
mockery when I saw their willing submission to Party 
discipline.493   
Michael Blankfort offered a more charitable view that seems to sum up the 
thoughts of many of the other HUAC witnesses.  He said, “Yes, I feel that the 
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Communist Party as an organization is a subversive organization.  I do not feel that 
individual communists are invariably subversives.”494    
 In summary, the documentary evidence from the HUAC archives reveals a 
much more nuanced picture of the Hollywood probes than historians understood 
before now.  Scholars’ emphasis on the Committee’s requirement that witnesses ame 
the names of individuals known to them as communists, while grounded factually, 
overstates the case.  The HUAC investigators did indeed consistently ask witnesses to 
name names as part of a process apparently designed to insure accuracy through 
triangulation, eliminate individuals innocently connected to fronts, and generate leads 
for future witness.  However, the Committee increasingly focused more on the 
activities of front organizations.  This was particularly true in the second investigation 
of 1951-1952, as opposed to the 1947 probe.  The HUAC acted as if exposing various 
communist-led fronts was an important end unto itself.  This view stands in 
contradistinction to that held by a number of civil society and revisionist historians.  
They have argued that HUAC’s interest in the fronts was to create guilt by association 
for front members.  In this view, the Committee sought to make charges of 
communism or communist sympathies stick by associating such innocents with front 
organizations.  The archival evidence does not bear this position out.  On the 
contrary, the new archival evidence, especially the unsealed executive session 
transcripts, shows that the HUAC acted to combat the fronts as a response to what 
committee members saw as a powerful set of organizational tools or transmission 
belts that amplified Party policy positions to an audience unaware of their origin.  The 
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Committee seemed to believe that exposing fronts as being communist controlled 
served the American body politic by thwarting the interests of the CPUSA and by 
extension the Soviet Union, both of which arguably sought revolutionary change in 





Chapter 8:  Summary and Significance of Findings 
 This study has principally and extensively drawn upon primary source 
documents from the records of the United States House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Un-American Activities, which are newly available to scholars at the 
Center for Legislative Archives of the National Archives.  These documents first 
came available in 2001 and, as of the date of this writing, archivists are still in the 
process of declassifying many of the documents.  The review of the relevant literature 
in Chapter Two demonstrates that there has yet been no comprehensive history of the 
HUAC since the opening of its archives.  Furthermore, there has been no history of 
the Committee’s investigations of Hollywood based on a thorough and 
comprehensive study of the HUAC’s investigative files.  By offering a careful 
analysis of the Committee’s F&R and investigative files, as well as the transcripts of 
testimony taken in executive session, all of which were previously unavailable, this 
dissertation seeks to partially remedy this circumstance and fill in several key gaps in 
the historical record.    
This dissertation has presented some significant findings that are new to the 
historical record and key to a more complete understanding of the HUAC and its 
probes of communist infiltration of the motion picture industry.  This chapter will 
offer a detailed analysis of the meaning of each of these significant findings, their 
subsidiary findings, how they add to or change the historical record, and how they 
will assumedly assist historians in undertaking further research in this area.  Th  main 




First, the HUAC’s primary method of investigation entailed an on-going 
analysis of the communist press.  Newly available archival information appears to 
show that the popular perception of shadowy cloak and dagger investigative 
techniques by the Committee is a myth.  In fact during the heyday of its existence, he 
HUAC operated in a symbiotic relationship with the communist press.   
Second, the investigations of Gerhart and Hanns Eisler were the catalyst for 
the Committee moving forward with the full scale probe of Hollywood in 1947.  
While the HUAC would probably have eventually investigated the motion picture 
business anyway, the cases of the Eisler brothers made a probe of Hollywood 
inescapable that year.   
Third, especially with the second Hollywood inquiry of 1951-1952, historians 
and critics of the HUAC have overemphasized the Committee’s practice of asking 
witnesses to name the names of individuals they knew to be communists.  A broad 
reading of the executive session transcripts shows that this was not simply a ritual
designed to humiliate witnesses, that it was in reality an exercise in triangulation in 
order to protect those with only casual connections with the Party or its fronts, and 
that ultimately the process was an investigatory dead end.   
Fourth, the HUAC considered exposing communist controlled front 
organizations as important as and perhaps even more so than the process of naming 
names or even investigating the CPUSA itself.  The newly available archival 
documents appear to indicate that the Committee did not, as has been alleged by some 
critics, use associations with fronts to smear innocent citizens with the label of 




the alleged nature of front organizations, i.e. that they were controlled by communists 
and aimed to propagate the Party line.     
Fifth, the four findings above taken together indicate a fifth significant 
conclusion, namely that the archival evidence demonstrates that the HUAC’s concern 
with American communist propaganda in the service of a foreign power was a central
motivation for the Committee’s interest in the communist infiltration of Hollywood.  
It was not a side issue or a pretext for scrutinizing Hollywood in order to squelch th  
reforming efforts of radicals, as some have alleged.  Furthermore, the HUAC’s 
understanding of the nature and conduct of communist propaganda changed over 
time, growing more sophisticated and focusing more on the work of front 
organizations.    
 Before proceeding with a discussion of each of these findings, a brief review 
of the previous historical and critical thought regarding the HUAC’s foray into 
Hollywood will help clarify how the conclusions of this study represent a new 
departure from the previous historiography of the subject.  Also, a brief summary of 
the context in which the HUAC investigations took place is also in order.  
 The opening of the vast HUAC files to researchers represents an opportunity 
to understand better a key governmental body of American government in the 20th 
century.  For better or worse, the HUAC helped shape the American response to 
domestic communism during the decades of the 1940s and 1950s.  Although not 
plumbing the depths of disrepute that McCarthy did, the Committee was nevertheless 
highly controversial in its day and its reputation has not prospered over time.  Many 




antics of Senator Joseph McCarthy, unnecessarily infringed upon civil liberties and it
investigations illegitimately intruded into the private political thought of ordinary 
citizens.   
The view of civil society and revisionist historians is that American 
communism was a relatively benign phenomenon dedicated mainly to such worthy 
endeavors as the extension of civil rights to minorities, food and housing assistance to 
poor, the expansion of New Deal programs, and efforts to promote international 
understanding in the cause of peace.  This perspective holds that out of naïve 
idealism, American communists esteemed the Soviet experiment, but nevertheless 
American communism was a domestic movement and charges that Moscow 
controlled the CPUSA were spurious.  Finally, it argues that any potential security 
threat posed by the CPUSA was marginal and the response of the Committee to any 
perceived threats was all out of appropriate proportion.  Most of the studies of the 
HUAC’s probe of Hollywood have their basis in this perspective.   
The notoriety of the HUAC was in many respects well deserved.  It originated 
during the tenure of the HUAC’s predecessor, the Dies Committee, when its 
chairman, Martin Dies, turned his attention from domestic fascist and Nazi groups to 
the issue of American communism.  Chairman Dies’ public statements and his 
conduct of hearings often appeared aimed at garnering headlines and scoring points 
against the administration of Franklin Roosevelt.  Dies also built a reputation as one 
who would often lay indiscriminate charges of communism of those on the left 
without adequate documentary evidence to support his assertions.  Thus, critics began 




In 1945, Rep. John Rankin of Mississippi maneuvered a vote in the House of 
Representatives that resulted in the conversion of the old Dies Committee into a 
regular, standing committee of the House.  Now known simply as the HUAC, the 
Committee became inexorably connected with Rankin’s name, especially in the eyes 
of its critics.  Even though Rankin only served on the HUAC for two congresses, the 
79th (1945-1946) and the 80th (1947-1948), and was never its chairman, the 
Committee’s reputation suffered further due to its association with this rabid racist 
and anti-Semite.  It has not helped the standing of the HUAC in the eyes of history
that its members, during the 80th Congress, i.e. the congress during which the first 
Hollywood probe took place, were a rather dubious lot.  Four of the nine members on 
the Committee, i.e. all of the Democrats, were Southern segregationists.  A federal
jury found the HUAC chairman during the 80th Congress, J. Parnell Thomas, guilty of 
corruption and he served time at a federal penitentiary in the early 1950s.  The 
Committee’s youngest member, freshman Representative Richard M. Nixon, had a 
checkered career (no pun intended), which ultimately ended in disgrace.   
On the other hand, it is important to point out a fact which is a matter of 
public record, but essentially overlooked in the historiography of the Hollywood 
probe, namely the HUAC of 82nd Congress (1951-1952) was a very different 
committee than that in 1947.  The only holdover was John S. Wood of Georgia, who 
served as chairman during the second Hollywood investigation.  All of the other 
members of the Committee were new.  Furthermore, only two of the nine members 




of McCarthy’s Senate sub-committee, no other congressional body in American 
history has been as controversial and as unpopular as the HUAC.   
 This study is unique in that it offers a discussion of the HUAC’s two 
investigations of Hollywood (1947 and 1951-1952) firmly anchored by an articulation 
of the specific domestic and international context in which these events took place.  
On the domestic side, there was a profound dissatisfaction of the economics of the 
New Deal by many members of the Committee, which reflected similar sentiments 
amongst the American business community.   
Another element of this context included a new and rapidly developing 
understanding of the power of mass propaganda as a result of experience with Soviet 
and particularly German propaganda efforts during World War II.  Furthermor , the 
primitive communication theory of the day indicated that the media delivered 
messages to their audience much like a hyperemic needle delivers a drug.  It is 
possible that this led academics and governmental officials at the time to overestimate 
the efficacy of the propagandizing efforts of domestic communists.  Charges that the 
Office of War Information had employed a number of communists likely increased 
these concerns.  No other study of the HUAC’s investigations of Hollywood mentions 
the new awareness of mass propaganda as part of the milieu in which the events 
occurred.    
Probably the key domestic contextual factor was the revelations of domestic 
espionage cases linked to American communists.  These began with the Amerasia spy 
case in early 1945 and continued with the defection of Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa, 




1946 that Gerhart Eisler was an agent of the Soviet Union directing the affairs of the 
CPUSA eventually lead to a probe of Hollywood in 1947, the revelations the 
following year of Elizabeth Bentley ultimately led to the exposure of numerous 
American communists who had spied for Moscow.  The public disclosure of the 
existence of the Silvermaster Group, the Perlo Group, the Ware Group and the 
Rosenberg Group – all domestic espionage rinks populated by American communists 
– shook the national security establishment.  Yet, because so few trials ended with 
convictions for spying, many on the political left believed such charges were 
overblown and possibly fabricated by anticommunists given to conspiracy theories.  
Anticommunists, on the other hand, attributed the rapid development of a Soviet atom 
bomb to the treachery of domestic communists and their ability to compromise the 
Manhattan project.  Certainly, the HUAC congressmen and investigators, who were 
pivotal in the exposure of Alger Hiss, believed domestic communist espionage was a 
real and serious threat to national security.  Significant work by post-revisionist 
historians drawing upon the newly opened archives of the Comintern and the 
declassification of the Venona decryptions has demonstrated that a significant 
element of the CPUSA was indeed engaged in Soviet espionage or else indirectly 
supported such spy activity.  Thus, regardless of whether the HUAC acted 
appropriately in its investigations of communist activity, concerns about American 
communists engaging in espionage for Moscow were grounded in reality and not a 
case of irrational hysteria or conspiracy paranoia.  This stated contextual lement 




International events also played a key role in establishing the cultural milieu 
in which the HUAC investigations of Hollywood took place.  Saying the 
investigations of Hollywood by the HUAC occurred during the Cold War is not 
saying much of significance.  Not all years of the Cold War were equally as tense.  It 
just so happened that both of the Committee’s forays into communism in Tinsel 
Town fell during particularly anxious points during the Cold War.  The Iron Curtain 
began to close tightly in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s just as the first Hollywood 
investigation got underway.  Seemingly each week brought new newspaper headlines 
of the Soviets clamping down on the independence of Eastern Europeans, installing 
one satellite government after another.  Even more momentous was the fact that 
during the second Hollywood probe of 1951-1952, the United States was a nation at 
war with eventually two communist countries, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and the People’s Republic of China, both armed with Soviet tanks and fighter 
jets.  Yet previous studies of the HUAC’s investigation of Hollywood barely mention 
the Korean War if at all and it does not even merit a complete sentence in the seminal 
history of the Hollywood blacklist, The Inquisition in Hollywood, in terms of 
establishing the context of the second Hollywood probe.495  On the other hand, newly 
available executive session transcripts reveal that the Committee rarely dismissed a 
witness during the 1951-1952 hearings without a congressman or investigator asking 
whether that individual would be willing to bear arms in defense of the United States
against a Soviet attack.   
                                                




 In summary, the HUAC did not undertake its investigations of Hollywood 
within a vacuum.  Rather they took place within a specific historical context that no 
doubt influenced to a significant degree how those events would transpire.  Previous 
histories of the era have done a poor or very limited job establishing logical and likely 
possibilities for such a broader context.  This dissertation has offered a remedy to that 
problem.   
 The discussion of the investigative methods set forth in Chapter Five of this 
study offers the first detailed examination of how the HUAC conducted its probes of 
Hollywood since historians have gained access to Committee’s archives in 2001.  The 
newly available archival material provides a significant amount of information that 
has allowed for a reconstruction of the investigatory methods and process employed 
by the HUAC.  The archival data indicates that the Committee undertook its inquiries 
in distinct stages as part of a five-step routine.  Before the findings of this 
dissertation, the details of the first three steps of that process remained unknown.   
The first step was the research phase in which HUAC staff collected raw at , 
summarized information, and created files under the names of individuals and 
organizations.  The new and fascinating aspect of this step is that the overwhelming 
majority of the raw data the staff researcher collected for the Committee came 
through a careful process of analyzing publications by the CPUSA and its front 
organizations.  Of those publications, the communist periodical press, including 
Communist, Political Affairs, New Masses, the People’s World and in particular the 
Daily Worker, were the most common sources of information.  In support of this 




other documents in order to create a very significant library of materials publi hed by 
subversive organizations.  Staff researchers supplemented this library with articles 
from mainstream newspapers, such as the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune 
through the employment of a press clippings service.  Committee staff clipped articles 
from local Washington DC newspapers with additional information collected from 
trade publications, such as the Hollywood Reporter and Variety.  The key new fact 
here is that, without the communist press the Committee would have had to rely 
entirely on information collected by testimony of subpoenaed witnesses in order to 
conduct its investigations.  In fact, one of the significant new findings of this 
dissertation is that the communist press was the in  qua non of HUAC’s Hollywood 
investigations.   
Committee researchers distilled the data derived from the periodical press, and 
in particular the communist press, onto a series of cards stored in card filing system .  
There was one filing system for organizations and another for individuals.  The Files 
and Research Section of the HUAC’s staff supervised the on-going renewal of these 
two large card files, which were essentially repositories of raw, uncorroborated, 
unanalyzed data.  Together the HUAC referred internally to these files as the F&R 
files and they were the source of data that other agencies of the federal govrnment 
drew upon when using the HUAC files as a research tool.  The archival evidence 
shows that numerous executive branch agencies of the Truman Administration 
accessed these files to query for potential information against several thousands of 
names on a typical day in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  This is a surprising finding 




statements with regard to the Committee.  Nevertheless, apparently the Truman 
Administration’s Civil Service Commission needed the resources of the HUAC to 
operationalize its loyalty program.  Additionally, the newly available files reveal that, 
at least with regard to the Hollywood probes, the FBI shared precious little of its 
information with the Committee, even though it would have been very helpful to 
HUAC investigations.  Ironically, however, FBI agents made copious use of 
Committee files on a regular basis.     
The above finding of this dissertation is highly significant.  Previous 
historians of the Hollywood probe, such as Victor Navasky, have assumed a high 
degree of cooperation between various governmental bodies investigating 
communism.496  Such suppositions are incorrect.  In fact, it appears that there was 
exceedingly little and the trade of information was in fact almost entirely a one-way 
flow toward the FBI.  The HUAC and the FBI had very different agendas.  The 
HUAC sought to expose subversive activities and propaganda.  The FBI sought to 
prosecute such activities and building a case for prosecution often meant allowing 
such activities to continue under covert surveillance.  The above finding confirms 
other research that suggests that investigations of domestic subversion and espionage 
were poorly coordinated across the federal government.   
Another important fact revealed by the research offered in this dissertation is 
that since Committee researchers derived the data contained in the F&R files from 
public sources, such as the communist press, it was only as accurate as those source. 
This accuracy is highly questionable.  Chapter Seven of this study outlined evidence 
                                                




from executive session testimony that indicated a strong likelihood that communist 
operatives in front organizations lied about the participation of celebrities and cultural 
luminaries in front activities.  Such individuals found themselves the sponsors and 
endorsers of events, causes and activities that they never authorized.  They found 
themselves members of organizations that they never joined.  They found themselves 
elected to organizational offices for groups in which they had never applied for 
membership.   
The F&R files were a distinct entity from the Committee’s investigative files.  
The latter represents the work of HUAC investigators in analyzing the information 
contained in the F&R files and substantiating it with corroboratory information as 
discussed below in the second phase of the Committee’s investigatory process.  This 
distinction is extremely important because another key finding of this dissertation is 
that the newly available archival evidence indicates that executive branch use of the 
F&R files impacted far more people than those who were the subjects of active 
HUAC investigations.  Furthermore, since the data that constituted the F&R files was 
raw, uncorroborated and unanalyzed, it would appear that those accessing it, i.e. 
agents of the executive branch, were far more likely to draw erroneous conclusions 
than HUAC investigators working from investigative files.   
The newly available archival information indicates that the second step in the 
Committee’s investigatory routine was the corroboration phase, wherein invstigators 
would look for additional evidence to substantiate the initial indications of the 
research phase.  During this phase, investigative staff created three-column 




participation in communist fronts and narrative reports that were more biographical in 
nature.  Again, the most common citation in these reports was from the Daily Worker.  
There were two common sources of corroboratory information.  First, there were 
publicly available documents, such as police and military service records, 
immigration and naturalizations records, transcripts of testimony from trials, in some 
cases income tax records, and where possible Party documents, such as CPUSA 
registration cards.  The last type of evidence was rare indeed.  Investigator even 
drew upon such publications as Who’s Who to flesh out the record.  Again, only 
rarely was the HUAC able to access documents originating from the FBI.  The second 
source consisted of field interviews by investigators of individuals who might be able 
to speak to an issue at hand.  However, since, unlike the FBI, the HUAC only had a 
handful of investigators, such interviews were limited.   
One of the key duties of HUAC investigators was to interview, if possible, 
potential witnesses prior to their appearance before the Committee.  Investigator  
sought to gauge an individual’s potential testimony ahead of time in order to insure
that it was worth the HUAC’s time.  The newly available archival evidence 
surprisingly reveals that many so-called “friendly” witnesses from Hollywood were 
extremely reluctant to testify.  Samuel Goldwyn refused any significant cooperation.  
Even though he had battled efforts by communists to unionize his small (at the time) 
studio, Walt Disney did not want to testify before the HUAC.  The HUAC’s Los 
Angeles field agent had to work hard to persuade the president of the Screen Actors 
Guild, a liberal named Ronald Reagan, to testify.  Conservative anticommunist 




evidence stands in contradiction to much of the previous historiography of the era that 
held to the thesis that Hollywood anticommunists invited the Committee to rid Tinsel
Town of the Reds.  Thus, future historians of the HUAC and the Blacklist era in 
Hollywood will need to reconsider the political dynamics at work in the motion 
picture industry at the time.   
If investigators determined there was sufficient evidence to proceed, the 
contents of the investigative file might lead the Committee to the third step, which
was to hear testimony under subpoena or voluntarily in executive session.  Although 
historians have known all along that the HUAC heard testimony in executive session, 
until the House of Representatives authorized the unsealing of the Committee’s files, 
the contents of the transcripts of those sessions remained a matter of conjecture.  
Those transcripts provide a great deal of documentary evidence supporting the 
arguments offered in Chapter Six and particularly Chapter Seven of this dissertat on.    
 The final two steps of the HUAC’s investigatory process, namely testimony 
obtained in open session and the publication of reports by the Committee, have been 
part of the public record and, therefore, not addressed in any significant degree by this 
study. 
Careful scrutiny of the Hollywood files in the archives also reveals some 
surprises that contradict the popular conception of HUAC investigations.  There is no 
evidence of the use of wiretaps in the course of investigation.  Committee 
investigators did not record any conversations, private or otherwise, and when a 
manufacturer of recording equipment tried to approach the HUAC chairman to sell 




HUAC archives seem to indicate that the only method of recording statements 
employed by the Committee was the use of legal transcriptionists to make a 
permanent record of testimony taken during public and executive session hearings.  
Also, it does not appear that investigators sought at any time to open personal mail.   
There are no cases of HUAC investigators tailing suspects or interviewing 
neighbors about the activities of the subjects of investigations.  In the thousands of 
pages of documents accessed for this dissertation, there is only one instance in which 
the subject of a Committee investigation was placed under surveillance.  That 
individual was Gerhart Eisler and, even then, the HUAC did not surveil him directly.  
Chairman Thomas feared Eisler would slip out of the country before his scheduled 
testimony could take place.  Therefore, he asked the FBI to place Eisler under 
surveillance to insure he honored his subpoena.  Hoover obliged Thomas.  
Furthermore, there is no record of the use of informants by the Committee or the 
existence of any network of domestic spies.  Finally, newly opened archives 
surprisingly reveal that HUAC investigators were so concerned with following the 
law that they were careful not to violate the copyrights of publications by making 
Photostats of borrowed copies.  This included periodicals printed by suspected 
communist front organizations.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the Hollywood files that HUAC 
investigators pursued investigations based on anonymous denunciations or 
accusations from members of the public and submitted to the Committee via mail or 
telegram.  Only very rarely did HUAC investigators draw upon anticommunist 




record of any cooperation between the Committee and the organizations that 
published those newsletters.  Likewise, there appeared to be minimal interacton 
between the HUAC and its state level counterpart in California, known as the CUAC.  
The HUAC did draw upon the CUAC’s published reports.  The CUAC’s chairman, 
Sam Tenney, did testify before the HUAC once in March 1947 and wrote the 
chairman of the HUAC at least once the same year.  However, surprisingly, it appears 
that on the whole there was not any significant coordination between the two bodies.   
The above findings, based on newly available documentary evidence from the 
National Archives that summarizes the investigative practices that the HUAC 
employed, as well as those in which the Committee did not engage, are highly 
significant.  This is so because these findings offer a new and unexpected picture of 
how the HUAC undertook its investigations.  That picture stands in contradistinction 
to the popular and prevailing view of how the Committee went about its work.  The 
documentary record of the HUAC’s Hollywood probes simply does not support the 
image of the Committee operating as a specter-like McCarthyist Star Chamber 
surreptitiously surveilling Americans, conducting smear campaigns on innocent 
victims simply because they held unpopular political beliefs, and in the process 
flagrantly violating the law.  Until now, scholars had little idea of how the HUAC 
actually collected information and conducted its investigations before they reached 
that stage of hearings open to the public.  This dissertation offers specific findings 




With the opening of the HUAC archives, correcting the historical record will 
be an on-going effort of which this dissertation is the first step.  Correcting the record 
will mean demonstrating the specious nature of such claims as the one below: 
As lengthy as the list of subversives in Hollywood was, 
it contained but a small portion of the names (60,000) 
compiled by HUAC.  HUAC was lavish, both in its 
compilation of dossiers (over 1 million) and its 
distribution of information they contained to employers 
– some 60,000 individuals became “known” to their 
bosses via this channel.497 
This claim in a key scholarly work on the HUAC’s probe of Hollywood is based on a 
secondary source, which in turn had no access to the newly opened Committee 
archives.498   
The above statement is simply erroneous and it is so for several reasons.  First, 
the number of names is highly inflated, because it does not take into account 
pseudonyms, which American communists were highly prone to using.  The total 
number of names in the HUAC’s files does not equal the total number of individuals.  
Besides his legal name, Gerhart Eisler had seven known pseudonyms, all of which 
appear in the HUAC’s F&R files.  Union leader Steve Nelson, who was a secret 
communist, had a different birth name, Stephen Mesarosh, and four different aliases, 
so he is one individual who corresponds to six names in the HUAC files.  Thus, two 
discrete individuals represent a total of fourteen names in the Committee’s fils.  
Second, the “dossiers” referred to were simple reports, usually one paragraph in 
length, which summarized the information in the F&R files under a given name.  
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Third, it is unclear what the basis is of the figure of one million such reports.  No such 
documentation was readily available and the figure appears highly inflated.  During 
the thirty month period between the middle of 1946 and the end of 1948, the HUAC 
issued approximately 17,000 of such reports.  If one uses this as an average and 
extrapolates over the life of the Committee, the total would have been slightly over 
200,000.  Moreover, as a matter of policy, HUAC staff only issued these “dossiers” to 
members of Congress or agencies of the Executive branch.  When in 1953 it was 
demonstrated that there had been instances in which staff had not followed this policy 
and issued reports directly to private citizens, the HUAC adopted a formal resolution 
forbidding it.499  Thus, although in some rare instances such reports could have gotten 
in the hands of employers, newly available evidence from the National Archives 
indicates that the assertion that this occurred in a pervasive and systematic manner is 
simply false.    
Committee critics and revisionist historians often characterize the period of 
American history in which the HUAC’s investigations of Hollywood took place as 
one of a national anticommunist hysteria, during which irrational fears of foreign 
subversion led to the persecution of innocent citizens.  This is essentially the 
perspective that undergirded Arthur Miller’s allegory as articulated in The Crucible.  
Given the work of the post-revisionist historians, which drew heavily on the opening 
of the Comintern archives in Moscow in the 1990s, as well as the release of the 
Venona decryptions, the validity of this thesis is highly suspect.  Documentary 
evidence from the newly opened HUAC archives appears to confirm the general 
                                                




substance of the work of revisionist historians.  The Committee appeared to proceed 
logically and methodically in its investigations.  The evidence appears to show, that 
although there were times that HUAC congressmen and investigators made mistakes, 
these were the result of error in the interpretation of evidence, not from pursuing 
imaginary subversives.  Certainly, the congressmen serving on the Committee, as 
well as the staff investigators working for them, may have been naïve about the 
strength of the communist threat, i.e. they may have overestimated the likelihood of 
any action by the Soviet Union or domestic communists against United States.  
Nevertheless, unlike the deplorable antics of McCarthy, the HUAC based its 
investigations on real evidence and overwhelmingly Committee investigators drew 
that evidence directly from the communist press in the United States.   
One such case is that of Gerhart Eisler.  The HUAC obtained information that 
Eisler was a trained agent of communist propaganda, having obtained entry into the 
United States illegally, and was once and possibly currently the Comintern’s 
representative to the CPUSA.  The Committee had strong evidence that Gerhart had 
traveled repeatedly between the United States and the Soviet Union under false 
passports.  The HUAC discovered that while living in the United States during the 
period of 1941-1946, Eisler was very active as a propagandist for various communist 
newspapers and magazines, writing under a variety of pseudonyms, most famously as 
Hans Berger.  When exposed by newspaper journalist Frederick Woltman and ex-
communist Louis Budenz, Gerhart Eisler attempted to use American mainstre m 
newspapers and the radio program Meet the Press to sway support for his cause.  




communist front.  Furthermore, Gerhart was as associate of Otto Katz, a German 
communist and reputed Comintern agent known for involvement in communist front 
activities in New York and Hollywood.   
Eisler’s brother, Hanns, with whom he was close, lived and worked in 
Hollywood as a composer for motion pictures.  There was strong evidence that Hanns 
Eisler also obtained entry into the United States through perjurious statements under 
oath to the INS.  Furthermore, the HUAC believed that Hanns had gained permanent 
residency status through political pressure placed on officials in the State Department 
initiated by important cultural figures in front organizations who won the sympathy of 
Eleanor Roosevelt for the composer.  Hanns Eisler had a reputation as “the world’s 
foremost revolutionary composer” and the Committee had some evidence that he had 
strong Comintern connections.  Hanns was well connected in Hollywood and had 
close relationships with a number of Hollywood luminaries and professionals, 
including Charlie Chaplin, John Garfield, Clifford Odets, Paul Henreid, William 
Dieterle, Salka Viertel, and Vladimir Pozner.  In addition, Hanns had more casual 
friendships with Peter Lorre, Thomas Mann, and Lion Feuchtwanger.  Finally, the 
composer was very close to Bertolt Brecht, the author of a number of revolutionary 
plays and operas, for which Hanns had written the musical scores.   
Committee documents newly available at the National Archives indicate that 
the motion picture industry did not come under scrutiny of the Committee in 1947, as 
critics have charged, simply because Hollywood communists were high profile 
supporters of the political reforming impulse of the Popular Front.  Nor does the 




example of Hollywood Reds in an effort to discredit the communist cause more 
broadly.  Previous historians have offered competing theses to explain why the 
Committee launched its inquiry into Hollywood.  Some have argued that a foolish 
idea by the HUAC that Hollywood communists were guilty of inserting propaganda 
into movies was the reason.  Others have explained the probe by arguing that it was a 
response to the success of communists in gaining influence in the Screen Writers 
Guild.  Some historians have pointed to the union jurisdictional battles between the 
supposedly conservative IATSE and the so-called progressive CSU as an explanation.  
Several scholars have combined one of the above theses with the assertion that the 
HUAC was responding to an invitation by the conservative Motion Picture Alliance 
to investigate their political enemies.  While each of the hypotheses has a basis in the 
facts and has some merit as a partial explanation, none adequately explains the issue 
of timing, i.e. why the Committee launched the 1947 probe when it did.   
This study, based on the extensive use of newly available archival documents 
that were unavailable to previous historians, offers a more complete and satisfactory 
explanation as to why the HUAC launched its first investigation of Hollywood when 
it did.  The evidence indicates that the Committee’s investigation of Gerhart Eisler led 
directly to his brother Hanns.  Because of Hanns’ strong ties to the Gerhart and the
Comintern on the one hand and the motion picture business in Hollywood on the 
other, a probe of Hollywood sooner rather than later became inevitable.  Thus, the 
1947 investigation of Hollywood did not happen in isolation from the investigations 
of the Eisler brothers nor was the link a casual or tenuous one.  The case of Gerhart 




Eisler was the most significant communist agent to become the subject of a HUAC 
investigation.  The Committee simply could not ignore any leads that arose from their 
investigation of him.   
The above argument is new and unique to this dissertation.  If it is correct, and 
the archival evidence appears to indicate that this is the case, then it means that the
HUAC launched its probe of the motion picture industry because of perceived links 
between the latter and known agents of the Comintern.  Subsequent evidence, of 
which the Committee was ignorant, links the Eisler brothers, Bertolt Brecht and Otto 
Katz to the famous Comintern propagandist and front organizer named Willi 
Munzenberg.  This in turn offers the possibility that the highly successful communist 
fronts that operated in Hollywood found their genesis from someplace other than 
local radical organizers.  Future historians of the era should consider book length 
studies of these Hollywood fronts.  More scholarly research of organizations such as 
the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League would help fill gaps in this important area of the 
historical record. 
 Furthermore, Gerhart Eisler was not an inconsequential figure in the 
landscape of American politics of the 1930s and 1940s.  The HUAC was aware that 
during the 1930s he served as the Comintern’s representative to the CPUSA with 
plenipotentiary powers.  As such, he was arguably the final authority on Party policy 
and the appointment of senior Party personnel.  The Committee also knew that in the 
1940s, Eisler was at a minimum a senior figure in the CPUSA’s propaganda machine 
and likely instrumental in the Party’s radical shift of line and the toppling of Party




Communist Party, the Popular Front, the Party’s myriad of front organizations, and 
the CPUSA’s propaganda machine were an important aspect of American history, the 
role of Gerhart Eisler is significant.  The newly available documents show that 
HUAC investigators were concerned that Eisler had strong connections to numerous 
communist fronts.    
Despite his importance as a historical figure, Gerhart Eisler remains a little 
known figure to most scholars of American history, except those engaged in the study 
of CPUSA history.  As Chapter Six of this dissertation has demonstrated, scholars of 
the HUAC and the Hollywood Blacklist era have not understood his significance to 
the event of the period.  Unfortunately, no biography of Gerhart exists, scholarly or 
otherwise.  The new research offered by this dissertation suggests that such a 
biography would be warranted.  Additionally, the one serious biography of Hanns 
Eisler is over thirty years old and, thus, could not draw upon documents from either 
the Comintern or the HUAC archives.  It paints a picture of Hanns as a non-political 
figure during his stay in the United States and does not explore in depth his 
Comintern ties or allegations that he was compromised by service to the NKVD.500  A 
new biography, focusing more on Hanns Eisler’s Hollywood career and his 
Comintern ties and drawing upon newly available archival documents, would make a 
useful addition to the scholarly literature.   
 Historians have focused a great deal of attention on the Committee’s 
persistent request that witnesses name the names of those they knew to be 
communists.  The procedure was even more prominent in the 1951-1952 inquiry than 
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in the first investigation.  This is because, while the public phase of 1947 
investigation was over in a matter of a couple of weeks, HUAC congressmen and 
investigators took testimony on and off for several years during the second 
Hollywood probe.  A reading of the previous historiography of the subject leads one 
to believe that all the Committee really cared about was securing a list of names from 
witnesses, forcing them to become informers.    
 Victor Navasky focused almost exclusively on this practice by the HUAC and 
his book is entitled, not surprisingly, Naming Names.  Therein he argues in essence 
that the Committee’s insistence that witnesses name names constituted a ritual of
humiliation, a “degradation ceremony.”   The willingness to inform served as a test of
whether the witness was friend or foe.501  He bases this assertion on the claim that the 
HUAC already had a list of names of all the communists in Los Angeles.  Thus, the 
Committee ritually forced witnesses to name names it did not need.  He states: 
The testimony of Kimple, Silver, and Erwin, combined 
with intelligence from the FBI and countless other 
government sources in the business of trading 
information (with such as the good-natured investigator 
Bill Wheeler and his colleagues on the HUAC), meant 
that the last thing the Committee needed to do its job 
was to accumulate more names.502  
 The newly available documentary information from the HUAC archives 
appears to indicate that Navasky is in error.  His claim that Max Silver, a former Los 
Angeles Party functionary, had in essence given the Committee 4,000 names of Los 
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Angeles communists is not true.503  Silver’s executive session testimony is now 
available for inspection and he makes no such offering of names.  Navasky claimed 
that another ex-communist functionary, William Ward Kimple, gave the HUAC 
almost 1000 names.504  However, the date of that public testimony was June 30, 1955, 
just over three years after the second Hollywood probe came to an end.  Navasky’s 
assertion that the FBI and the HUAC shared intelligence is based on one instace he 
found in a Freedom of Information document request.  Navasky obtained an FBI 
report on actor Larry Park requested by Chairman Thomas.  From that one instance, 
which Navasky calls “irrefutable evidence of such cooperation, he extrapolates into 
the assertion that such cooperation was on-going.505   
 Contrary to Navasky’s claims, what the newly available documentary record 
does suggest is that there was little cooperation between the HUAC and the FBI.  
Unless in the unlikely event that they were somehow withdrawn or destroyed, the 
absence of FBI reports in the Committee’s files, with the exception of a rare few, 
indicates just the opposite of what Navasky argued.  A broad reading of the executive 
session transcripts now available to historians in the HUAC archives also indicates 
that, contrary to what Navasky and others believed, the Committee did not already 
have a complete list of names of Hollywood communists.  In fact, what documentary 
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evidence now clearly reveals is that HUAC investigators had conflicting information.  
The process may have indeed been humiliating for witnesses and the legitimacy of 
the act of asking such questions has been vigorously argued for the last sixty years.  
The findings of this dissertation will not end that debate.  However, what this study 
can report as new information gained by a broad reading of executive session 
transcripts is that the Committee’s insistence on witnesses naming namesw s by all 
appearances an exercise in triangulation designed to resolve conflicting claims and 
eliminate errors in its lists, by removing non-communists whose names were 
accidentally or erroneously associated with the CPUSA.  Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, the HUAC was well aware that the communist press and communist 
organizers in fronts had a record of claiming participation in or endorsement of Pary 
and front activities and events for famous individuals who made no such 
commitment.    
The newly available executive session transcripts also indicate that the process 
of naming names was not as important as historians previously believed.  At least as 
important were investigators’ questions about the structure and conduct of local Party 
cells and their queries about participation in communist controlled fronts.  One of the 
patterns that HUAC congressmen and investigators believed they saw emerging from 
executive session testimony was that CPUSA organized its Hollywood branch along 
the same cell structure as the rest of the Party.  The HUAC clearly believed this 
confirmed the conspiratorial nature of the CPUSA:  Meetings conducted in secret in 
private homes, alternating locations, and often with the use of only first names.  




As screenwriter and ex-communist Leo Townsend told the Committee in executive 
session about his time in the CPUSA: “The thing that worried me was that if this was 
an American party, which I was told by everyone in the Communist Party, then why 
does it meet secretly?”506     
 Finally, the newly available executive session transcripts seem to indicate yet 
another new finding.  It appears the HUAC was interested in understanding how 
communist fronts operated, how they attracted support, how the marshaled their 
human resources, how the promoted communist policy goals through the effective use 
of propaganda, and how they successfully made use of celebrities and cultural 
luminaries as opinion leaders.  By 1951, Committee investigators explicitly believed 
that communist fronts were the most significant weapon in the CPUSA’s propaganda 
arsenal.  Thus, in contrast to the process of the naming of names by witnesses, on 
which historians have hitherto focused most of their attention, the documentary 
record appears to indicate, and this study offers as a significant finding, that by the 
early 1950s the most paramount concern of the HUAC was exposing the nature and 
practices of communist controlled fronts.   
Thus, in a twist of historical irony, the story of the HUAC’s investigations of 
Hollywood comes full circle.  It was the work of a communist controlled front that 
financed Gerhart Eisler’s release from a French concentration camp and his journey 
to the United States in 1941.  For the next six years, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee, a front that the HUAC had just investigated in April of 1946, paid Eisler 
a salary under the name Julius Eisman.  The Committee’s investigation of Gerhart 
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Eisler led them to Otto Katz and Hanns Eisler.  Once the HUAC turned its scrutiny to 
Hanns Eisler, it became clear that a full scale investigation of Hollywood was 
unavoidable.  Then by the time of the second Hollywood probe in the early 1950s, the 
Committee believed that the key “front” in its war on domestic communism was in 
fact the fronts themselves.     
 In conclusion, it is only appropriate to recognize the provisional nature of 
these findings.  This acknowledgement makes them no less significant, however, 
because they offer a more accurate understanding of the HUAC and its Hollywood 
investigations.  Although tens of thousands of HUAC documents are now available 
for inspection by scholars, there are problems, including lost or misplaced files.  
Additionally, archivists have not released some documents for reasons of national 
security, while others have been redacted.  At the time of this writing, there exists no 
good finding aid for the HUAC files.  Eventually, archivists at the Center for 
Legislative Archive will remedy this circumstance, but in the meantime rying to find 
a specific document is like trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack.   In the
future, new documents may come to light that warrant a revision of some of these 
findings.  This dissertation has extrapolated the conduct of Committee congressmen 
and investigators as evidenced by the Hollywood files and assumed this is how the 
HUAC went about its business in other investigations.  Although this seems a 
reasonable procedure to predict the likely conduct by the Committee in other 
investigative contexts, future historians studying other HUAC investigations will 
need to validate these conclusions against their findings.  Nevertheless, as science




study stand as both reasonable and based on the best available documentary evidence, 
which has been inaccessible to historians until recently.   
Repeatedly during the history of the United States, the perceived needs of 
national security have come into conflict with highly prized American values of 
political freedom and a limited government to protect those freedoms.  From the 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 through to the Patriot Act of 2001, American civil 
society and the political institutions of the Republic have struggled to find an 
appropriate balance between liberty and national security.  It seems reasonable in that 
search for balance to study the attempts of previous generations to strike that balance.  
Therein lays the significance of closing gaps in the historical record regardin  the 
investigations of the motion picture industry by the United States House of 







Blacklisting and the Blacklist.  No credible scholar would assert that there 
was an actual written down list of names, copies of which were circulated amongst 
studio executives.  Rather the blacklist was a metaphor for being unemployable for 
political reasons and blacklisting was a practice of not employing anyone who had a 
known affiliation with the CPUSA or who refused to deny an accusation of such an 
affiliation.  Considering the small number of those in Hollywood who regularly and 
consistently work in the business in any position of importance – i.e. writers, actors, 
producers, directors, etc. – this industry was and is a relatively small community.  
Studio executives could easily keep track by memory of those whose political links to 
the CPUSA were suspect.  This was so first because before the onset of the Cold War, 
many did not strive to keep those particularly secret and second because a HUAC 
subpoena usually clarified any ambiguity.  What critics of this practice hav argued 
was so immoral was that blacklisting involved collusion by a very few potential 
employers who drove individuals out of their profession and it often affected those 
whose reputations and careers were destroyed by mere innuendo.  Finally, it is argued 
that driving communists out of the entertainment and/or communications businesses 
in order to remove their possible negative influence was a stated goal of the HUAC.  
Thus, by removing those with certain viewpoints from the industry, the practice of 
blacklisting was de facto a type of censorship of the movies.   
Comintern.  This was an abbreviation for the Communist International, also 




organizational instrument for maintaining control over national communist parties by 
the CPSU and coordinating their policies and political line with that of the Soviet 
Union.  The Comintern had its headquarters in Moscow and the Soviet state provided 
generously funding, office space and equipment.  Stalin disbanded the Comintern in 
1943 as a political gesture to his Western allies during World War II.  In fact, Stalin
merely transferred its functions and most of its bureaucracy to the International 
Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.   
Communist.  This term can mean a lot of things to different people.  By 
labeling someone a communist, one can mean that person is a believer in communist 
ideology or is a member of one of the many communist-inspired organizations that 
base their main beliefs on the writings of Karl Marx.  For example, in the United 
States, besides the CPUSA, there have been a number of radical parties that have 
considered themselves communist, such as the Lovestonites and the various 
Trotskyites.  However, for the purposes of precision in this study, I will use the word 
communist exclusively to mean an open or secret member of the CPUSA or any other 
Comintern sanctioned national communist party.   
CPSU.  This was the acronym for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
It was originally known as the RKP(b) or the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).   
CPUSA.  The acronym for the Communist Party of the United States of 
America is the designation used for this organization from 1929 on, although its name 
changed repeatedly before that time.  The CPUSA was the Moscow sanctioned party 
that was a member of the Comintern or Communist International.  It was formed 




from Moscow.  For an account of the Byzantine early history of the American 
communist movement, see Theodore Draper’s The Roots of American Communism.  
Over the years, the party changed its name a number of times.  For the sake of 
simplicity, I will use the acronym CPUSA to refer to the party no matter what its 
current name or status was at the time covered in the text. 
Fellow Traveler.  This was an individual who was not a party member, but 
who bought entirely into the program of the CPUSA and Communist International.  
Such a person usually followed each shift and change in the line of the Comintern.  
Often such people were apologists for Stalin and the Soviet Union; some persisted in 
thus even after such an activity was an intellectual embarrassment.  David Caute has 
written at length on these individuals.507   
Front.  This refers to an organization that prima facie appeared to be an 
independent entity, often with a non-communist as a figurehead leader.  Sometimes 
communists were in a minority on its board.  However, in reality a front was either
controlled outright by the CPUSA or the party had enough organizational leverage to 
get the body to do its bidding, endorse its agenda, elicit publicity for party causes or 
all of the above.508   
HUAC.  This is the acronym for the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, which undertook investigations of the CPUSA, the Ku Klux Klan, the 
American Nazi movement, and other subversive organizations.  It operated as a 
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Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) 
508 See Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine (New York: McGraw-
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“temporary select” committee, known as the Dies Committee from 1938 to 1945, at 
which point it became a regular congressional committee.  It changed its name to the 
Committee on Internal Security in 1969 and was abolished in 1975 with its 
jurisdiction transferred to the Judiciary Committee.  For the sake of simplicty, I have 
opted to use the acronym HUAC, which seems to be the one most commonly used in 
the scholarly literature.  For a comprehensive, critical history of the HUAC, see 
Walter Goodman, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1968).  
For a liberal, critical and somewhat dated perspective of the anticommunist campaign 
under the Truman administration, see David Caute, Th  Great Fear: The Anti-
Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (Simon & Schuster, 1979). 
McCarthyism.  The term has two dictionary definitions.  The first is the act 
or practice of publicly accusing individuals or groups of political disloyalty and 
subversion, usually without sufficient evidence.  The second definition is confined to 
an historical era: the public investigation of communist activities in the United States 
in the early 1950s, conducted in sensational public hearings.509   
Radical.  I will attach a specialized meaning to this term in this study.  I shall 
define radical as any political activist, who is to the left of the leftwing of the 
Democratic Party.  This would include CPUSA members and those friendly to the 
CPUSA, such as fellow travelers, as well as rivals to the CPUSA, such as the 
Trotskyites, the Bukharinists and the various flavors of Socialists.  It also includes 
non-Marxist radicals, such as anarchists and Wobblies.  A key characteristic of 
                                                




radicals is their advocacy for the replacement, either peacefully or through the use of 
force, of the very structure of the political and economic order. 
Red-baiting.  The dictionary definition of redbait is “…to accuse or harass (a 
person or persons) with being Communist, usually without sufficient evidence.”510  
The original implication of the term was that a person who engaged in red-baiting did 
so to drive the accused from their employment and make them social outcasts.  This 
of course was modeled on Senator McCarthy’s well-documented outrageous 
behavior.  Note, however, the dictionary definition has an open ambiguity – it leaves 
room for someone who makes such an accusation with sufficient evidence.  In fact, in 
recent years the pejorative nature of the term in public discourse, especially as used 
by those sympathetic to the fate of the communists in the 1940’s and 1950’s, has 
seemed to expand on this ambiguity.  Now this term is often applied to anyone who 
makes the assertion that an individual is or was a member of the CPUSA, no matter 
how well founded that assertion might be.  The term “red-baiter” has come to imply 
that anyone who makes such an assertion is a rightwing ideological fanatic bent on 
ruining innocent lives because of a blind hysteria against communism or more rarely 
because that person has become intoxicated by the power of demagoguery, as in the
case of Senator McCarthy. Such a person is often suspected of making such a charge
in order to score political or ideological advantages, as Richard Nixon did in his first 
congressional election.  Thus, as the ideological tenor of the nation has changed since 
the late-1960s, the word has taken on more and more of a pejorative sense, whilst its 
application has admitted fewer distinctions.  This imprecision of language, however, 
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is an unsatisfactory position for the historian to take.  When “red-baiting” is used in 
this study, it should be construed as meaning a public verbal or written attack against
an individual or individuals without sufficient evidence and with the intent to harass 
or demean.   
Witch-hunt.  An informal term defined as persecuting or defaming (a person) 
to gain political advantage.511  The implication of the term is since in reality there are 
no witches to hunt, the process is a sham and the witch-hunter(s) have another hidden 
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